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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

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***Political Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-032

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2 July 1991

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### **Pivovarov Views Impact of Communist Deputies on Local Soviets**

*91UN15104 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 91  
Second Edition p 2*

[Interview with N. Pivovarov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee for state building, by PRAVDA parliamentary correspondent M. Buzhkevich. "What a Communist Should Do in a Soviet—The Platform of a People's Deputy"]

[Text] Half of the people's deputies at all levels are communists. There is no denying that they are an important force. But what is their influence on the work of local soviets and the parliaments of the republics and of the country in the sphere of creating laws, implementing adopted legal acts and decisions directed at the stabilization of the economic and political situation, strengthening the social protection of the population, and easing its living conditions? An interview with N. Pivovarov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on state building, by PRAVDA parliamentary correspondent M. Buzhkevich is devoted to these problems.

[Buzhkevich] Can it be said that the voice of communist people's deputies can be heard clearly in the soviets?

[Pivovarov] Yes and no. On the one hand, the communists constitute a majority in many soviets and their position has a definite meaning, and on the other hand, they do not have a united position on a whole series of questions. Their dissociation and participation in many factions and social movements at times lead to the fact that communists are ceasing to speak as representatives of one party. This is especially evident in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the RSFSR, whose sessions are relayed over television and radio to the entire country.

Of course, the transition to a multiparty system, to pluralism of opinions, and the abandonment of the former command methods and forms of work is not a simple process. However, it must be said frankly, it has dragged out, which in turn has an increasingly more negative effect on the authority of communists, party committees, and the party as a whole.

In participating in various deputy and social formations, communists should not forget their party affiliation, and the party committees cannot remain disinterested observers. They must help and win leading positions in the soviets for the communist deputies.

Previously, the question of increasing the role of communists in the soviets was viewed most frequently as the usual report and a dressing down for non-fulfillment of party instructions. To-day, a communist who is elected a deputy is a person of the party organization, and the efforts of its committee should be concentrated on providing him specific help in his deputy activity, because it is either a specific and weighty contribution to the strengthening of CPSU prestige, or the discreditation of both the party and its policy.

Therefore, in my opinion, the main thing today is universal assistance to communist deputies in their activity that is directed most of all at the resolution of the specific problems of the voters.

[Buzhkevich] In other words, the control functions of the soviets come to the foreground. Incidentally, at this and at the previous session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the question of intensifying this aspect of the activity of the parliament has become more and more critical.

[Pivovarov] I agree, but with a specific addition. Naturally, it is necessary to control and make demands on the leadership of the executive organs. But it is far more important to help them, figuratively speaking, with your own hands, to do that for which they voted at the session. For example, there are laws on the allocation of arable plots of land for farmers and leaseholders, but many farm managers impede this in every way possible. When you consider that a majority of them are communists, the impression is created that the party is obstructing the action of the law. However, many communist deputies and party committees observe the struggle of a growing number of farmers and leaseholders for "a place in the sun" from the sidelines, like dumb witnesses, watching as an already shaky prestige sinks. But, after all, the variety of forms of property is reflected in practically all party program documents.

I cannot recall a case when, for example, some raykom or obkom discussed the question of how communist deputies achieve implementation of decrees of a rayon or oblast soviet, making them strictly responsible for their inactivity. Not to mention even that they should help them in implementing the decisions of the soviets and the laws of the USSR in their voting districts. But then there are still a lot of leaders of party committees who are quick with open malice to emphasize—there, they say, the new soviets are helpless, and the only thing they can do is talk. Forgetting here that a good half of the deputies in these soviets are communist. And, indeed, they are managed in a significant part by their former colleagues.

[Buzhkevich] Previously, cadres of soviet managers were part of the party nomenklatura. Now they are chosen at the sessions. Can the party committees under the new conditions, nonetheless, influence the selection of these cadres?

[Pivovarov] The managers of the soviets were also previously elected at sessions. However, when CPSU members constituted a majority of the deputies, and the voting was open, the party committees had an unlimited opportunity to assign personnel according to their own discretion.

Now everything is different. The pace of democratization of the soviets has substantially overtaken these processes in the party organizations. Ensuring the alternative candidate system, the introduction of secret balloting, and the necessity to come forth with an action program requires a completely new approach to guarantee influence on the resolution of personnel questions.



Previously, one of the main criteria in the nomination for this position was obedience. The chairman of the ispolkom [executive committee] could not take a step without coordinating it with the first secretary of the party committee. And this was deemed as his, the chairman's, virtue. Today, the situation has turned 180 degrees.

In supporting the candidacy of a communist deputy for the position of chairman of a soviet, the party committee, in the event of his election, must concentrate efforts on giving him help, because the prestige of the party organization itself depends on the results of his work. Not all party managers can and are ready to reconcile themselves to this. This process is moving painfully, however, there is no other way today.

But now I will answer the second part of your question—can the party committees today influence the structure of soviet managers? They can and should. But not by a decision of the bureau of the party obkom, but in other ways.

Who do the voters want to see at the head of their own soviet—village, rayon, oblast, and higher? A person of prestige, who is respected, honest, and active. I have had more than one occasion to accompany important representatives from the center to plant shops. Some are remembered who had this kind of "eccentricity". The director leads him into the building but he asks: Where is the plant dump? And he goes to it. There he examines thick shavings and defective articles. But then he asks to be taken to the shops from which all of the waste products were brought. And he very quickly analyzes all of the failures in technology and production. In short—he is a professional.

The party committees should seek among communists the kind of professional people who are given to working with people, who are able to listen to them, to understand their needs, who try to help them, who are able to cope with the most complicated mechanism of authority, and they should help them develop the qualities of political fighters and high industriousness, but, mainly, to gain the respect of thousands and thousands of people. And the people themselves will nominate them to soviet management, and the prestige of the party will only grow—these are its pupils.

[Buzhkevich] There are many arguments about the so-called dual positions of chairmen of soviets. Decisions have even been made in some places about its impermissibility. Although there are republics where this is not given any attention. How would you, Nikolay Petrovich, treat this problem?

[Pivovarov] The decision that you mentioned was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and many perceive it ambiguously. Without going into the judicial subtleties of the document itself, I support the idea about the inadvisability of holding two positions, although I think that this must be decided based on specific conditions.

What do I have in mind? The chairman of a city soviet becomes the director of a large enterprise or a scientific establishment. Even if he wants to, he should not hold both positions. I recall this episode. One director, who frequently criticized the city soviet for inactivity, became its chairman. After a couple of weeks he came to me—and at that time he was the chairman of the Rostov Oblast Ispolkom—and said: This is worse than being a minister, there are so many problems, and you have to know so much.

Indeed. Take the mistress of a house. How many troubles she has. Feed the husband and children, send them off to work and to school, do the shopping in the stores, prepare dinner, and tidy up the apartment. But in addition, calculate the budget, and decide what clothes to buy. And a dozen other tasks to create an atmosphere in the family of mutual respect and harmony.

And this is one family. But in a city, where a good 100,000 people live, there is no end of different problems. The administration of one city involves so much! Heating, water supply, sewers, construction and repairs of dwellings, public transportation, roads, and street cleaning. At the same time, there is trade, public restaurants, schools, polyclinics, and hospitals. And also a major unit—industry. In addition, there is a critical shortage of resources, equipment, materials, and spare parts. All of this has to be dealt with, and optimal solutions have to be found. Of course, it is not all up to him, but to his "team": the deputies and workers of the ispolkom. But, then, the burden of responsibility rests on him most of all, on the chairman of the soviet. And there are demands on him, and the anger of the city residents falls on him. There can be no holding of more than one job here.

This means it is necessary to become a professional. A professional soviet manager. And praise to that party gorkom or obkom that helps a new chairman become such a professional. This will be counted as a plus for our party.

[Buzhkevich] A lot of parties have already been registered in our republic and at the Union level. Some of the people's deputies represent various unions, societies, and other organizations. How are the soviets to work under the conditions of a multiparty system that is new for us.

[Pivovarov] In practice, our soviets—from rural up to the parliament—are already working under multiparty conditions, and various factions and groups operate in many of them. In accordance with their status, all deputies have the same rights, no matter whom they represent. According to the law, all parties also have equal opportunities to participate in the work of the soviets through their factions. Not one possesses some kind of privileges or advantages. In addition, one should get accustomed to this and proceed from this basis. And the influence of one or another of them in the parliament of the country or of the republic, and in any local soviet,

will be determined not only by the proclaimed program, but by the specific deeds of its representatives. Any soviet, indeed the voters themselves, will assess to what extent a specific party actively participates both in the creation of laws that distinguish a true law-governed state and in their implementation, and how consistent it is in the defense of the interests and rights of the individual.

And here the communist deputies are faced with an urgent task—to understand the methods and forms of parliamentary work. It must be said that we have a lot to learn in this direction from the Interregional Group of Deputies. I have in mind its first steps in parliament. Unfortunately, a number of its representatives, after coming to power in some soviets, slipped toward authoritativeness and a unilateral rigid position that are more reminiscent of the "stagnant" system and far from the democracy and pluralism of opinions that they proclaimed. But then, two years ago, the "interregionalists" were the first to undertake the study of the experience of the parliaments of countries of the world, deriving a lot that is useful from it.

Under conditions of this tough political opposition that we are experiencing, it is very important to learn the dialectics of the struggle of opinions, including in the parliaments and in every soviet. If we want perestroika to move forward, then we must find ways toward a consensus and an agreement with our opponents. Here, the role of the communist deputies is great. We should not sweep aside any proposal or any thesis only because it was put forth by a representative from another party. It is more useful to reflect on it and find common positions, even allusions to them, and to strive for a rapprochement of opinions. It is the consolidation of all progressive forces and the unification of efforts directed at overcoming the crisis that the country is experiencing and which—I am confident—it will survive, that can bring success and an easing of the life of the people. And in the achievement of this, the example and role of communist people's deputies at all levels are great.

#### **RSFSR's Stolyarov on Declining CPSU Membership**

91UN1541A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN  
in Russian No 3, Feb 91 pp 42-52

[Interview with Nikolay Stolyarov, member CPSU Central Committee, chairman, RSFSR Communist Party Central Control Commission, by Viktor Churilov, correspondent: "Indifference Is Counterindicated"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Churilov] An important trend in the work of the commissions is the consistent, step-by-step, unceasing struggle against manifestations of bureaucratism, boastfulness, conceit, and an inattentive, callous attitude toward people. It must not be thought that the party's renewal has washed away all these defects and vices. No. Unfortunately, they are still alive. No matter how

strange it may seem, the arrival of new people in leadership positions and the replacement of the apparatus have not radically changed the picture. At times we lose fine traditions very rapidly. But then sometimes, when we should certainly get rid of them, we tenaciously hold onto them. Why is that so?

[Stolyarov] [passage omitted] Sociology is the most effective method for fixing a picture of current political life, and it can perform quite a good job of feeding our own knowledge of problems and tendencies. Here, for example, are the latest data from the Center for Sociological Research under the Academy of Social Sciences.

Positive changes in the activities of their own party organizations after the 27th CPSU Congress with regard to strengthening party influence in the collective were noted by only 13 percent of the communists polled, whereas 57 percent noted the following: "Nothing Changed," and 29 percent said: "Things became worse." But, then again, work on explaining the program for action adopted by the congress was noted by 46 percent of the communists. It's obvious that the effect of adjusting or "fine tuning" party teaching is producing a harmonious result.

Some 23 percent of the communists have a favorable attitude toward the proposal for removing party organizations from enterprises, while another 30 percent replied that they were favorably inclined on the whole, but they consider that this is still premature. That is, more than 50 percent of the communists are inclined toward removing the party from labor collectives.

Concerning the party's authority in their own city (or rayon) they said the following: It is increasing—seven percent; it is lacking—34 percent; it is declining—more than half.

Concerning the authority of local people's deputies, the ispolkoms of Soviets and other parties (aside from the CPSU), the communists also responded not too highly or favorably. To the question concerning whose authority at the present time is the highest among the population of your city (or rayon), 61 percent of those polled replied: "Nobody's." But this should not give us any cause for joy. The thing is that the party's authority is directly dependent upon whether there is authority in general in the locality being spoken about.

Particularly significant, to our way of thinking, are the data concerning attitude toward party membership on the part of those persons who are members of it at present: I'm a party member and will remain so—so say 66 percent. I intend to leave the CPSU—say 13 percent. I have difficulty in responding. I have not yet decided—say 20 percent.

Consequently, we must be prepared for new departures. At the same time, the data indicate a significant proportion of doubts, an unsureness in the communists' point of view regarding the subject of quitting the party. It is precisely this factor that we must pay attention to in our

work with regard to preventing the processes of a mass exodus from the party. We need to make a serious analysis of the composition of those who have already departed and their motives for leaving. But let's address this matter specially.

[passage omitted]

[Churilov] A subject of particular concern for the party control organs nowadays must be an analysis of the reasons for curtailing the party ranks. In the eyes of people in many places this seems to be an incipient process of disintegration of party organizations. For example, over the last nine months of last year alone in the Solnechnogorsk City Party Organization of Moscow Oblast 1156 persons handed in their own party documents. This is a seven-fold increase over what occurred in 1989. Doesn't it seem to you that the opinion to the effect that what is going on is a self-purging of party ranks is slight or flimsy?

[Stolyarov] Slight or flimsy? What you said is perhaps, putting it too mildly. The reasons for a person's quitting the party are varied and diverse. A significant portion of persons joined the CPSU not out of conviction. At the same time many former party members explain their own actions by a dissatisfaction with the course being taken by perestroika, by the failure to adopt timely measures on the part of the country's political leadership in the struggle against speculation, crime, by the liberal attitude toward morally "fallen" communist leaders, and by the lack of social protection for party members. It was for these causes that they quit the party, and this was stated in conversations by the following persons: V. Sorokin, secretary of the shop party organization at the Lunevskiy Poultry Plant, Solnechnogorskiy Rayon, and S. Chernyayeva, a staff member at this same plant, a delegate to the 28th party congress, and a bureau member of the party gorkom.

Let's turn to some sociological data. A study conducted by the Academy of Social Sciences in November of last year (poll based on an All-Union sample) provided the following diverse breakdown of communists' reasons from quitting the party. Ranking first was "Disillusionment with communist ideas and a lack of faith in the CPSU as a political force"—stated by 36 percent of the communists polled. Next in order came "Lack of desire to be responsible for past mistakes"—30 percent. "Lack of agreement with the present-day political line of the CPSU"—24 percent. "Danger that membership in the CPSU could result in trouble"—23 percent. "Loss of advantage from party membership"—17 percent. "Lack of desire to perform party duties and obligations"—11 percent. "Dissatisfaction with attitudes and relations in party organizations"—nine percent.

One can clearly see in these data the priority of those reasons which are connected to the general state of affairs within the party, and this, in particular, is also attested to by the example of Solnechnogorskiy Rayon. Dissatisfaction with the specific situation in their own

collective is noted much more rarely by communists among the reasons for quitting. This conclusion is reinforced by data concerning the attitude toward communists in the collectives. They responded as follows: 26 percent look askance at the communists; four percent "embrace" them, but 48 percent consider that membership in the CPSU has no effect at all on one's attitude toward a person, whereas 21 percent stated that in their collectives the attitude toward the communists was good, i.e., almost 70 percent noted a completely normal attitude toward communists at the lower levels—in the labor collectives. And so work in the localities, if it exists, can effectively serve the cause of strengthening the party.

[Churilov] If we approach these data from a different point of view, it seems that some people are quitting the party because they condemn its past and have no faith in its ability to correct itself, while others are doing so because of a lack of agreement with its new course and even a fear that this course will place the communists in a difficult position.

[Stolyarov] We must take these schemes of analysis and apply them to the specific situations of quitting, for example, in certain large-scale organizations, after having elucidated the reasons for leaving from direct conversations or interviews with those persons who have quit the party. Only then will we be able to formulate and correct the specific activities of party organizations in a city, rayon, or collective.

This was not done in that same Solnechnogorskiy Rayon referred to above. Moreover, the partkom of the Brattsevskiy Poultry-Breeding Association (Ye. Kondratyeva, secretary), which includes the Lunevskiy Poultry Plant, did not exhibit concern. During the course of a year those questions which were bothering the communists, in particular, the reasons for quitting the party, were not discussed even once at meetings. Explanatory and organizational work was poorly conducted, instances were allowed of an inattentive attitude toward the needs and suggestions of the communists. Amid this rather complex situation the CPSU Solnechnogorsk Gorkom (V. Zagurskiy) and the control commission of the city's party organization (V. Vereshchagin, chairman) proved to be not up to their tasks.

All of us must thoroughly analyze the mechanism of cleaning out the party ranks. In many respects, this process is the indicator of party organizations' activities. Here, for example, is the case of pensioners—veterans of the party and labor—quitting the party. We have been accepting this case quite indifferently—as if what is going on is a natural process of the party ranks becoming younger. Indeed, many ex-party pensioners do give as reasons for their leaving the state of their health and their age, they critically evaluate their own stay in the party as follows: "At meetings I just sit tight and do not carry out any party assignments." But quite a few of them, who have devoted their entire lives to the party's cause, suffer morally because they have turned out to be

unnecessary ballast for their own party organizations, and because they have not merited any concern about themselves on the part of the party organizations. In most cases, the attitude toward these old communists quitting the party is formalistic and insulting for them. Of course, we cannot allow this.

Problems of another kind have also arisen: The process of persons returning to the party has begun. How should we proceed with these persons—accept them back on general principles or rehabilitate them? How should they be rehabilitated—with a break in their service period or not? Within the TsKK [Central Control Commission] we have the following opinion: We need to rehabilitate people in the party. Of course, this must be approached on an individual basis within the primary organizations.

[Churilov] Now, if you have no objection, Nikolay Sergeyevich, let's move on to the most important tasks confronting the TsKK Standing Commission for Auditing Work and the control commissions of the party organizations.

[Stolyarov] This commission's activity is directed at carrying out the functions which have been stipulated by the Statute on the TsKK, as approved by the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party. One of the principal functions is exercising monitoring controls over the execution of the budget of the RSFSR Communist Party, i.e., over mobilizing the funds of the party budget and their expenditure. The most topical and burning issues nowadays are those concerning the payment, accounting, and accountability for members' party dues. New negative phenomena and tendencies have recently manifested themselves here.

There is cause for concern over the increase in the number of communists who do not pay their party membership dues on time, and in the increase in the total indebtedness connected with this factor. Considerable sums of money are not being received in the budgets of party organizations because of a failure to pay dues or their payment in amounts which are less than those provided for by the CPSU Charter. In the party organizations of several mines in the city of Inty, Komi ASSR, for example, people have paid dues amounting to one percent. And even that was not from the communist's entire income.

There is likewise concern over the fact that certain party organizations have in a self-willed, unwarranted manner—I repeat—in a self-willed, unwarranted manner—despite the CPSU Charter—have retained their own party dues for their own needs. In Arkhangelsk Oblast 88 party organizations have retained 86,000 rubles of membership dues for their own needs and have transferred more than 20,000 rubles to various organizations and societies. Unfortunately, such instances have not always brought about a timely assessment on the part of party committees.

The violation of the established procedure for paying, receiving, and turning over party membership dues,

along with the lack of the necessary monitoring controls in this matter, have created the conditions for a squandering of party funds. The total sum of membership dues embezzled last year in our republic amounted to 44,300 rubles.

These and other shortcomings in the payment of membership dues attest to a sharp lowering of discipline within the party and a scorn for the requirements of the CPSU Charter. There has been a weakening in the attention paid by party organizations and committees to ensuring the on-time and full payment of membership dues. The work of several primary party organizations has been essentially paralyzed; they lack the conditions for imposing responsibility on those communists who have not paid their membership dues inasmuch as the violators of the Charter have proved to be in the majority. And the only means for exerting an appropriate influence is individual, explanatory work with the communists, but such work has been conducted poorly. The secretaries of several primary party organizations are in a state of perplexity; they have ceased to be concerned about the payment of membership dues.

[passage omitted]

[Churilov] Under the present-day conditions, party committees and organizations are required to approach in a new way (I emphasize—in a new way, rather than from the standpoint of confrontation) the matter of reciprocal action and cooperation with other parties and public movements. Yes, what I am talking about is mutual aid and cooperation. This is very important. For this purpose, of course, it is necessary to determine who are allies and in what, who are "fellow-travelers," and who are opponents. And we must build our relations depending upon this. Don't you think, Nikolay Sergeyevich, that the time has come for alliances with other parties?

[Stolyarov] I do think that, and I actively support that idea. After all, you know, about 20 percent of the representatives of the new parties recognize the CPSU as the legitimately leading political force in the society. They understand that their small parties cannot, objectively speaking, govern this society. Taking this percentage into account, together with those 65 percent which are undecided as to whether or not they will cooperate with the CPSU, it follows that, under the appropriate circumstances, their could either comprise advocates of the CPSU, or at least we would have nothing to fear from encountering any other public movement, and then we could join forces, perhaps for common causes.

[passage omitted]

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### Political Influence of Scientific-Industrial Union Studied

91UN16384 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with A. Vladislavlev, vice-president of the Scientific-Industrial Union, by Vera Kuznetsova; place and date not given: "Is the Phantom of the 'Third Force' Coming to Life?"]

[Text] The so-called power... It is not only that separate politicians detach themselves from it but, as they slide into the shadows, they engender a kind of "comet tail"—public structures that seem to be parallel to the government ones. Shevardnadze has left and seems to have taken with him if not the power (in foreign politics) then at least its prestige. Even earlier than that a union—NPS [Scientific-Industrial Union]—formed on the basis of the parliamentary scientific and industrial group. It was a powerful lobby of producers headed by Arkadiy Volskiy. The direct members of the NPS (about 2,000 of them) are represented by ZIL, KamAZ, the Rostov plant of agricultural machines, the Vorkuta coal mining industry, the experimental design office imeni Tupolev, the experimental design office imeni Ilyushin, etc. Associated members are represented by the USSR Union of Lease Holders and Entrepreneurs, the USSR Union of United Cooperatives, etc. The NPS embraces over 60 percent of the industrial workers. Is this "third force" very terrifying?

### The Third Force?

The Soviet Union is rushing between the two poles with such urgency, as if it is pursuing the fame of Newton's apple. But suppose somebody stretches his hands out to catch it, in spite of everything... There are even some stories about the origin of these hands. One of the leaders of the USSR NPS, Aleksandr Vladislavlev, thinks the following, unlike the experts who are obviously pointing in the direction of this organization:

[Vladislavlev] Mankind has not yet come up with the kind of hands that can interfere with this country. It was clear at the first stages that we had to start with political reforms. Had Gorbachev failed to release people with different points of views out into the streets, it would be impossible even to think about any structural changes. Our current trouble is that the political reform has gone so far that its results are viewed almost as destructive ones. But at the same time the economic reform has not moved anywhere. As the result of this gigantic gap, our political movement has acquired economic slogans and vice versa. Our country is going out of control and to save it we need some power that will move the economy away from the standstill. It will be fatal to continue political squabbling and ambitious attempts to settle accounts among the leaders who are holding onto the economic levers as arguments

[Kuznetsova] In other words, one of the conditions or one of the slogans of your scientific and industrial group in the parliament of our country is "We are outside of politics." Is this possible?

[Vladislavlev] Actually, our group formed as a response to Ryzhkov's report (a year ago). It was obviously meaningless to vote for his program. But it was impossible not to vote as the prime minister was just appointed. For that reason we felt a wish to establish an alternative, bypassing the apparatchiks. That was how we all got united—people representing the interests of industries, from the military-industrial complex to the latest in private enterprise: Samsonov, Velikhov, Seleznev, Tupolev, Shmelev, Petrakov...

As soon as this group removed itself from the fetish of nonsensical political incantations, they took their jackets off and started to talk about what was dear to them—about the enterprise. The differences of opinions disappeared and the one who used to stand on the podium and call for order was the first to bring in the draft of a law. We should have gathered these pragmatists on the platform of the "new economy" long time ago; that is how you form a power capable of becoming the brains of the reform.

[Kuznetsova] Given our present alignment of forces, who can initiate the movement "away from a standstill?"

[Vladislavlev] In general, I support Gorbachev and I do not see anyone else... However, three mistakes were made. I think, He, personally, made the first one. Gorbachev underestimated the full power of the economic monster that we took 70 years to create (there was hardly anyone who could fully estimate it then). Having done so, he probably thought that the market economy could develop speedily and easily. But economy is not the same as politics. So, the command style economy has almost collapsed, but we have no other in its place. The second mistake: We were very indecisive going towards the market economy. And the third mistake is the fact that all these years there has been no power behind the leader and behind perestroika to defend them. We have only the opposition in our country; we do not have any power. The CPSU is the opposition to perestroika. The same is true about the democrats on the street. Who is perestroika? Gorbachev alone.

There is one more thing. I think that our intelligentsia has missed its chance... We had six years of political freedom, two years of which were open to any entrepreneurial activity. Show me what was realistically done in these years outside of the government machine? Nothing, except the awakened conscience of the people. But so far all these street processes have been uncontrolled. There has to come a powerful political organization—the third force with a well-designed strategy and tactics.

Such a force will be facing two tasks which may seem mutually exclusive. First, we have to retreat (back or to

the side) and to restore the vertical links in our economy that were overly disrupted. Second, we have to multiply our market structures. Who can do this? Only a person who is concerned with order—I mean observing the law. Industries are interested since they are also interested in reforms. They are capable of becoming not a party but a basis for a public force destined to realize and to defend the reforms. "Competency, pragmatism, determination, and consistency in implementing the reforms, order" should be written on its banner.

[Kuznetsova] Is it the party of the center?

[Vladislavlev] Maybe, it is the party of common sense. It should not get lost in terms such as "capitalism," "socialism," etc. Incidentally, the NPS was formed as the first and rather successful attempt to consolidate, in spite of the ideology.

[Kuznetsova] Is your union sometimes viewed as a shadow cabinet?

[Vladislavlev] We would not want this. There is Pavlov's cabinet. At present, we have one characteristic for the assessment of its work: Can it impede the downfall of our country (nobody is expecting the market economy from him)? As for Pavlov personally, he is a man of energy; he will go through as a bulldozer—but one cannot act any different now.

[Kuznetsova] Is it possible that Volskiy will replace the prime minister?

[Vladislavlev] I do not know that he will want to. Volskiy is capable of doing a lot more than simply stabilizing the situation.

As I have said, there is no party yet that can consolidate the majority at the negotiating table...

[Kuznetsova] The "roundtable" that your union is conducting on 20 April—is it an attempt to do it?

[Vladislavlev] Rather, it is a small detail. It is an attempt to consolidate the legislators of all republics, at least. We want to get together and to tell each other: "They will be trying to figure out things in politics for a long time yet. So, in order not to starve to death, let us coordinate and act together."

### **Changes to Legal System Recommended Under New Union Treaty**

91UN15004 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by V. Kudryavtsev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and USSR people's deputy: "Power and the Law. What the Union Treaty Will Change in Our Legal System"]

[Text] The move toward signing the Union Treaty has been noticeably activated since the well-known "Statement by the Ten." But realization of the ideas of the

treaty and the real renewal of the Union, and real change in the relationship between the center and the localities on fundamental new foundations are by no means exhausted merely by the signing of the treaty. That is only the beginning of the process. It will continue in many practical actions—the creation of new Union and republic state structures, the reorganization of all the organs of power and management, a change in the "philosophy" of relations between them, and so forth. The work will be complicated and prolonged.

These changes will also include a radical restructuring of our legal system. It is not just that the need for this must be recognized and foreseen; a start must be made on making practical preparations for it in a thorough and comprehensive manner. In my opinion the main task here is to ensure true constitutional legal procedure within the Union and the republics. For this, a number of steps are needed that would guarantee a person's rights regardless of where he may be living, and also the rights of public and state organizations as provided for by law, which would ensure undeviating observance by all institutions, citizens, and officials of the existing legal standards. We must put a final end to the "war" of laws, of sovereignties, of budgets, and of territories, and strengthen democracy at all levels.

As is known, the draft Union treaty provides for a delineation of the jurisdiction of Union and republic legislation (in general, in favor of the latter). This principle must be augmented with the ideas of a clear-cut separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial. It is necessary to create a well-formed and noncontradictory system of federal and republic legal organs and a set of mutual relations between them that would guarantee a solid democratic legal order within the country and effectively support it.

This task will be resolved during the course of the conclusion and realization of the Union treaty. But it is already possible to offer certain ideas in this regard. First of all, executive power. Here it will be necessary finally to bring elementary order. The main thing is to have done with the "war of laws." Two conditions are essential for this. The first is that there must be clear delineation of the competence of Union and republic organs. The second is that there must be strict observance of the priorities of those laws that are passed within the framework of the competence of the corresponding organ.

As far as the first condition is concerned, the draft Union treaty contains a sufficiently clear, though not detailed provision: the passage of legislation on matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Union is carried out by Union organs, and all others fall within the competence of the republic organs. The volume of legislative work carried out in the Union republics will increase significantly, while for the Union it will be sharply curtailed. The draft Union treaty establishes that the fundamentals of legislation may be passed by a Union legislative organ only on matters agreed with the republics.

These provisions must be concretized and clarified in the future Union Constitution. At the same time, the republic constitutions must define the competence of the republic legislative organs in such a way that they do not clash with or impede the competence of the Union Constitution.

Now as to the second condition. Article 10 of the draft Union treaty makes provision that laws of the Union relating to its jurisdiction have supremacy and are binding on the territory of all the republics. The same article states that "the constitution and laws of a republic should not be at variance with the provisions of the Union treaty." This means, in particular, that the republic constitutions cannot retain the well-known provision that Union laws are to be ratified by the republic parliament. But this is what has been stated in a number of the declarations issued by the republics on their state sovereignty! Here the republics must show good will, otherwise no headway can be made.

Conclusion of the Union treaty should bring order to ideas about legislation and set them on a firm foundation. At present, the strengthening of legal order is being hampered not only by nihilist views about Union legislation, but also the discussion about a Union parliament supposedly not being necessary at all, that all is needed is a Federation Council. But it is quite obvious that in a democratic country only the people can exercise legislative power, either directly (through referendum) or through their representatives elected specifically for that purpose. The parliament (Supreme Soviet) cannot be replaced by some group of persons, even leading persons. Let me remind you that in Europe, which not only is not a federation but not even a confederation, there is a European parliament elected by the people of 12 countries. Rejection of an all-Union representative legislative body would be an unforgivable retrograde step in the process of democratization of the state and legal system.

I think that it would be advisable for the country's future Supreme Soviet to be a bicameral body; it should reflect the interests not only of the republics but also the common interests of the people, not divided by national barriers. Of course after the Union treaty has been signed, the Supreme Soviet must be elected on a new basis. Here, whereas the Soviet of the Republic may be elected according to the national-territorial principle, the Soviet of the Union must be elected only by the population of the entire country by electoral districts with equal numbers of voters.

Reform of the legal system must be considered within the context of a broader task, namely, the building of a rule-of-law state. To this end the principle of separation of powers must be realized, not in the sense of delineating the competence of each of them, but also on the plane of strengthening their powers. This has already occurred with respect to legislative power: At the Union and republic levels we have strong parliaments that have assumed totally independent stances vis-a-vis other state organs. And although legislators are often criticized for

their "garrulousness," in fact they have passed important laws that have significantly altered the appearance of the political system.

No marked progress has yet been made in executive power. Its defects are well known: indecisiveness, the inability to see a matter through to its conclusion, the ineffectiveness of steps taken, and so forth. In some areas there is real paralysis of power. The essential interaction between the legislative and executive organs has been lost. It is not by chance that ways to strengthen the vertical links of the executive organs at the local level (mayors, prefects) are being debated so urgently and vigorously.

At the same time it is particularly important to consolidate the control apparatus that in the broader sense is the third power, namely, the judiciary. It is called upon to resolve disputes, remove specific contradictions and conflicts, and stabilize the situation on the basis of unified norms by which society functions. Observance of the law, punishment for those who violate it, strict conformity with the country's Constitution—these are specially needed now in this difficult and critical period.

For some years a reform of the courts has been under way in the country, aimed at bringing the court system into line with today's political, economic, and spiritual realities. A number of useful innovations have been introduced—the term that judges carry out their duties has been extended to 10 years; judges are elected by the organs of power, not the public; liability has been established for disrespect to the court; the powers of the USSR Supreme Court have been defined; and so forth. But the reform is not yet complete; it is really still in the initial stage of its development. What is needed is not restructuring but a real rebuilding of the legal edifice.

In connection with the proposed conclusion of the Union Treaty, the competence of the Union in the legal field should obviously be significantly limited. But even if the sphere of their action is curtailed, Union laws apply everywhere without hindrance and, of course, equally. The legal bodies enforcing them should be independent of republic or local authorities. Otherwise there will be no minimum order in the state but "war of the laws" (the "war of the procuracies" in the Baltic is already evident). This is why what is needed is an independent, federal legal system.

When talking about legal powers, not only civil and penal justice must be borne in mind but also the review of administrative complaints and the work of courts of arbitration and constitutional courts. The "third power" is a set of institutions that together guarantee legality and law and order. And in this sense, legal reform cannot be limited to the reorganization of traditional legal establishments.

When considering reform of the legal system in light of the new Union treaty, the ideas and principles by which people working in law will be guided should not be



forgotten; in other words, the "ideology" and "philosophy" in their activity, which must also be changed. The old "philosophy" of totalitarianism and stagnation was simple: extreme centralization of power, priority of the state over the individual, impermissibility of political and ideological pluralism, suppression of heterodoxy. The new ideology is complex and ambiguous, like reality itself. The interests of the center and the locality, of the citizen and the collective and the state, must be combined; the law must be obeyed, but not to the detriment of citizens' rights and freedoms; democracy and glasnost must be defended without permitting a descent into anarchy. The work of jurists is becoming more complex but their role in society is growing.

I would like to draw attention to at least three of what I think are fundamental principles that must permeate all the activity of the renewed legal system. The first of these is the unconditional and undisputed priority of human rights. The draft Union Treaty repeatedly reminds us that the aim, task, and principle is to provide reliable guarantees for the rights and freedoms of the individual. This should be the foundation of legislative, executive, and judicial power. Therefore the priority of human rights should be reflected more concretely in the Union Constitution and the constitutions of the republics, and in the Declaration of Human Rights. Proposals that, following the example of many countries, a new institution should be set up—a plenipotentiary to defend human rights and carry out a function of control and consultation—also deserve attention.

The second principle is protection of property. Essentially this is a right of the individual (but also of the collective), which was for a long time neglected. Interest in property and its inviolability, and even more its "sacred nature," used to be regarded as bourgeois ideology. With views like that, any transition to market relations is, of course, impossible. As far as jurisprudence is concerned, there must be a radical change in the attitude toward the owner and toward the use and disposal of property, and the rights of citizens, including those derived from the state, must be protected in every possible way, and the civil legal relations with institutions guaranteeing all forms of ownership by citizens and collectives (leasing, contract, loan, inheritance, gift, and so forth) must be strengthened.

The third principle is liability with respect to execution of the law. It is common knowledge that this principle has for a long time been repeated frequently in speeches made by leaders, but in fact it is not realized. They reflect the spinelessness and impotence of the authorities, which are incapable of or reluctant to demand any accounting from persons who mess up their work or are incapable of doing it. This is by no means a question of any return to the repressions of the past; lawlessness can in no way be justified. But there are elementary forms of disciplinary, administrative, civil, and, finally, criminal

liability for negligence, nonfeasance in office, failure to carry out lawful instructions, and so forth. In the meanwhile, if these forms are being applied, then the public is totally unaware of it.

It is understood that under the conditions of parliamentary power, the "wars" of laws and sovereignties are making demands of principle on both the center and at the local level that are far from simple. But if the Union treaty is signed, general agreement must be reached on firm compliance with decisions that end confrontation, laxity, and arbitrariness. This will also apply to the legal system itself, which cannot function if there is not elementary discipline and if laws are flouted. Democracy assumes legal order, otherwise it will degenerate into ochlocracy—rule by the mob—or into totalitarianism or dictatorship. And we are interested in neither.

#### **Resolution on Promulgation of Entry-Exit Law Published**

PM0606113591 Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*  
in Russian 6 Jun 91 First Edition p 5

[“USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on the Promulgation of the USSR Law: “On the Procedure for Exit From the USSR and Entry into the USSR by USSR Citizens””]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. That the USSR Law: “On the Procedure for Exit From the USSR and Entry into the USSR by USSR Citizens” will be promulgated as of 1 January 1993.

2. That the USSR Cabinet of Ministers be tasked with submitting to the USSR Supreme Soviet within a two-week period proposals on the phased promulgation of the articles of this Law.

3. That, pending the promulgation of the said Law, it be prescribed that a USSR citizen submitting an application to leave the USSR for permanent domicile abroad submit an invitation from relatives permanently domiciled abroad or an entry permit for the country of acceptance.

4. That the USSR Ministry of Justice submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet by 1 July 1992 proposals for specifying the jurisdiction applicable to cases linked with the examination of disputes over extending the period of restriction of USSR citizens' rights to exit the USSR.

5. That organs of state administration proceed on the basis that the restoration of USSR citizenship to individuals who lost USSR citizenship under the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 17 February 1967: “On the Forfeiting of USSR Citizenship by Individuals Who Resettle in Israel From the USSR” be effected in accordance with the procedure specified by the USSR Law: “On USSR Citizenship.”

6. That the following be deemed no longer valid as of 1 July 1991:

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 17 February 1967: "On the Forfeiting of USSR Citizenship by Individuals Who Resettle in Israel From the USSR" (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1991, No. 8).

The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree of 3 August 1972: "On the Reimbursement of State Expenditure on Training by USSR Citizens Leaving for Permanent Domicile Abroad" (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1972, No. 52, p. 519).

USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov

Moscow, The Kremlin, 20 May 1991

### Dzasokhov on Emigration Law

LD240517491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1859 GMT 22 May 91

[Interview with A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, by reporter V. Bakarinov; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Bakarinov] Aleksandr Sergeyevich, the law on immigration and emigration is no doubt very important and very necessary, but why did it take so long to be adopted?

[Dzasokhov] You know, there is an explanation for this. In the first place the aim was just, but the law itself, its status, were new for us, because it was a matter of fundamentally advancing the freedom of our citizens, in the field of travel, and we had completely different methodological premises from earlier years. Therefore time was necessary. I would even say that we had to burst out of the inertia of our previous ideas. Apart from that, it was proposed that the state departments whose activities lie within the sphere of implementing the tenets of this law would, on a regularized basis, fundamentally work on the law. Therefore the fact that we worked for almost 18 months, moreover not just within the framework of the Supreme Soviet or the committee on international affairs, and other committees and commissions, but also with the participation of professional experts, this is justified, since the law is aimed at the future.

[Bakarinov] Were there any opponents of this law?

[Dzasokhov] You know, the discussions almost always not only aroused great interest, but also were quite pointed. I hold the point of view that there were no opponents, let alone a political opposition. Many of my colleagues who more than once spoke in defense of their own views were guided, in my opinion, by genuine desire to better understand the significance of this law. Moreover there were various reasons for such discussions and

speeches which could indeed be outwardly perceived as being indisposed to adopt such a law. Some wanted to see more favorable material, technical and financial conditions. Others considered that at the moment it is premature to adopt such a law. Yet others proceeded from the basis that the adoption of the law might open up unjustifiably broad possibilities for the emigration of our fellow-countrymen from our country, and thus weaken our own possibilities in the intellectual sector of society, and among our qualified workers and engineering and technical workers.

[Bakarinov] How, in your opinion, will the status of our country change in connection with the adoption of this law, which it is now real and will soon be in effect?

[Dzasokhov] Well, first of all, I want to stress—and I constantly talked about this when I spoke at Supreme Soviet sessions—that we adopted the law not so as to see the response, as to how our country is regarded abroad, including in their parliaments. The adoption of this law is a convincing confirmation of the fact that we are following a course of deepening the democratic processes in our own country. This is the main point. But at the same time, of course, we had to make sure that this law not only corresponds to, but passes all tests in comparison with the best examples of such legislative acts. I must say that even a strict judgement on the status of the law will confirm the conclusion that it corresponds to the declaration of human rights and the final document of the Vienna conference and the Paris Charter and so on and so forth.

[Bakarinov] Can the time-scale for this law coming into effect be explained by the fact that on the one hand it has been signed, but on the other work has not yet been completed on it?

[Dzasokhov] Our task, as legislators, in the first place must be aimed at giving every citizen of our country the legal prerequisites to exercise—in this sphere as well—the civil possibilities and rights which belong to him. But on the other hand, this is not a bad, I think, on the contrary a good quality and a merit of the Supreme Soviet: there was an effort to anticipate everything that will accompany this law. And as a matter of fact the majority of discussions and thoughts were in this direction: How will the rights of Soviet citizens be insured in reality if this law is adopted?

[Bakarinov] Rumors are constantly circulating among people that whilst allowing emigration abroad to some degree, the competent bodies are having difficulties, let us say, the lack of passports, how can you explain this?

[Dzasokhov] Recently many states, including some in West Europe and North America, and Australia as well, in the face of the increase in migration, have adopted legislative acts regulating, and in the end, restricting and fairly definitely limiting the number of citizens they can receive. Thus in order to go there you need not only the right, the desire, but also the agreement of the receiving country. As regards documents, particularly passports, the law intends that every Soviet citizen can have a foreign passport. This of course places the task on the

appropriate departments here of creating the necessary number of these passports and so on. And of course, here in the face of our shortages and complications with paper and the other necessary components, so to speak, the processes cannot be solved overnight.

[Dzasokhov continues] I think that the Soviet citizen will relate to this with understanding.

[Bakarinov] We often talk about human rights and forget the rights of the state. After all there is a right of the state to intellectual property over those people who want to leave the state for ever. Is this not foreseen by the new law?

[Dzasokhov] In the first place, I should very much like that the process of utilizing the conditions of this new law, which has, I hope, major prospects, will be used sensibly by Soviet citizens. What do I mean? Yes, use the right to emigrate, but at the same time do not break ties with your country. This is very important. This particularly applies to people who are engaged in high-level intellectual work in the sphere of science or culture and so on and so forth. Incidentally, it seems to me, many emigres do follow this concept.

I think that along with obtaining this freedom, the feeling of attachment to our unique, interesting country, which is going through many difficulties, will be awakened. It is necessary to beware here, but not to such a degree as to dramatize things.

[Bakarinov] No law can exist alone. There must be accompanying laws. Are there any laws accompanying this law?

[Dzasokhov] There are, and also potential ones. It seems to me that although the law is universal, it must be linked with the law of defending intellectual property, with the basis of legislation on cultural issues, with the law on citizenship, and so on and so forth.

[Bakarinov] Before our meeting, people asked me to find out what the role of the president was in the adoption of this law.

[Dzasokhov] I can say quite definitely that the president's role was that of initiator.

In December 1988, as head of our state, Mikhail Sergeyevich spoke in front of the international community at the General Assembly, and there he actually noted and described the contours linked to the problems of the emigration and immigration of Soviet citizens. So from that December up to the present day, we have been occupied in implementing this statement on behalf of the Soviet Union.

[Bakarinov] Can this law be considered a real implementation of the democratic rights of the Soviet citizens?

[Dzasokhov] I think so. Moreover in a particularly important sphere, regarding which many Soviet people had questions and demands to speed up the process. I think that on the one hand we found the desired in this sense, freedom and space, but on the other hand, this places fairly serious duties, but ones within our competence, on our Soviet people and our state. These duties will be examined. It should say that such examinations will be held this year. In September, in development of the Helsinki process, in the capital of our country there will be a fairly broad, large-scale forum on the human dimension. So in practice we will confirm, so to speak, that the democratic processes are being implemented here.

The task just now is moral, and in essence everyone occupied in implementing this law is being brought to make sure that on the one hand the clauses of the law are carried out, and that on the other the conditions are created in our country for encouraging the citizen who wishes to emigrate to stay here, by creating the conditions for his creativeness, his labor, so that he can realize, of course, his creative ideas, and so on and so forth.

### Slavic Culture Foundation Plans Described

9JUN18624 Moscow ROSSISKIY UGOLZET  
in Russian 18 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by Natalya Bobrova: "Slavic Roots"]

[Text] We have to develop an awareness for our Slavic roots—this is the thinking of the Foundation of Slavic Literature and Culture.

The foundation chairman, sculptor Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Klykov, winner of the USSR and RSFSR State Prizes, is a very busy person. But you can judge for yourselves.

"The revival of such a mass, civilian, all-Russian festival as the Festival of Slavic Literature and Culture (which was officially celebrated in Russia from 1882 through 1917) is only one aspect of our work. The oblast and regional programs of the foundation have been very successful since 1986. Among them we can name the monthly Sunday Lyceum in the former Noblemen's Assembly, the establishment of a new joint-stock, people's cultural and economic society 'Bezhin Lug' in the Tula area, and the 'Russian Encyclopedia' program.

"As suggested by the foundation, the Donskoy Monastery was returned to the Russian Orthodox Church (there are now four people and a prior living there). The church was also given back the building of the famous Slavic, Greek, and Roman Academy which is expected to be restored soon as a classical educational establishment.

"Finally, for the fall we are planning a science-and-applications conference 'The Russian Chernozem.' It will include scientists, public figures, men of letters, and, of course, those who work with the soil. We are talking about the most stable area of our country, about the granary of Russia. The 'Russian Chernozem' Bank is also among the conference organizers.

"We must say that the foundation is staying in close contact with the Russian Slavic Foundation, which recently split from us, we also maintain close links with the Noblemen's Assembly as well as with our compatriots abroad. For instance, a branch of the foundation has opened in Washington and a hard currency account was set up, thanks to the efforts of Bishop Rodzyanko. We are planning to restore the mansion of Nikolay Uryupin in Golitsyno (Rodzyanko is his direct descendant) and we expect to open there an all-Slavic cultural center."

"Finally," says Klykov, "we will probably take part in such a grandiose action as the Congress of Compatriots, but on one condition only: They will have to invite Russian refugees, the representatives of the first and second waves of emigration.

"To bring all this to life we need money. A lot of it was donated by the founders: eminent writers, scientists, artists, people of art, for instance, V. Rasputin, D. Zhukov, V. Bryusova) and the collective members (the

Russian National Bank, first of all)... The revenue from our small enterprises helps. But all this is not sufficient any more and our experts from the economic council of the foundation are now thinking about options for attracting new income."

"The main thing is," thinks Klykov, "for the Slavs—Russians, Serbs, Bulgars, Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians, Belorussians—to be united. They are obliged by history."

### SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Liv

9JUN14374 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 4, Jan 91  
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences Yu. Simchenko: Liv]

[Text] Self-designation: **Livli** or **Randal** (coastal, shore dwellers), **Randalist** (coastal, shore dwellers), **Kalamiyez** (fishermen), **Kalamiyed** (fishermen), Latvian designation: **Libyeshi**, **Yurmaliyeshi** (coastal dwellers). Estonians, who live on Saaremaa Island, and who are ethnically the closest to the Liv, know them as **Kuralased** (Kurshi) or **Rannakuralased** (coastal Kurshi).

The Livonians, who were once the big and strong Liv tribe, were well-known to the medieval world. Thus, for example, the "Tale of Temporal Years," mentions the Livonians (Lib) as worthy neighbors of the Eastern Slavs. A great deal of information about the Livonians may be found in Western European chronicles dating from the wars of conquest waged by the German knights between the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th centuries.

No precise data on the size of the Livonian population exists. Even the 1926 census, which recorded and made public information about 185 ethnic groups, provides no known information about the Livonians. It is assumed that by the turn of the 1960s there were about 3,000 Livonians in the Soviet Union, of which no more than 500 were fluent in the Livonian language. The 1989 census recorded the existence of 135 Livonians in Latvia.

Unlike the surrounding Latvian population, which lives mostly in villages, most frequently the Livonians live among the Latvians and the Russians. They may be found in 12 villages located along the coastal strip of Kurzem Peninsula in Ventspilsskiy Rayon in Latvia, and in Dungal, Ventspils, Talsi, and Riga.

Anthropologically, the Livonians are part of the Atlantic-Baltic race of the big European race. Some Kurzem Livonians, who have retained to a considerable extent their indigenous culture, belong to a separate anthropological type. These are the descendants of the ancient Livonians.

The Livonian language belongs to the southern subgroup of the Baltic-Finnish group of the Finno-Ugric branch of

the Uralic language family. The definitive formation of the Livonian language was greatly influenced by Latvian (belonging to the Baltic group of the Indo-European language family). In turn, the typical Finno-Ugric Livonian language retains traces in the Latvian language, particularly in its vocabulary and, to a lesser extent, its phonetics and grammar.

The origin of the Livonians may be traced to the Lih tribe.

At the turn of the 13th century, when Henry of Latvia was completing the writing of his chronicle, which included a great deal of valuable information about the Livonians, the latter had settled in a relatively small territory on the Gulf of Riga, from the border of the Estonian-speaking area to the middle of the Kurzem Peninsula.

At the beginning of the 13th century, the Liv of the old Livonia were enslaved by the Germans. The Liv of the former Kuroiya (Kurland, Kurzem) offered a stubborn resistance to the Germans. However, in the course of the 13th century they too lost their independence. Subsequently, the size of the Livonian population declined steadily.

In the 14th and 15th centuries individual Livonian villages could be found near Riga and in Sigulda; in the 17th century they lived in areas between the cities of Limbazi and Tsis, and in the 18th and beginning of 19th centuries, a significant percentage of Livonians had settled along the banks of the Salatsa River (the Salatsa Livonians). By the end of that century they had merged with the Latvians.

The final blow was dealt at the Livonians during the German-Fascist occupation. They were forced to leave their native shore and to resettle deep within the country where, under unaccustomed and difficult material conditions, a substantial part of the older Livonian generation died. After the war, the remaining Livonians returned to their former dwellings.

Religious Livonians are Christians (Lutherans).

#### **SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Moldavians**

91UN1437B Moscow, SOYUZ in Russian No 4,  
Feb 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences Yu. Simchenko: "Moldavians"]

[Text] Self-designation: **Moldoven**. Until the 13th-14th centuries, they were known as "Velokhi" ("Vlaxhi"). The origin of the ethnonym "Moldavians" is not entirely clear. It is believed that it is linked to some hydronyms and toponyms which included the root "molda" or "moldova." Such are, for instance, the ancient names of rivers and villages in the eastern foothills of the Carpathians: Moldova, Moldovitsa, and Moldova-veke.

According to the 1989 census, more than 3.3 million Moldavians live in the Soviet Union, including 2,794,000 (83.4 percent) in Moldavia.

Anthropologically, the Moldavians are part of the middle European race of the big European race. Elements of a southern European (Mediterranean) component may be found among some Moldavian groups.

The Moldavian language belongs to the eastern subgroup of the Romance group of the Indo-European language family. It is very similar to Romanian.

The spoken language is divided into groups of dialects: northeastern, northwestern, central, and southwestern.

The literary language was formed on the basis of the ancient Rus' and, subsequently, Russian alphabets. During some periods, the Latin script was used in recording the functional history of the Moldavian language.

The first books and documents in the Moldavian language (religious service publications, official state acts, private letters, etc.) appeared at the start of the 16th century. Previously, in the 14th and 15th centuries, from the time that the Moldavian state was formed (1359), old Slavonic was the state language.

The Moldavian enlighteners of the 16th and 17th centuries (Varlaam, Dosoftei), and the chroniclers of the 17th and 18th centuries (Grigore Ureke, Miron and Nikolay Kostin, Ion Nekulche, and others) made a major contribution to the development of the literary Moldavian language based on the Cyrillic alphabet. The first Moldavian printing press appeared in 1640, with the assistance of the Kiev-Pecherskaya monastery. Printing equipment was obtained from Moscow in 1679.

It would be difficult to recreate the full picture of the ethnic origins of the Moldavian people. To this day, it is not entirely clear how the nucleus of the Moldavians developed. We know that a group of Thracian tribes, who were Romanized during the first centuries A.D. and, subsequently, in the sixth century A.D., and Slavic and partially Turkic influences played an important role in the development of the Volokhi, who were the common ancestors of the Moldavians and the Romanians, in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula and the Carpathian foothills.

The Moldavian principality, which appeared in 1359, and which included the lands west and east of the Prut, had a favorable influence on the establishment of an independent Moldavian ethnicity. By the 16th century the process was essentially completed. Starting with the 16th century, when Moldavia became part of the Ottoman Empire, and until the 1812 Bucharest Peace Treaty, according to which Bessarabia was freed and became part of the Russian Empire, the process of the ethnic consolidation of the Moldavians was blocked by the Turkish administration.



A Soviet system was established for a short time in Bessarabia in 1918, after which Bessarabia was annexed by Romania.

The Moldavian ASSR was founded, as part of the Ukraine, on the left bank of the Dnestr, settled by Moldavians in 1924.

In 1940, part of the Moldavian ASSR, along with the territory of Bessarabia, which was returned to the USSR, was reorganized as the Moldavian SSR.

At the 5 June 1990 session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, a number of amendments to the Republic's Constitution were passed. According to one of them, Moldavia was given a new name: the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic.

Religious Moldavians are Eastern Orthodox.

### **SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Nanai**

91UN16344 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 10, Mar 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: "Nanai"]

[Text] Self-designation: **Nanay**, which means "local person." The former designation of the Nanai is Gold. The Nanai have also been known by other names, based on the names of their place of residence and their clans.

According to the 1989 census there were slightly more than 12,000 Nanai in the USSR.

The Nanai language belongs to the Tungus branch of the Tungus-Manchu language family.

As a people, the Nanai come from the aboriginal population which, by all available indications, is related to the Nivkhi and the subsequent arrivals of Tungus-speaking groups which influenced both the language and many cultural elements.

The Nanai are age-old taiga hunters and fishermen. As a rule, their settlements were built along rivers where fishing was possible on a year-round basis. The Nanai blocked the small rivers with set up dams in the openings of which they placed woven traps. Their main fishing gear, however, were a variety of nets, stationary and floating. The fish were caught with seines, hooks, spears, and a particular implement consisting of big hooks mounted on long sticks. The fish were usually sun-cured, fileted, and dried on special racks. They were used as food for people and dogs.

To a lesser extent the Nanai hunted sea game for food.

Taiga hunting held a leading place in the Nanai economy. The Nanai hunted for meat game—reindeer, elk, and roe deer, using a variety of implements. They set up crossbows on the game tracks and followed it in the salt marshes. They hunted bears which they roused out

of their lairs or bears hiding among the last year's berry bushes during the period of the spawning of the salmon.

The game was traded as a commodity. The Nanai engaged in lengthy hunting expeditions in areas neighboring the Nivkhi and the Ulechi, hunting sable and other valuable game ignored by the Nivkhi. The Nanai were perfectly familiar with the habits of all fur game and could faultlessly determine areas where lots of squirrels gathered, the fattiness of the sable and martens and, in general, the situation in the various parts of the taiga.

Armed with nothing but a bow and an Evenk long-handled knife and a quiver of arrows, the Nanai hunter would spend entire months in the deep taiga. This type of life demanded exceptional stamina which was developed since childhood. In a single season the Nanai hunter crossed hundreds of kilometers on the soft snow or thin ice cover, pulling a sled or a rudimentary drag net. In the summer he carried his heavy load on his back with a special attachment. He used dogs as pack animals.

Only isolated Nanai families acquired from the Evenk riding reindeer. The Nanai knew how to hollow canoes for a single man or several persons.

The Nanai clothing was exceptionally beautiful.

The usual clothing of the men consisted of robes made of fabrics, fur, and fish skin, which were used as cloaks, hunting jackets made of deerskin, sleeveless jackets, leather aprons, trousers which they shoved in their boots, and helmet-type headgear. All of this clothing was richly decorated.

The sewn garments accounted for a significant amount of the work of women. The women's robes were more richly finished. Women's clothing included trousers and breastplates decorated with embroidery and metal pendants.

The Nanai were shamanists and professed a number of cults related to their occupation, clan, etc.

### **SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Negidal**

91UN17094 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 12, Mar 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: "Negidal"]

[Text] Self-designation: **Nabeyenin**, meaning "local person." Some Negidal called themselves **Elkan Beyenin**, meaning "real people." **Amngun Beyenin** or "Amngun person," inhabitant of the Amgun River.

The name "Negidal" which is the origin of the contemporary "Negidalsy" means "coastal." This name identified the Negidal who had settled along river banks, unlike the Evenk who were nomads roaming the mountainous taiga.

According to the 1989 census slightly more than 600 Negidal live in the USSR.

The Negidal language belongs to the Tunguso-Manchu language family.

The Negidal live in the Khabarovsk Kray, Uchskiy Rayon, where they moved from the Ust-Amgun Village, which was frequently flooded by the Amur.

The ethnic origin of the Negidal is complex. Some families are related to the Udan-Ayumkan and Khatkhil Ulehi, who inhabit the area of Lake Udyi. The Sigdyl family is related to the Udegei and the Ulehi. The Tapkhal family may be found both among the Nivkh and the Negidal. The Negidal became part of the Nivkh tribes of Tyabing, Amingkal, Dekhal, Tapkal, and Khir-long and some Ulehi tribes: Aimka, Rosugbu, Khatkhil, Udan, Nvasikhgil, and an entire array of Nanai tribes—Tumali, Khodzhar, Alcheka, and Kile; the Oroche are related to the Milinka and the Udegei to the Sigdee.

Some Negidal were the descendants of the Evenk Myake-gir-Ayumkan. Some Negidal families of the Ayumkan and Nvasikhgil clans moved to Sakhalin.

It is thus that several ethnic groups living in the Amur River Basin led to the development of the Negidal as a distinct ethnic group.

The culture of the Negidal was based on the local settled way of life of the native population. Fishing played the leading role in the Negidal economy. The fishing methods of the Negidal were quite similar to those of the remaining population along the lower reaches of the Amur.

Fishing is done mostly with made at the homesteads themselves and were either stationary or floating. The fish were caught in open waters, after building various

obstructions on the Amgun tributaries. Fish hooks were used to catch fish under the ice, along with harpoons and spears.

Different nets were woven for each type of fish. Thus, there were nets for catching ide, other for sea trout, others again for beluga sturgeon, and so on. Running salmon were caught usually in small sweep nets, seines or bag-shaped nets.

The fish were essentially cured. Next to each settlement or house racks were set up on which the fish were cured.

The Negidal had been hunters since ancient times. They hunted for game and furs.

Despite the popularity of hunting weapons, to this day hooved animals are still hunted with crossbows set along the paths used by the animals. Sable was the main hunting game for the Negidal as it was for other hunting nations in the lower Amur area.

The Negidal knew the habits of the game to perfection. They used various sounds to trap the animals, they blew into special pipes to call Manchurian deer, used various whistles for birds, etc.

Hunting demanded of the people exceptional endurance and inordinate strength and stamina. The entire system of training the future hunters among the Negidal was based on these tasks.

Since childhood they were trained to shoot, ski and walk and row boats.

Negidal clothing was similar to that of all Tungus-speaking people of the lower Amur. The men wore short robes, hunting jackets, aprons, and short skirts which they put on for hunting, trousers which they stuffed in their short boots, helmet-type headgear, etc.

The women as well wore richly decorated robes, fur underwear, and fur shoes.



### Kalugin on Markov Murder, Other 'KGB Crimes'

91U F08364 [first SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian, 27 Apr 91 pp 8, 10]

[Interview with former KGB General Oleg Kalugin by journalist Aleksandr Ivanov, under the rubric: "Position," place and date not given: "The Kremlin's Perfidy and the Hand of Moscow: The Tale of the Rebel-General Oleg Kalugin"])

[Text] Yuriy Andropov, a not so unknown "pre-perestroika" leader of the CPSU and of the bloodstained Soviet empire, said in 1976 when he was still chairman of the USSR KGB: "We are at the front where there are no truces or respites; where a heated battle keeps going on... To be a chekist is to be first of all a warrior, and to nurture in oneself the qualities needed for it: loyalty to the party and to the people, courage and selflessness, and the readiness to fight for the triumph of the great communist ideals—in whatever difficult and hard circumstances." And what about conscience? Honesty? Integrity? This has never been—and still is not—required by the Kremlin. The only thing that was required was to "fight for the triumph of the great communist ideals" both in one's own country and in others. The idea was paid for by thousands and millions of lives...

What then about the "perestroika" leaders of the CPSU and the empire? Their moral criteria have not changed; they are still the same. The democratic camouflage which they were using to cover themselves did not last long. The people are protesting; the people are demanding the liquidation of the union government; the whole country is on strike with radical demands while the Kremlin strategists continue to "fight for the triumph of the great communist ideals" that have already brought the people to utter poverty. In their struggle for power, they desperately fight all those who unmask their true aims and goals, who in any way prevent them from calmly paying with the lives of millions for the "triumph of the great communist ideals." One such "bone in the throat" of the Kremlin and of the KGB is General Oleg Kalugin, whose name has become widely known lately and who, despite many years spent in the ranks of Soviet chekists, has preserved his conscience, honesty, and integrity... "The supreme leadership" threatens to put him on trial, while the people elect him their deputy.

In yesterday's issue of SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA we told of the KGB's dark affairs, and, among others, of the murder of Bulgarian dissident Markov.

Today we are offering our readers the transcript of an interview with Gen. Oleg Kalugin, provided to us by Moscow journalist Aleksandr Ivanov, in which Kalugin gives particulars and details of this and other crimes of the KGB.

"At the beginning of 1978 a meeting took place in Andropov's office in Lubyanka; the participants were Kryuchkov, then chief of intelligence; his first deputy, Vice Admiral Usatov, and myself." Gen. Kalugin started

his testimony: "Along with other matters of an operational nature discussed at that meeting, Kryuchkov informed KGB Chairman Andropov that he had received a request from Bulgarian Minister of Internal Affairs Stoyanov to render assistance to Bulgarian special services in a matter of the physical liquidation of Georgiy Markov, a well-known opponent of Zhivkov, who for some time had been close to Zhivkov's family, knew many "kitchen secrets," and then later emigrated to the West and during the last few years was working for the BBC.

"Kryuchkov also said that this request originated from Comrade Zhivkov personally and that the minister had simply passed it through his channels; he did not specify, however, whether the request had been passed verbally or in writing, most likely, it was verbal, because we were not in the habit of putting this kind of thing in writing.

"When Kryuchkov brought up this issue in the conversation with the chairman, Andropov got up and started to slowly pace the office; after a pause, he said: 'I am against political murders.' He did not say that he was against this particular murder. He formulated his thoughts this way: 'We are being dragged into all sorts of situations—they have their own problems, let them solve them on their own.' To this, Kryuchkov immediately reacted: 'Yuriy Vladimirovich, please understand, if we refuse the Bulgarians we will put Minister Stoyanov in an awkward situation. Zhivkov will think that Stoyanov no longer has respect in the KGB, or even that the attitude toward Bulgarian comrades is changing in the USSR, in the leadership here, in short, this may not be the best thing in terms of consequences for the development of our relations and, in particular, for Minister Stoyanov, who helps us in everything.' After some contemplation, Andropov said: 'All right, you have my consent to participate, but only on the technical side—no personnel involvement. Send an instructor, give them appropriate technical means and equipment, and let the Bulgarian resolve this problem on their own. That is all. To this I agree.'"

[Ivanov] Do you count on some documents to surface during the judiciary investigation?

[Kalugin] I doubt it... After this I called two of my subordinates, Sergey Mikhaylovich Golubev, a former colonel, chief of the security service and specialist on "murder," and another operative; we sent them both on detached duty to Sofia. Before they went on this trip, however, they visited the 12th Laboratory, which is a part of the KGB operational-technical department... It is involved in the development of substances that incapacitate people, and respective antidotes should such types of substances be used against our operatives... Having received their instruction in this laboratory, our operatives, headed by Sergey Mikhaylovich, went to Bulgaria where they discussed with the Bulgarians various options of liquidating Markov.

They worked out the following scheme: to use a poison that could be dissolved in a beverage—alcohol, tea, coffee, any liquid... Then such an attempt was made during one of Markov's trips to West Germany. It is not known whether the recommendations were followed and how reliable the man was, but the fact is that nothing happened to Markov—he was still alive and well.

Then a new plan was hatched, more crude, so to speak... To use as a camouflaged weapon a folding umbrella containing a firing mechanism with a small pellet; at close range (one and a half or two meters) a shot is fired by pressing the mechanism in the umbrella; the pellet penetrates the clothing and lodges in the upper skin layer. The Bulgarians worked on this option for about half a year because the assassination took place in the late spring or summer of 1978. In short, this operation was carried out and Markov died a day later in a local hospital from cardiac arrest. Both the pellet and the poison dissolve within 24 hours and do not leave any traces. So, in this case everything was done without a snag—no traces.

After this, the Bulgarians decided to liquidate another man, a Bulgarian intelligence officer, Major Kostov. He defected sometime in 1977 and they decided to liquidate him as a traitor to the Motherland since he had been given the death sentence. So, in the Paris subway in the fall of 1978 the Bulgarians used the same scheme and fired a second shot. However, unlike Markov, Kostov instantly reacted to this "mosquito bite." The man who shot him disappeared in the crowd while Kostov ran to a doctor; the doctors discovered a minuscule puncture in his skin. They operated immediately and took the pellet out.

I even saw a photograph of this pellet in some magazine; it was still in a condition to be reproduced. In short, the assassination failed.

This is actually the whole story in brief. Thus, Zhivkov is responsible as the organizer or initiator of this crime because Markov had never been tried and nobody sentenced him to death... Kryuchkov was, in fact, an indirect accomplice since he prompted Andropov to take part (even though it was only technical assistance) in organizing this affair. It is known that the Bulgarians could not have such technology. Only the CIA (they developed it) and the KGB have this kind of poison in their arsenals. No other country had ever been involved in this.

In this sense I, too, have a moral responsibility for this matter. It is true that I was simply present, but I did not object either. The moral responsibility also falls on all organizations and all the people who participated in the murder. By the way, for this "meritorious service" I received a personal gift from Minister Stoyanov—a Browning of Belgian make with an inscription in bronze: "To General Kalugin From Minister Stoyanov."

[Ivanov] Are you not afraid your witnesses may be removed?

[Kalugin] On the Bulgarian side, the chief organizer was the chief of intelligence, Vasily Kotsov. I have learned that he died relatively recently in a car crash. A strange situation for a chief of intelligence. Of course, anything can happen... It happens that even prime ministers die in accidents; a question comes to mind, though: Could it be an attempt to eliminate the trail because Kotsov possibly knew of some other Bulgarian "murders" of which I am personally not aware. They must have been carried out only at Zhivkov's order. He was one of the chief organizers. It will all come out during the trial. On the Soviet side, in addition to the four people I have already mentioned—with the exception of Andropov—three of them, thank God, are still living—people who knew about this included Victor Chebrikov, who was head of the 12th Laboratory and who was, by the way, blamed that the poisons were not effective enough. Also well informed are former KGB representative in Bulgaria Ivan Savchenko and chief instructor Sergey Golubev. These are persons that can already be named today.

[Ivanov] Do you think you will be put on trial?

[Kalugin] Well, if I am I am ready to tell everything, and even to add a few details. I am saving them on purpose for potential examinations.

[Ivanov] Does it occur to you that you may perish in a, let us say, automobile accident?

[Kalugin] By the way, I have prepared a comment on the draft Law on the KGB in which, among other things, I propose a stipulation for the KGB to publicly renounce the use of illegal—or generally any—methods of physical liquidation of people or harm to their health. It will not do it any harm, by the way. For instance, in the United States, where the CIA used to use similar methods, a law has been passed that says the CIA, under the threat of severe criminal penalty, is banned from engaging in this kind of activity. If we put it in for the KGB and emphasize that it will be subject to the harshest penalties, I think we will make foreign citizens and ourselves safe from this kind of attempts on people's life and health.

[Ivanov] The KGB has never complied with any laws.

[Kalugin] I would also do something else. I would create a parliamentary commission or a special deputy group under whose supervision I would see that this laboratory is destroyed. I think it will be one of the steps toward disarmament aimed at the liquidation of the most vile, in my opinion, method of liquidating people—a secret, clandestine, criminal method... If we could liquidate the laboratory, destroy the technology, and disband the personnel, this would become another step in the liquidation of this deadly potential.

[Ivanov] NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA recently published a letter from Yuriy Vlasov to Lukyanov in which the former says that foreign specialists have advanced a hypothesis that his lung disease was introduced by external methods.

[Kalugin] This is quite possible because one of the methods (other than causing cardiac arrest) is to introduce certain components into the lungs that gradually destroy them. People contract a lung disease and gradually wither away. I cannot state it with certainty since I do not have sufficient grounds for it. At some time, however, I heard conversations around the KGB that similar measures involving the use of this type of substance were being prepared against Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. Moreover, I know of one concrete example. It is mentioned in my book and it took place at the end of the 1960's-beginning of the 1970's when a foreign citizen who was at the time in the Soviet Union received a dose of poison introduced through his food without his noticing it; the poison was gradually destroying his body. By the way, he died in the age of 48. This is also a fact. And many people in the West were puzzled: Why did the man die so early?

All of this should be officially banned under threat of the most severe criminal prosecution because in reality it is a crime—a murder, if we call things by their proper names, no matter for what motives—especially political ones—it may be justified. We need to dismantle this entire system, to physically dismantle the equipment and technology, and the people who have been engaged in this, so to speak, production should be disbanded. If we achieve a real reform in the KGB, a perestroika and an expurgation of the old bankrupt leadership headed by Kryuchkov, as well as those who were involved in these affairs, I think the KGB may have a future, although I think it will have to be called by some other name, not the KGB.

[Ivanov] Is there a some sort of moral justification for the murders from the point of view of carrying out the sentence in regard to those who had been sentenced by the court in the Soviet Union?

[Kalugin] Yes, at some time there were such attempts. For instance, there was an NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] resident in Spain, Orlov, who defected to the West in 1939 out of fear of repressions. He had an enormous amount of information about the Soviet agent network in Western Europe. He knew Philby and he knew many of our famous spies in France, Germany, and Switzerland, but he had no choice but to defect. He wrote a letter to Stalin in which he said that if his family were harmed or his murder organized, the files (he kept them somewhere) would be automatically opened and all information would be published. I must say that Stalin did not harm any members of his family. But there was a plan to liquidate him. At some time, I participated in the preparation of such an operation in the United States. We found him, I think, in Chicago. It does not matter. It was, as I recall, 1968. We met and talked with him. When we found him he could be liquidated at any moment since he had been under this sentence for a long time. We reported to the chairman. At that time it was already Andropov. He said: "Do not touch him. This is too old a case. Better talk to him." So we talked to him and told him about the situation in the

country and started to try to talk him into coming back. Generally he was inclined to come back to the Soviet Union. This was after the 1967 defection of Svetlana Alliluyeva, and we needed a big propaganda action. That is when this situation with Orlov came up. Since we had established contact with him, he was ready to return, but when we reported to the leadership of the country, a certain dilemma arose: How should he be greeted—he could not be greeted as a hero since he had been sentenced by a military tribunal, but he could not be punished either, since the purpose was different. Anyway, it was decided to leave him where he was, in America. Two years later, by the way, he died before learning of our decision.

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The editors of *SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA* express their gratitude to journalist Aleksandr Ivanov for providing us with the transcript of his interview with Gen. Oleg Kalugin. Perhaps, one more witness will emerge from the KGB who will reveal the Kremlin's devious plans in regard to Georgia and unmask those "strategists" who "develop the ethno-conflicts" here wasting the lives of hundreds and thousands of people.

#### Drug Traffic Increases With Border's Opening to West

97W D08841 Minsk, SOVIETSKAYA BELORUSIYA  
in Russian 1 Jun 91 p. 3

[Article by V. Ksucharvants: "Will the USSR Become a Market for the Drug Trade?"]

[Text] Whereas the two million Soviet people already "sitting on their suitcases" await the passing of the law on entry and departure as an opportunity to solve their problems abroad, the law enforcement agencies see in it a potential danger for a sharp jump in drug-related crimes. In the opinion of criminologists, opening the borders between East and West, so vital for creating a Europe-wide community and rule-of-law state in the USSR, will also have a negative side: The borders will be thrown open to the drug mafia as well.

Drug dealers are constantly seeking new markets and unquestionably, would like to exploit the Soviet market. Despite all efforts, we are constantly a few steps behind the drug dealers. In the USSR this lag is small, since the problem has a lesser scope. However, the problem is most certainly global in nature, and therefore can only be solved by uniting the efforts of all countries.

Specialists from 13 countries in Europe, the United States and Canada have drafted the necessary recommendations for cooperation and unification of efforts under the new conditions taking shape in a changing Europe. Improvement of the world community requires decisive actions. The need to achieve the declassification of bank deposits abroad in certain cases was also recognized, and even Switzerland agreed that banking secrecy often serves as a stout shield for drug dealers. Remote

satellite sensing will be used to reveal concealed plantations of opium and hemp in both Asian and Europe.

Although for the time being the Soviet Union has not become an active arena for the international drug mafia due to reasons such as non-convertibility of the ruble, definite restrictions on entry and departure, and the complexity of making money because of the poverty of the market, nonetheless the scale of the spread of narcotics contraband throughout the USSR is expanding. In the last 5 years, more than a thousand attempts to transport drug equipment and psychotropic substances were stopped at the border. The number of channels and suppliers of the "intermediate" commodity through our country is increasing. These include Afghanistan, Hungary, the PRC, Vietnam, Romania and Iran. The situation in the country itself is also changing. There is an obvious trend toward growth in drug-related crimes. Whereas it comprised 9.3 percent in 1989, it was 35.5 percent in the first half of this year compared to the same period last year. In the words of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Vasily Trushin, about 30,000 such crimes are committed in the country annually, and the amount of confiscated drug equipment and raw materials for their manufacture is 25-30 tons. The latency of the problem complicates estimates, but it is possible to assume that the number of people abusing narcotics is significantly higher than the officially registered number and approaches up to 1.5 million people.

Whereas even a year ago MVD specialists preferred to say that we had no united narcotics mafia, just separate groups existing in various regions of the country, today it is already obvious that the tentacles of the "octopus" grip it both from South to North, as well as from East to West. The "sorest spots" are the republics of Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasus, the Ukraine, and the Far East, where hemp is growing in sizable territories and the population has long engaged in the cultivation of poppies.

The concentration of addicts, and hence the growth and circulation of drugs is great in large cities, international ports and resort cities. Today, specialists are noting the stable interregional ties of a domestic drug mafia.

According to expert estimates, the annual turnover for drug dealers in the USSR is over 3 billion rubles. Moreover, exposing the mechanism for "laundering" the money obtained from drug trade, one of the most difficult problems encountered in all countries, is still "terra incognita" for Soviet specialists. Of course, they are familiar with the experience of foreign countries and have had certain successes in this area themselves. However, the conversion to market relations and the appearance in connection with this of thousands of the most diverse independent enterprises opens up unusually favorable "laundering" opportunities for the drug trade and, conversely, extraordinarily complicates the job of police experts.

A glance at the near future is convincing. The growing foreign trade and humanitarian ties of the USSR, the opening of the borders and, mainly, the upcoming transition to ruble convertibility will give a sharp impetus to the penetration of drugs into the country and, at the same time, to their export to other countries. A supra-national awareness of the danger of turning the USSR into one of the centers of the drug trade faces the law enforcement agencies with new and highly difficult tasks. The key element of international cooperation in this area, unquestionably, is the exchange of current information. The membership of the USSR in Interpol, which as of this September has opened access for Soviet specialists to the latest Western practices in the struggle against the criminal world, will play a great role here. Furthermore, in the words of V. Trushin, the USSR MVD has proposed to create a special agency to coordinate the actions of all services relating to one goal, the struggle against narcotics, under the President or under the USSR government.

"Of course, there are no universal cures," said M. Zh. Enst. "Every society, every culture has its own specific features, yet we are seeking the possibility of general measures for adapting them. The war against drugs may turn out to be a long battle to exhaustion despite the opinion of most people, who see only its investigative side. However, the problem is far deeper. Different laws operate here. The only law that drug dealers recognize is that of supply and demand. And the demand is growing, especially among youth. The reasons are spiritual bankruptcy, an absence of vital values, and disillusionment. Then they resort to "artificial heaven." We have only recently begun to regard this aspect seriously. Meanwhile, the forecasts of experts are very pessimistic. Today, we simply must think not only of those who already need to be rescued from this evil, but also of future generations. We must give young people spiritual values."

#### **Crime Related To Growing Narcotics Traffic on Rise**

9/11 D08611 Moscow GI-SSNOST in Russian No 11  
14 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by B. Mikhaylov, chief, USSR MVD Press Center: "The Drug Business: Traffic in the Billions"]

[Text] There are 118,800 drug users on the rolls of the internal affairs organs today. More than 65,000 of them have been diagnosed as drug addicts. But criminal law experts believe that only those who have come under the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies are registered. The true dimensions of the problem are significantly greater. Experts estimate that there are approximately 1.5 million drug addicts in our country and that the drug business traffic is as high as three billion rubles.

In 1990, 35,309 drug-related crimes were registered (24 percent more than in 1989). MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] agents brought to light more than 2,900 cases in



which narcotic substances were produced, stored, and acquired for sale; 387 instances of maintaining and organizing [drug] hangouts, and exposed more than 1,500 criminal groups of drug business dealers.

Approximately 3.5 million rubles in valuables and money were confiscated from criminals and described. A complex of preventive and operational investigative measures was carried out within the framework of Operation Poppy-90 [Mak 90]. Almost 100,000 crops of narcotics-containing plants were discovered and destroyed over an area of 450 hectares. Dealers could have realized about two billion rubles from their sale. Forty-eight tons of narcotics were taken out of circulation.

Taking into account the specific features of the diffusion of the drug mafia's ties, the USSR MVD established seven interregional departments in 39 cities. This made it possible to organize a single all-union system for exposing drug dealers. Thus, the joint efforts of the Moscow and Tashkent interregional departments exposed a group of criminals that procured narcotics in Uzbekistan and sold them in Moscow. In close contact with local organs, USSR MVD agents eliminated 45 interregional narcotics distribution channels. Seventy-one criminal groups were exposed and 341 crimes were brought to light. More than 300 drug-related crimes—murder, rape, robbery, theft, and racketeering—were also discovered.

The Leningrad department uncovered an underground laboratory that was producing synthetic, potentially lethal narcotic substances that drug addicts call "Crocodile" [Krokodil] and "Devil" [Chert]. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against 22 persons. Laboratory equipment, foreign currency, weapons, and more than a million rubles' worth of drugs were confiscated. In Omsk, a group of drug dealers committing serious crimes numbering in the double digits in Omsk, Moscow, Sochi, and Kazakhstan was rendered harmless.

Last year alone, drug addicts committed 4,387 crimes, including 76 murders and cases of infliction of grave bodily harm, 183 robberies and thefts, and more than 1,000 larcenies. There are 10 murders and 20 violent robberies for every thousand crimes committed by drug addicts. This is evidence of the special social danger presented by criminals connected with the drug business.

The adoption of the Law of the USSR "On Responsibility for Lawbreaking Connected With Unlawful Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances," which takes into account the provisions of the UN International Convention ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 9 October 1990, will be of great importance. The draft of the law is being coordinated. The draft decree on the creation of the Interdepartmental Committee that will formulate the all-union strategy of the fight against drugs has been submitted to the USSR government. The "Flame" [Plamya] program, that will help to resolve the problem of identifying and eliminating the raw material base of narcotics, is presently being formulated.

### Rising Percentages for Specific Crimes Noted

91U N16241 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 10  
Mar 91 p 9

[Article by Aleksey Chernyshev "Living With an Axe Under the Pillow"]

[Text] *It had been expected, for the first time in many years the number of crimes broke the postwar record. It appears that it will not be long until detective films die out as a movie genre: our streets and courtyards will have become the scene of vicious robberies and cruel murders, and today's legendary "black cat" will in comparison with the hit squads of brazen racketeers seem like little friends of the militia.*

In 1990 internal affairs and procuratorial organs investigated **over four million complaints** and crime reports. A total of 2,786,605 crimes were reported, or 13.2 percent more than the year before. Upon closer inspection this dry statistical data prompts, quite frankly, a mass of emotions, and definitely not of the most joyous kind. Until recently we preferred to illustrate all the horrors of crime with examples drawn from American life, modestly failing to mention our own accomplishments in this field. Well, the time has come to share our own achievements: **according to official figures, a murder or attempted murder is committed in our country every 20 minutes, a serious bodily injury every 10 minutes, a rape every 23 minutes, and a burglary, robbery or violent robbery every 19 seconds...**

An increase in crime has been observed in every union republic, particularly in Armenia (up 43.9 percent), Estonia (up 24.4 percent), Lithuania (up 18.6 percent), Latvia (up 16.9 percent) and Kirghizia (up 16.1 percent).

The social background of criminals arrested is also very interesting. 13.8 percent of them are women, and 16 percent are minors. As to be expected according to the immortal theory the working class is ahead here as well—the share of the total number of convicted criminals held by the leader is 52.3 percent, with kolkhoz members lagging far behind with 5.7 percent, as are persons with no specific employment at 17.2 percent of the total. Typically, the lion's share of those arrested (43.8 percent) committed their crimes at a fairly adult age, 30 years old or older.

Against the general backdrop of rising crime rates the greatest increase was observed in lawbreaking connected with means of transportation (by 27.7 percent), and in those areas there was also observed an epidemic increase in thefts of state and public property, the number of which increased by 70.5 percent as compared to 1989. **With a little bit of imagination based on crime statistics one can even identify the average statistical Soviet criminal: most often a man, a blue-collar worker, over the age of 30, dealing in transportation-related crimes, poorly organized and moderately corrupt.**

Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, what is alarming is not so much the brisk increase in the crime rate as the de facto impunity of thieves and murderers. In actuality, and this is something which should finally be acknowledged, the state is no longer capable of protecting its citizens: almost one-half of all reported crimes are never solved.

The question presents itself: **SO HOW CAN ONE PROTECT ONESELF?** Our law enforcement organs

have been attempting for years now to disarm the mafia, but thus far no progress has been made. Last year over 7,000 crimes were committed using firearms.

Probably one avenue of self-defense is the sudden wave of interest in hunting: the lines to purchase weapons in hunting stores today exceed all bounds. Well, until we can get to the counter to buy the traditional double-barreled shotgun we will just have to sleep with an axe under our pillow.

Figures on Unsolved Crimes

Type of Crime	Number of Crimes Still Unsolved (in Thousands)		Rate of Increase (in Percent)	Percent Solved
	1989	1990		
Premeditated Murder and Attempted Murder	2.5	3.3	32	85.6
Premeditated Serious Bodily Injury	13.2	15.3	16	70.0
Rape and Attempted Rape	2.8	3.2	14	84.9
Violent Robberies	6.8	9.6	41	63.5
Robberies	55.2	69.2	25	40.5
Theft of State and Public Property	159.3	233.2	47	35.3
Theft of Personal Property	537.5	651.2	21	29.4
All Types of Crime	927.7	1,167.9	26	55.2

### Funding to Donetsk Oblast Militia To Fight Crime

9JUN15541 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
21 May 91 Union Edition p.2

[Article by S. Gavrilenko, chief of the internal affairs division of Donetsk Oblast and deputy of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet: "The Deputies of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet Have Found Money for the Militia"]

[Text] Recently we were all shaken by the news of the death of V. Blakhotin, chief of rear services of the internal services for the Northern Caucasus. The murder took place in Rostov, but employees of the militia arrested the main perpetrator of the terrorist act in the Donbass.

The long-standing cooperation of the internal affairs divisions of the two neighboring oblasts, which have the most difficult crime problems, permitted them to chase down the presumed criminals and, in a gypsy family in the city of Selidovo, to arrest a citizen of Armenian nationality whom, despite all the evidence incriminating him, I must in accordance with legal norms refer to as a suspect prior to his conviction.

Unfortunately these days we have many murderers, thieves, and other such riff-raff. The following figures give a picture of the situation that exists in the Donbass: During the first quarter of 1991, 10,702 crimes were

committed in an oblast with a population of 5.3 million people; 7,900 of them were criminal offenses, including 1,600 serious crimes, of which there were 96 murders. That works out to a murder a day. A simple calculation shows that there was one criminal for each 530 people in the first quarter alone. The crime statistics for the Donbass have never been that high.

What is behind these very alarming statistics? The overwhelming majority of the crimes are violent crimes for gain, and today when social contradictions evoked by the increase in prices and miners' strikes are strained to the limit, this especially makes society nervous. People are also made indignant by the fact that the crimes are becoming increasingly cynical and blatant and that we, the employees of the militia, do not always have the forces to protect people in a timely fashion from attempts on their property, honor, and dignity. The problem is not so much a matter of the training of our employees—for the most part it is appropriate to the times. It is a question of how the defenders of order are equipped. Unfortunately the time is past when it was possible to count on the effective aid of the local authorities to offer an official apartment or a telephone to a divisional inspector. Despite all our gratitude to the collectives of the Azov Sea steamship line, the Mariupol "Shakhterskanratsit" association, and others for providing us with several high-speed vehicles and video equipment, it is impossible to consider the problems of strengthening the material base of the militia of the

Donbass even partially resolved. This is only one-time, if you will, charitable aid. To fight crime effectively we need a reliable supply system which will resolve without exception the problems that arise in the course of the work of the militia.

Of course, the budgetary allocations of the Union and republic-level sources are only enough to more or less make ends meet. Given today's deficit it is especially impossible to count on the budget of the oblast. And the cases will not wait. In short, we need to seek out other paths.

These paths are being opened up by a "Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Organs of the Internal Affairs of the Oblast" created here. The deputies of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet voted unanimously in favor of the creation of such a fund, the first in the country. And it should be noted that in our soviet such unanimity occurs about as often as an eclipse of the sun. For some reason it is gratifying that the representatives of the democratic wing, supporters of "Rukh," and activists of the miners' rallies found cause to unite. From this any sensible person may draw the conclusion that the condition of law and order not only evokes alarm in all sectors of society, but even consolidates all forces in the fight against crime.

It is now clear to all that the militia should be provided for. But where is one to get the money for the newly created fund? The response is both simple and complex. The fund is formed using allocations from the profits of labor collectives of the oblast and it should be noted that these include voluntary allocations. There are more than 6,000 such collectives. The amount of the allocations is quite reasonable: No more than one percent.

"We have become sick of this outrage when, stopping in at the cloakroom after finishing work in the mines, the miner cannot find his jacket, hat, or coat," V. Kurashov, team leader of tunnelers at the Makeyevka mine "Chaykino," said angrily. "We cannot stand it any longer. We need to defend ourselves."

This year the "Chaykino" mine spent a substantial amount of money to compensate the miners for losses caused by a rampaging thief. A. Ivankov, director of the mine, named about 10 instances when the building of the administrative and services plant of the enterprise was burglarized. In this year alone thieves have stolen calculating equipment and chandeliers, destroyed beehives in the miners' hothouse, and even dragged away new entry doors.

"Of course, we could organize round-the-clock guards of our works and provide for the security of both people and property that way," A. Ivankov said. "But is there any sense in using miners with a monthly wage of 800-900 rubles [R] as guards? Would it not be better to pay money to the militia and let it decide for itself how many and what kind of professionals should be used and what kind of equipment to give them?"

And this is why the council of the labor collective of the "Chaykino" mine unanimously agreed to pay the Kirovskiy Rayon department of internal affairs of the city of Makeyevka R22,000 to guard the mine and its inhabitants.

According to our calculations, the needs of the Donetsk internal affairs division will amount to about R200 million over the next three years. It is clear that the soviet of people's deputies does not have any spare money, but the oblast budget, reinforced by the "Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Organs of the Internal Affairs of the Oblast," will probably permit us to take a large step in the matter of material and technical provision of the militia. In particular, it will help to build more housing, purchase the newest criminology and automotive equipment, and hire new employees for work (for example, 426 people are being added in Makeyevka alone).

There will also be an opportunity to carry out other plans which are not presently being implemented because of a chronic shortage of capital. The fund has only just been formed, but we, the workers of the militia, already feel the support it gives us. I am convinced that the workers of the entire Donbass will soon notice the results. I believe that our experience in solving a problem that is practically today's most difficult will be useful for other soviets of people's deputies. In addition, I want to stress in conclusion that the designation of the fund completely accords with Article 19 of the USSR Law on the Soviet Militia and the appropriate republic-level act.

### **Crime Increasing in Ukrainian Agriculture Industry**

*LD2005123191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 20 May 91*

[Text] The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukraine has sent a statement to the leadership of the Republic's State Agro-Industrial Committee regarding the growth in crime in the agricultural industry system. In the last month alone, the bodies of law and order have uncovered 800 head of cattle, more than 3,500 pigs, and dozens of tonnes of petroleum products that have been concealed from registration. Almost 300 cases of the theft of sowing materials have been exposed. Major cases of abuse and misappropriation have also been exposed at a number of meat combines and sugar refineries in the Ukraine.

### **Ways To Alleviate Shortage of Lawyers in the USSR Cited**

*91UN15214 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 May 91 Union Edition p 4*

[Article by S. Soldatov, deputy rector of the Moscow Legal Institute: "Who Are the Judges? About Legal Illiteracy and a Shortage of Lawyers"]



[Text] At present there are only 270,000 lawyers in our country—that is all there are. In the United States, for example, there are 700,000 lawyers. The case of any developed country indicates that economizing on the training of personnel with the highest qualifications, including, or perhaps, primarily, pedagogical and legal personnel, means dooming the state to tremendous economic and ethical losses.

I am profoundly convinced that the "war of laws" which is discussed so much at present is caused in many cases by precisely a lack of sufficient legal education, by the insufficient, if you will, legal competence of the representatives of the authorities and their advisers rather than someone's ill will. Where is such competence to come from if there is an altogether glaring shortage of legal experts in soviets of all levels? Until recently, people with pedagogical education accounted for one-third of the soviet apparatuses, and lawyers accounted for merely three percent. The position of the legislators themselves on this score is even more lamentable. Given this, the lawlessness of decisions made by the soviets is hardly surprising. In this sense, even presidential ukases are no exception.

In a word, however you look at it, it is necessary to think about expanding and, most importantly, sharply improving the training of lawyers now that we are creating a genuine rule-of-law state.

At present it is clear to all that we need many more lawyers than we have or than our colleges train, though we do not quite know precisely how many.

At present, more than 50 departments of law and four law colleges are in operation in our country. For a long time, the expansion of a chain of specialized colleges, for example, by setting up departments at state universities with great numbers of staff, was the "main line" for developing higher law education in our country. Apparently, there was nothing wrong with this: The geography of college locations became more extensive, and they began to train lawyers in various parts of Russia. However, first, the "geographic" expansion was very restricted because colleges and departments of law appeared exclusively in the RSFSR; there were none in other republics. Second, the abundance of "college establishments" themselves brought about an inevitable decline in the standards of instruction. At present, there are law departments functioning in our country in which there is not a single professor among the so-called cadre of professors and instructors, and in which candidates of science and associate professors are, as the saying goes, few and far between. Of course, it may be said that having a degree is not in itself indicative of anything. However, not having one is not the most convincing proof of superior qualifications for an instructor.

So our society, which is undergoing a transformation, has an acute need for highly skilled lawyers which is objectively due to the changes in all spheres of life—economics, politics, and international relations. What is

needed for lawyers to appear in our country in, so to speak, the numbers and condition necessary? An entire set of measures is needed.

To my mind, we should first take the path of reducing the scale of training by correspondence in the legal profession. I do not mean to offend anyone who got a legal education this way. There are many excellent specialists among them. However, we can train an investigator, judge, or procurator no better by remotely managing their training, than we can teach a surgeon to operate through recommendations by correspondence.

It is necessary to stop the outflow of instructional staff from law schools to cooperatives and joint enterprises. It has become sort of unprofitable to train students at present. At any rate, even at our Moscow Legal Institute we lack about 150 instructors, according to state standards for the number of students in full-time, part-time, and correspondence forms of training. The available, quite strong faculty which includes, for example, 50 professors, doctors of sciences, and more than 250 associate professors, candidates of sciences, cannot make up for this shortage. The classroom workload is such that it cannot but influence the quality of instruction. As far as wages are concerned, even now, after a raise, professors and even department chairmen at the institute make less than a driver in a cooperative or a joint enterprise.

We could continue to dwell on similar "trifles," such as the extremely unsatisfactory supply of textbooks. The situation will not be improved by partial measures. It is necessary to fundamentally change the entire structure of the training of legal experts, gearing it to profound changes in public life. As I see it, the organization of legal education should borrow a lot from the experience of training technical cadres with superior qualifications, primarily by using the system of continuous education and by the organization of training complexes. Higher and secondary special educational establishments, vocational technical schools, general secondary schools, preschool and extracurricular educational facilities, as well as the educational establishments of systems for skill improvement and cadre retraining belong to such complexes, naturally, on a voluntary basis. Our institute intends to set up such a complex very soon which will consist of two general secondary schools, a vocational law school, and a lyceum. This will be a complex with two or three stages of training: a school-institute, or a school-vocational school-institute.

Autonomy given to the higher schools is a serious help to our operations. At present, we control our own destiny to a much greater extent. Presumably, this would make it possible to set up in our country, among other things, independent pedagogical schools, and to abandon leveling and uniformity of actions which are instilled by rigid centralism, and which rob the higher schools of their own identity.

From this school year on, with the consent of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, our institute will

also embark on training specialists on a commercial basis. This is how those who already have a higher education—both Soviet citizens and foreign citizens permanently residing in our country—will study legal sciences. This will become an additional service rendered by the institute for those who wish to be trained in a related profession or to change their careers to that of lawyer. For its part, the institute will have an opportunity to replenish its budget which is absolutely necessary in order to bring education up to modern standards. Naturally, the introduction of paid training will in no way supersede existing procedures for receiving a second higher education free of charge.

Recently, many new chairs have appeared in our institute—crime study, engineering and technical law, defense attorneys, economic law, and constitutional (state) law of foreign countries. We have begun to teach private international law, economic law, and legal foundations of the foreign economic operations of the USSR. Special-purpose training of specialists on the basis of contracts with departments, enterprises, and organizations also belongs here. For example, we have signed such a contract with the USSR Procuracy. What does this do for the higher school? We can now act with greater certainty of purpose, and train specialists with quite precise "parameters"—who is necessary for what kind of job—rather than train them, so to say, blindly. We can create procurator-investigative groups of sorts, as early as in the process of instruction, with students specializing in a certain direction.

In a word, we try to make better use of current opportunities by, so to speak, mobilizing our resources to generate funds which will be used to solve the social problems of the collective, increase the wages of the employees, and improve physical facilities.

The last question is the most acute for us, and not only for us—the condition of the instruction facilities of many law departments and institutes is catastrophic. As far as we are concerned, the facilities of our own school are virtually non-existent. We rent space for instruction for more than 700,000 rubles annually. Meanwhile, the Moscow Legal Institute has existed for 60 years now, and it has trained more than 100,000 specialists for the country. So has it been possible or not to acquire our own "production space" in this period of time in order to keep from turning the process of instruction into continuous commuting from one building to another?

What is the reason? Are we really involved in a pursuit which is of no use to society? Apparently, we are not. Most likely, this has to do with the long-standing erroneous practice whereby the organs of state power neglect the issues of the higher schools in humanities. After all, as a rule, they are precisely the ones afflicted by extreme poverty. This is what the attitude toward the humanities as something second-rate, not belonging to the basis has brought about. However, it appears that we have now seen how bitter the reckoning is. This means that the attitude needs to be changed fundamentally, taking into account the fact that lawyers do not have rich sponsors, to say nothing about other humanities specialists.

At present, a lot is being said about education as a priority, about the need for its problems to be handled by state program No. 1. Education should become a priority after all, despite the fact that the country's financial situation is extremely difficult, and the state has many priority tasks, because as an ancient maxim goes, education is the only guarantee for the future.

Is there hope that the right, the left, the democrats, and the conservatives will finally understand that both we and our descendants will have to pay dearly for the disintegration of higher education which has been under way for a long time?

### Central TV's Editorial Control Procedures Explained

91U N15274 Moscow, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 27 Apr 91 p 6

[Interview with unnamed TV journalist by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent Sergey Fomin; place and date not given: "'Cooking' in Ostankino"]

[Text] A well-known TV journalist, whose name we decided not to disclose, answers questions asked by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent Sergey Fomin.

[Fomin] Mikhail Nenashev said once that Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] was an uncontrollable structure. But since the arrival of Leonid Kravchenko things have changed in a rather short time. After the scandalous bans and program cancellations a peaceful atmosphere has descended on TV broadcasting. Critical programs either have disappeared or are disappearing. How is this done technically?

[Answer] Generally speaking, it is done in a most banal and boring manner. Every Monday a brief meeting takes place during which they discuss the most important programs. Either the chairman or his deputy is present at this meeting. There they make remarks on aired programs and make plans. All of this is reported by the editors-in-chief to the employees.

[Fomin] Suppose that somebody disagrees with these decisions and wants to do a program his own way? How can this be controlled? Is there anyone who watches every program before it is aired?

[Answer] The president of the all-Union company has several deputies in charge of various "zones" of TV time. All control is exercised primarily by them and through them. These people may, to a certain degree, share in some original ideas; they may be allies of the program authors but at the critical moment they choose to be on the side of the leadership anyway. Valentin Lazutkin, for instance, has been contributing, to some extent, to the establishment of Russian TV for a long time as he searched for a compromise with the Union leadership. But now his actions in this direction have become less energetic, if I may say so, because now they may threaten his existence in the structure.

The finished programs are viewed but not all of them, of course. They view only the most important ones and also those which attract the most viewers. But the main thing is to watch after the people. If an author is more loyal he needs less control. If they want to cancel a program that has been already announced in the schedule, an order is sent to the main program management and to the master control room. Then the program gets canceled and as a rule the announcer says that it happened "due to technical reasons."

Concerning the main information programs, the anchors' texts are personally edited or even written by the editors-in-chief in very close contact with the deputy chairmen. This was done, for instance, by Petr Reshetov for the "Vremya" broadcasts during the Baltic events. Incidentally, "Vremya" has a very rigorous plan of what will be shown and, of course, it has to be approved from above every time. The implementation of the plan explains the selection of rather conservatively-thinking editors. The plan may be amended on very short notice both "from below" and "from above". The changes from below are mostly non-political, suggested by the authors. From above there are phone calls. Everybody calls. Yazov, Lukyanov, Dzasokhov—everyone who has a "direct line" to the Kremlin.

All orders are given on the phone. Reshetov's order in writing "to suspend" the production of "Vzglyad" was a unique occurrence in the history of the Soviet television.

[Fomin] How do they control live broadcasts?

[Answer] "Live" programs have what they call "run through" rehearsals during which the hosts say on stage, without an audience, what they are going to say during the program. All this is viewed by deputy chairmen on a closed-circuit monitor. Besides, live broadcasts are seen on the four "Orbita" systems. Most often they watch the first one. After that they indicate what should be "cut" in future broadcasts. Basically, it is possible, without any contact with the author, to air the program to the European part with "cuts" and pretend that it is live.

[Fomin] They say that live broadcasts are aired with a 30-second delay during which you can cut out anything undesirable.

[Answer] This does not seem to be true. I did live broadcasts and we had a TV set in the studio which received the signal from an outside antenna. We always had full coincidence. But there is no need to "delay" the signal anyway. The people who are in control of the air at that time can always make a direct call to the control room or to the director. Announcers are always ready with a corresponding text and film reels which can be used as substitutes.

Besides, there are preventive sanctions such as simply locking up the stage. They can post militiamen and not let in those people who were invited to the program by the host. That happened with "Vzglyad" when Sakharov was invited to one of its live broadcasts. He did not show up but the militiamen were posted by the studio.

[Fomin] When Yeltsin spoke at the Kirov Plant he said that Central Television was operating under the aegis of the KGB.

[Answer] I think he said that in the heat of the polemics. There is no need of that. Kravchenko maintains personal contact with the highest echelons of power, but there are agents around. The Ostankino building is a transparent one.

[Fomin] In general, are there any rigid criteria for what may be shown and discussed and what may not?

[Answer] They are hard to specify. The general set of permits and restrictions depends, in many ways, on personal taste. They are often determined by negotiations conducted by the authors and the leadership either personally or through editors-in-chief. The personality of the chairman is of utmost importance in all this. He serves as an indicator of what is allowed. This way of settling matters can be especially complicated under the conditions of a changing political situation.

[Fomin] It happened several times that programs announced in the schedule were replaced by films with an urgent political context: "The Face of Extremism", for instance, which was aired in place of the last "Vzglyad," "Thoughts on a Baltic Subject," "Alien Voices." These films are somewhat strange. They are not done in the manner usual for your correspondents; they sound like a pretentious commentary by an overly biased and tendentious character. What is most important, no names of their authors or studio logos are shown on them. Where do these films come from?

[Answer] As a rule, they are made at the suggestion of the KGB, approved by the highest echelons of power. No attempt is made to conceal this fact. Groups of journalists and directors are formed to make the films. The programs are produced in Ostankino but the shooting is done by agencies in most cases. They edit the film which was shot by someone else and you can see from its quality that it was shot either with non-professional or a different system of equipment; you can also see that it was not cut by state TV.

[Fomin] It seems interesting that Central TV closed down "Vzglyad," "edited" the "TSN" [TELEVISION NEWS SERVICE], but the "Fifth Wheel" continues to come out as if nothing had happened. How would you explain this?

[Answer] It may be explained by the fact that Leningrad TV is not watched by the entire country after all, or by the fact that Bella Kurkova, the editor-in-chief of Leningrad's "Fifth Wheel" has more authority than the Central TV editors-in-chief. Maybe there is some kind of an agreement between Sobchak and Gorbachev. The process of control is, after all, a process and it may have its own nuances and paradoxes.

### **Mikhail Antonov Applauds Publication of Russian Nationalist Paper**

9 JULY 1991 Moscow *RUSSKIY VESTNIK* in Russian  
No. 11-22 May 91 p. 16

[Letter from Mikhail Fedorovich Antonov "Be a Patriot and Don't Undermine the Culture"]

[Excerpts] **Bearing in mind that in the way we perceive the phenomena of our history and culture, in our approach to the principles of patriotic journalism, certain divergences among our comrades-in-arms are inevitable, we have published Mikhail Fedorovich's well-wishing letter below.**

Dear Friends! It was with great joy that I received the news about the publication of your newspaper, one which has openly proclaimed as its task facilitating the renewal of Russian national life in all its manifestations for re-creating Russian society. It seems to me that there is no more lofty or more noble goal than this, and I consider it my prime duty to participate to the best of my powers and abilities in this cause of bringing about the salvation of our much-suffering people. I have succeeded in writing something for *RUSSKIY VESTNIK*, and I have something else in the planning stage. And reading this newspaper brings me many pleasant moments; it can be boldly stated that this newspaper has become well-established. It is gathering force from one issue to the next and expanding the circle of its readers. This is something that I personally and our Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of the Fatherland are attempting to facilitate in all possible ways. I would like to see *RUSSKIY VESTNIK* become a truly All-Russian newspaper of worldwide importance, all the more so in that it was founded by the "Rossiya" Society, whose voice is also directed at Russians abroad. [passage omitted]

*RUSSKIY VESTNIK* will be capable of becoming an All-Russian tribune only if it adopts as its main weapon not biting satire, but rather the Truth: "Not by God's power, but by the Truth"—These words, spoken by the Blessed Saint and Grand Prince Aleksandr Yaroslavich Nevskiy could be adopted as your newspaper's motto.

*RUSSKIY VESTNIK* should have its own circle of readers, including Russians abroad, who are often simply not reached by the "salt" of our biting satirical articles. We must be the most solidly substantial and fundamental Russian newspaper, profoundly patriotic, and highly cultured, and—if you like—in a certain sense (on a spiritual level) mass-aristocratic and chaste Orthodox.

But the main problem, which we must elucidate from all sides, is to find ways to accomplish the following triple task: to free ourselves from the foreign cabal, overcome the people's poverty, and curb the Mafia. I stand ready to help the newspaper in these matters.

I know that not everything I have said above will be met with approval by everyone. But I would be grateful to you for publishing this letter, albeit in the form of a polemic.

With sincere respect and good wishes for your success.

### POSTFAKTUM Agency's Financial Problems Assessed

LD2905135891 Moscow Radio Rossi Network  
in Russian 1152 GMT 29 May 91

[Arkadiy Medvedev commentary]

[Text] Hello friends. The rumors which have recently been going about to the effect that the well-known POSTFAKTUM news agency has round itself in deep water do, it appears, have some basis. According to information provided by employees of the KOMMERSANT paper, which as you know is one of POSTFAKTUM's founders, the agency's financial situation indeed leaves much to be desired. There are reports that the losses in the fourth quarter of 1990 comprised 100,000 Rubles [R] while in the first quarter of this year the sum had increased five-fold. Also highly eloquent, in my view, is the fact that the agency's employees have not been paid for three months.

Two years ago, this agency first made itself known by putting out a news service twice a week, which was printed on a single wire and included everything which the POSTFAKTUM agency's employees had managed to produce in the area of politics and the economy. Comparatively rapidly, as the year passed, a separate economic bulletin appeared, which began coming out twice a week. The agency's subscribers with an inclination for politics were fully able to satisfy their interest by getting a news bulletin three times a day. Yet another publication appeared, called ZAKONODATELSTVO I EKONOMIKA [Legislation and the Economy]. It should be said that it was those publications which reflected the events of business life—the POSTFAKTUM publications—that became the agency's main source of income.

Incidentally, subscribers quickly perceived that there was no need to spend money on politics, rather it was sufficient and cheaper merely to buy the economic and legislative information, as they needed it, of course. We get enough politics without this. Incidentally, the agency's subscribers include such major news giants as

UPI, REUTERS, and other large agencies and papers. And therefore, and reports that POSTFAKTUM's account contains R80,000, over R40,000 of which is owed to the FAKT cooperative, the POSTFAKTUM agency's second founder, seem to me quite strange. Incidentally, the control package belongs to FAKT.

It is rumored that the agency's development program envisaged full self-recoupment by the autumn of last year. However this did not happen and agency started going downhill. It is hard to say now whether this just happened or whether the conditions were created for it. The agency is the internal affair of KOMMERSANT and FAKT. One can only assume that KOMMERSANT is gradually swallowing up POSTFAKTUM by directing the network of correspondents toward working under the conditions of the publication of a daily business paper.

Incidentally, if one takes a careful look at POSTFAKTUM's bulletins one can assume that this network of correspondents encompasses approximately 60 cities in the country. The structure of the network is simple. Editors have correspondents who supply information by phone during the day and using an answering machine during the night. Bearing in mind the structure of the network, one can assume that it is an excellent basis for the organization of KOMMERSANT regional correspondents' bureaus. It is also possible that such bureaus will be given the status of small enterprises. Given this kind of organization of the network of correspondents, the right to make decisions on key issues such as financing, for example, is nonetheless left to central management. However, all these assumptions could remain just that and nothing more for an indefinitely long time, at any rate until POSTFAKTUM's credit debt at one of Menatep's banks is cancelled. The agency's employees are saying that it comprises about R1.5 million.

Well, the first wave of independent mass media, and POSTFAKTUM indisputably belongs to it, having accepted the rules of a market economy and thus tough competition as well, is becoming dependent on these rules.



### Suppression of 1962 Novochoerkassk 'Revolt' Described by Ex-Officer

*91JUS08264 Moscow IZVESTIYA 120 May 91 USSR  
Edition p. 3*

[Letter by V. Malakhov of Vladimir, former field-grade career officer in the Soviet Army, now a legal consultant to IZVESTIYA's editors under the rubric "From the Editors' Mail: Novochoerkassk, June 1962: Testimony of a Regular Officer Who Participated in Suppression of the 'Revolt'"]

[Text] The truth about the events of June 1962 in Novochoerkassk is finally being made public. Reports on this tragedy have appeared in both your newspaper (*Nov...*) and other publications. Perhaps my story—entirely subjective in some respects, but, believe me, utterly honest—also will interest someone. What is more, time is passing, there are fewer and fewer witnesses, and I am unable to remain silent any longer. The point is not so much in my personal need to speak out, or even, perhaps, repent, as in revealing the significance of both that which occurred and that which is happening today.

So, in the sequence of those events, already of an almost 30-year antiquity... On Saturday 2 June, our class (and it consisted of about 150 regular officers undergoing refresher training at the officer school men) [commemorative of] M.I. Nedelin) was taken on alert from its studies, hurriedly embarked in motor vehicles, and carried out of town. We were perplexed. What was going on? We were ordered to keep quiet and ask no questions. The motor vehicle column was halted beyond the airport, and we were assembled. The deputy curriculum chief and chief of the unit political department, Colonel Udaltsov, announced that we were being sent to Novochoerkassk, where disorders were occurring, and that we would take action in keeping with the situation. At the same time, we were informed that the officer school's cadets had been alerted as early as 0200, and were also in Novochoerkassk, guarding the bank, the post office, the railroad station, and other buildings, including that of the party gorkom [city committee], which a rampaging crowd and certain extremists and hoodlumish elements seemingly had destroyed.

At about 1200, we arrived at a tank division base. We found out. On the preceding day, 1 June, at the party gorkom's request, the division commander had sent a column of soldiers to the plant, with weapons and tanks, but without ammunition. At that time, a mass meeting of workers was taking place at the plant, and it had been called on the initiative of the partkom [party committee] and the administration at about 1600, at the change of shifts, in order to obtain the routine people's approval of the party and government's "care."

What was in mind? It was only later that we found out that pay rates had been reduced (and wages consequently lowered) at Novochoerkassk's largest enterprise—the electric locomotive construction plant (NEVZ)—simultaneously with an increase in the prices of meat and

dairy products. We also found out, for example, that mostly women worked on the heaviest earthen form jobs in the casting shop, and that the reduction of pay rates and increase in prices had additionally coincided with the administration's shameless explanations about a mythical mechanization of manual labor. Moreover, we found out that the partkom secretary had answered the women's question "what are we going to eat, and what are we going to feed our children?" with words to the effect that if they had eaten piroshki with meat before, they would now eat them with cabbage. Eyewitnesses would later say that this became the final spark in the worked-up crowd. The casting shop's women had started the "revolt." The administration and the partkom members had to barricade themselves in the administration building's attic.

Well, by that time, a column of soldiers, headed by the division commander, had arrived there in a convoy of heavy tanks. Workers on the plant grounds did not let them in. The soldiers and tanks were compelled to return to their barracks. At that mass meeting, those assembled had made the decision to go out on demonstration with the whole plant, together with the workers' settlement (and it was located about 10 kilometers from the city).

On the morning of 2 June, the production workers, the other employees (that was about 10,000 persons), and their families moved toward the city with red banners and portraits of V.I. Lenin. Fire engines tried to stop the column near the entrance to the city. They did not succeed. In the city, students of three institutes and residents joined the workers. A rally began.

At about 1500, CPSU Central Committee Presidium members A.I. Mikoyan and F.R. Kozlov, party obkom [oblast committee] chiefs, and representatives of the military high command arrived at the division base. About 20 minutes later, all command personnel were assembled for a conference, at which both our curriculum chief and his deputy, Col. Udaltsov, were present. The conference was brief. At about 1600, we were assembled again, and Col. Udaltsov informed us that the disturbances in the city had been provoked by criminals and hoodlumish elements, and that the decision had been made to institute a curfew in the city. Tanks with blank charges entered the city, but they were quickly blockaded by the population (True, window panes and frames in the buildings went flying even from the blank rounds).

Our class had been formed in front of the ammunition dump. The curriculum chief gave the order to take arms. The formation did not move from its position. We stood there in a quondary. What arms, what are they for, who is to be shot at—where are they, these "hoodlumish elements"?

Then the chief of the political department gave the command "Communists, forward!" He who has been at the front—he knows. This is a sacred command, and it

must not be disobeyed. The Communists marched forward. A "special mission"—to guard the electric power substation between the city and the plant—was assigned to us, four majors (A. Tynvanov, S. Fedorenko, V. Kodakov, and me). We were taken to the substation in a BTR [armored personnel carrier], under escort of two tanks beyond city limits. One little girl, about 11 years old, who yelled "fascists" after us, has remained in my memory and made my heart ache. She yelled it at us, combat veterans.

We assumed a perimeter defense. The firing in the city died down by evening, and only what was being announced with loudspeakers about the curfew's institution was audible. Toward morning, we were taken "off the special mission." When we rode through the city streets, we saw fire engines and "nitraliki" [not further identified] that were washing blood off the sidewalks and pavements, and taking away the trash and broken window panes. The city was surrounded by troops. Afterward we were quartered a week longer on the tank division's grounds. Every night the "black crows" [Black Marias], as we called them, ran about the city. It is likely that KGB associates, who had been concentrated in the city in great numbers, were working intensely. A delegation of workers made an appeal to Mikoyan on the dates of 6 and 7 June to properly bury the dead. They were denied this. It was probably feared that a spontaneous mutiny against the authorities might break out again during the funerals. In the evenings, we conversed a lot with F. Kozlov, trying to find answers to the questions that were tormenting us. The answers were circuitously insincere. It was sensed that the truth of the events was being carefully concealed from us.

Early in the morning (about 0500) on a Saturday or Sunday, I do not remember which now, we were taken toward the plant on motor vehicles in a convoy of armored personnel carriers and tanks. In the steppe, it was quite apparent how columns of motor vehicles with tanks and armored personnel carriers were moving toward the NEVZ from all sides. A. I. Mikoyan and F. R. Kozlov were to meet with the plant's production workers and other employees at 0900.

Our mission was to break through the plant's fences with tanks at the red flare (the signal for action) and the troops were to divide the plant's grounds into sectors in designated directions and take all necessary steps to rescue the members of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium and the government. Fortunately, everything went well. At about 1100, the green flare—[other, [cease action]]—shot up into the sky. And then the whole army behemoth, roaring and kicking up dust, passed belligerently through the hushed plant settlement's streets. This was a demonstration of the strength and authority of a people's army, which had punished its own people.

How many casualties there had been on the part of the military personnel and the population—it is doubtful that anyone knew. Now we hear: 24 killed, 39 wounded,

plus seven executed by firing squad. Are these figures accurate? I do not know, and I am not convinced that they are. How many were guiltlessly sentenced? The cadets guarding the railroad station told us later that two special trains carrying arrestees were sent out during those days. What was the fate of those arrestees? What was the fate of those students who were expelled from the institutes by the dozens? What, also, was the fate of that little girl who accurately defined our actions in just one word?

Well, now, after serving 27 years in the army, becoming a second-group invalid, and being in the CPSU for 43 years (but I had joined the party at the front—so that, if I were to die, it would be as a Communist without fail), I understand. All of the Novochoerkassk casualties—they are on my conscience too. The fact that I personally killed no one and personally shot no one—that is small consolation. After all, I could have received another assignment and been in a rank of those who fired. The army is the army, and an order is an order. But those who gave the order at that same Novochoerkassk hid behind our executorial backs. Indeed, no one knows their names or calls them to account. We all—both those who were shot and those who did the shooting—are alike the victims of some diabolical plot and the hostages of that same system, under which "half of Russia is in prison camps, and half of Russia is in the form of oppressors."

From my understanding of all of this, I am becoming fearful, especially now, when blood is being shed in the country, and when heedless soldiers (not combat veterans like us, but yesterday's little boys) are being drawn into all sorts of political, ethnic, or social hot spots. After all, the army is the army, and an order is an order. And there is no point in worrying about the Novochoerkassk of 1962 when there is already the Vilnius of 1991.

I am also becoming fearful because of the first more loudly resounding calls of "Union" Deputies and RKP [Russian Communist Party] leaders for the adoption of "emergency measures." What those are—I know from Novochoerkassk. The speeches of I. Polozkov, first secretary of the RKP Central Committee, about "Communists' going over to the offensive" very much remind me of that Novochoerkassk political department chief's command "Communists forward." I am fearful, too, that those who expounded Marxism-Leninism for the "short course" in political studies for the soldiers and sailors of the 1950's and who later, in the classroom or by correspondence, gained erudition in the dogmatic postulates at the "red professors" or VPSH [either the Military Political School or the CPSU Central Committee Higher Party School], will unexpectedly succeed in carrying our President, a rather good person on the whole, to the right and making him, as general secretary, "come out of the trenches," together with the rank-and-file party members, the army, and the KGB (and this is a real bonus of the President's hands). (The last CPSU Central Committee Plenum—was this not an attempt, fortunately in vain, to do this?) Why come out, I should like to ask, and



with what" with weapons in hand against their own people and to a new dictatorship."

Me—I am an old Communist. I fought for "full socialism" and defended "ultimate socialism". I built "communism" until 1980, and then was thrown into the building of "developed socialism". I, like millions of others, lived by the ideologies of unrealistic and unenlightened programs—such, when it be analyzed, is the sad summation of my life. Nevertheless I remain in the party, both because I believe in Gorbachev—the President and the General Secretary—and because I believe in the triumph of good sense and benign forces. These, I am sure, also exist in the party. After all, it is not just dirty deeds that are in its record—let us be fair even here.

Because of this, I was very happy when there rang out, at the Third Extraordinary Congress of Russian People's Deputies, the speech of the Afghan hero Rutskiy, who appealed, mainly to the unorganized majority of Communists, which has taken a wait-and-see attitude (to those such as I), to unite in a Communist Party for Democracy. True, the Russian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum reviled Rutskiy in this instance, and "parade veterans" even suggested depriving him of honorary city citizenship. I believe that this new trend will come to have its own organized structure, and will gain strength. In this regard, there is no need to fear the split, and it is necessary to sever relations with the upper crust of the party nomenklatura [hierarchy] and partocracy [party bureaucracies], which has transformed itself into a Soviet bourgeois caste, and has become antipopular and incapable of expressing the opinions and expectations of most rank-and-file party members. Precisely through the efforts of this upper crust, that slavish fear, which we have been squeezing out bit by bit during six years of perestroika, is again creeping into our souls. There are, to be sure, the likes of this upper crust in all ages; these give orders that turn in a flash into "forward" commands to the military, and they cannot now resign themselves to their time's having ended. But has it ended? Here again there are doubts and perplexities.

If so happened that I began with the Novochoerkassk of 30-year antiquity and am ending with our turbulent everyday life. But after all, it all, you will agree, is interrelated—without the past there is no future.

A little about myself. I completed the Order of the Red-Banner Second-Award Military Political School (men I. Engels (in Leningrad) in 1951. In the Soviet Army from 1943. I was a participant in the war (and the events in Novochoerkassk). I was a career military man. I was demobilized for illness in 1969. In 1972, I finished the Moscow VYuZI [All-Union Correspondence Law Institute] a lawyer. I worked as a legal consultant for the Vladimir Oblispolkom [Oblast Executive Committee], and I am now legal consultant for a design institute and the chairman of a labor-collective (union).

## Facts Learned in 1962 Novochoerkassk Shootings of Strikers

91U805534 Moscow TRUD in Russian 1 Jun 91 p. 1

[Article by TRUD correspondent A. Isayev "The Dark Day of Novochoerkassk"]

[Text] Novochoerkassk—Twenty years ago shots sounded on the square where the CPSU gorkom [city party committee] and gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] were located then. People who came to the square carrying Lenin's portraits and slogans protesting against the price hikes on meat and meat products were shot to death.

On 1 June 1962 the workers of the Novochoerkassk electric locomotive manufacturing plant went on strike. It was caused by price increases in the country and lowered wage scales—the administration "cut" these at the wrong time. When the workers asked plant manager Kurochkin how they were going to live after all that, he could not think of a better answer than to say with irony, "If you don't have the money to buy bread, eat pies with tripe!" That was the spark that ignited the fire. No attempts at persuasion could help after that. Rallies started springing up at the plant.

The next day strikers went in a column to the center of the city, to tell the city authorities about their objections and ask their questions. On the way they were joined by the people from other factories. More and more people gathered in front of the building accommodating the gorkom and the city soviet, tension mounted, some of the most excited broke into the building. Then the shooting started.

Tomorrow, on 2 June, after a requiem mass in the local cathedral and a solemn meeting, it is planned to put up a memorial plaque on the square and to designate a site for a future monument in the old city cemetery where they intend to move the remains of the 23 people killed in those days. All this will be done with the participation of the city leaders. The military procuracy found the secret burial places of the people who were shot. They were found dozens of miles away from Novochoerkassk, in Novoshakhtinsk, in the village of Martsevo near Taganrog, and in northern Rostov Oblast, near the village of Tarasovskiy. The dead have been identified. The names that have been circulating in the city for a long time were confirmed. The "Commission on 1962" considerably helped in the search.

Journalist Irina Mordar looks at some notes in front of her as she tells us what they managed to learn about the people mentioned in this mournful list.

Here is Viktor Revyakin; he was sitting in a tree. He was killed. Antonina Dmitriyevna Gribova, a hairdresser, was shot in the abdomen at her working place (which means that shots were fired at apartment and shop windows), she died on the operating table. Aleksandr Nikolaevich Dyakonov, a Great Patriotic war veteran, was killed as he was

exiting from a store. His wife told us he had gone to get a pack of cigarettes... Another soldier of the Great Patriotic war died then also—Konstantin Konstantinovich Klep; Gennadiy Terletskiy, a boy, as curious and willing to get into the hottest spots like all boys, was among the crowd that tried to break into the militia building to liberate the workers that had been arrested (in fact, they were not there), and he was shot to death. Aron Shulman, a visitor from Lvov, did not stop when halted by the military patrol on Sobornaya Square and was mortally wounded...

The commission is still searching now for the graves of the seven people sentenced to be executed by firing squad: plant turner S. Sotnikov, electrode plant workers A. Korkach and M. Kuznetsov, machine-building plant foundry cleaner B. Mokrousov, sovkhoz team leader from Volgograd Oblast A. Zaytsev, "Gormash" plant fitter V. Cherepanov, and Boarding School No. 2 cook V. Shuvayev. They were fully cleared of all accusations of banditry now (with the exception of Cherepanov, whose accusation was only partially removed).

The mother of one of them—Sergey Sotnikov—81-year-old Nina Leonidovna, wrote a letter to the city soviet chairman. This letter was recently published in the city newspaper NOVOCHERKASSKIYE VEDOMOSTI. "This letter is from the mother of Sergey Sotnikov, who was convicted and executed for the strike of 1962. I still do not know why my son died, what he was guilty of. Ever since he was a small boy he was honest and just, like his father (war participant, CPSU member since 1918—A.L.). What kind of a criminal was he?" "I am not a bandit. I do not want to die a bandit," Sergey said in his last words at the courtroom. He was accused at the trial of having climbed onto the "overhang" of the pedestrian crossing near the plant to tell the people to send their delegates to plant No. 17 and to the electrode plant in order to stop the work there. Now they have admitted that Sotnikov was no bandit. They admitted it, unfortunately, 29 years after his execution.

The same issue of the newspaper printed, for the first time, the texts of speeches made in those uneasy days on the city radio by A. Mikoyan and F. Kozlov. Those speeches were taped then by the instructor of the Novocherkassk Polytechnic Institute, P. Povarov; they were included in the new documentary film "Pictures from Novocherkassk" by director A. Maryamov.

What were the leaders of our country then saying after urgently arriving at Novocherkassk, what were they telling the people?

"Some people were saying: 'We were suffering, but we wished that somebody had prepared us in advance, say three months before the price hikes.' To that I may answer that when wholesale and retail prices are raised and the action is announced beforehand, it causes speculation and disorder in stores. Everybody will want to buy everything in the stores before that day. The kolkhozes would wait for the price hike to sell their meat. That is why we were

forced to take this measure. It is a temporary measure." This is an excerpt from A. Mikoyan's speech.

"The majority of Novocherkassk blue- and white-collar workers, students, and teachers also understood the policy of our party correctly. Only a few workers from the Budennyy plant could not comprehend the meaning of the current measures and swallowed the bait of some dishonest characters... Certain people who lost control over their actions have created such an unruly atmosphere of lawlessness that the authorities were forced to bring military units into the city and declare a curfew. How can it be possible to use shouting and anarchist actions to discuss important 'political issues' under the conditions of our truly popular socialist democracy, when the role of all public organizations and of the working class is so great?" F. Kozlov said, showing his indignation and displeasure.

The authorities then wanted to teach the disgruntled workers a lesson of fear. That explains the seven unrighteous "shooting" sentences and the dozens of convicts guilty of nothing but participation in the demonstration. But as we know now, power that is sustained by fear does not last long.

#### Official Views Pollution Effect on Public Health, New Legislation

91W X0468B Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 May 91 p 4

[Interview with V. Chiburayev, chief of the Sanitary-Phylactic Main Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, and USSR deputy chief sanitary inspector, by I. Tsarev: "Delay May Mean Death", date and place not specified, first paragraph is TRUD introduction]

[Text] Today the level of civilization of a country is determined, above all, not by technical achievements and industrial might, but by the state of public health and the life expectancy of its population. In terms of these indicators, the Soviet Union, alas, stands in one of the last places. We asked V. Chiburayev, chief of the Sanitary-Phylactic Main Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, USSR deputy chief sanitary inspector, to comment on the situation.

[Tsarev] The state of health of the population of our country, it is no mere chance, calls forth acute alarm among physicians. Judge for yourself.

In terms of life expectancy of women, the Soviet Union is in 47th place (among 60 countries of the world).

Soviet men in terms of this indicator even find themselves in 54th place.

Infants during their first year of life die in our country at twice the rate as in the United States, and at four times the rate in Japan.

death at childbirth in our country is six times higher than in America. What is the reason? What sort of epidemics take away the lives of Soviet people?"

[Chiburayev] Epidemics have nothing to do with this. The statistics indicate that 80 percent of all cases of death are due to chronic noninfectious diseases. Already during the pre-school age, about 20 percent of the children have chronic diseases, and functional deviations in the state of health are observed in every small child. And, as research has shown, plants, factories, and enterprises frequently make their sad contribution to this dismal picture. In many regions of the country, the air, water and soil have been strongly polluted. In 175 cities, a tenfold excess of the maximum permissible concentration of harmful substances in the air is registered. And this means that 40-50 million people are subjected to constant negative influence.

Drinking water produces a high level of viral hepatitis disease in our country. Every year this illness affects approximately half a million people. According to the laboratory research data of the health and epidemic service, every fourth sample of water is dangerous to health in chemical respect, every fifth—in bacteriological respect.

Soil contaminated with pesticides and the salts of heavy metals also makes the situation worse. Incidentally, on the territory of the USSR there exist permanently up to now 14 natural breeding grounds of the plague. And the total area on which there exists the potential danger of being affected by this disease comes to 209 million hectares.

One more significant factor is the unfavorable working conditions that call forth professional disease. They inflict enormous harm, not only to health but also to the economy. Thus, the economic losses from a person's contraction of the "vibration disease" comes to about 20,000 rubles. In 1989 more than 6,000 persons were declared to be afflicted with that disease. All in all, every year 12,000 are registered as suffering for the first time from professional poisonings and diseases.

If we use military terms, today this "army", although morally prepared for any battle, is stripped, barefoot and poorly armed. We lack the main weapon—a law which could stand in the path of this calamity. And when the authorities were confronted with the choice—to close a filthy enterprise, as demanded by the sanitation inspector, and thus to improve the surrounding region, or to continue production, having closed their eyes to the possible consequences, the decision was always identical. The legislative acts in effect did not legally strengthen the responsibility of all state organs, enterprises and institutions for the nonfulfillment of requirements of the normative documents in regard to the guarantee of the medical and epidemiological well-being of the population. And for this reason we place great hopes on the new health legislation, the draft of which has been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In accordance with the

most important international act—the Human Rights Charter—the right of Soviet citizens to an environment not exerting a harmful influence on the health of the present and future generations was formulated.

[Isarev] Will the new sanitation law not be an empty declaration of our rights?

[Chiburayev] It envisages guarantees of its practical implementation. This is the right of citizens to receive complete information on the state of the environment, the right to compensation of damage connected with the influence of the environment, the possibility of appealing in court against the actions of state organs and officials who violate the indicated rights. . . . Thus, for the first time in the practice of Soviet legislation, it makes provisions for responsibility for damage to the health of people, a new system of fines has been developed—for officials in the amount of 3 to 5 salaries, for citizens—200 rubles. Criminal proceedings are not excluded.

[Isarev] I would like to believe. The new law will help to bring about a change in the situation. But when will it enter into force?

[Chiburayev] Russia has already adopted such a law, but the USSR Supreme Soviet keeps delaying the time of its review, although delay in this question, as they say, may mean death. According to calculations by experts, the introduction of the new legislation will require expenditures in the amount of about R2.5 billion. But because of the absence of legal regulation of the provision of sanitary-epidemiological well-being, the state suffers much greater losses—about R33 billion a year. This sum consists of losses from the unproduced national product in connection with the diseases, disability, premature mortality, reduction of labor productivity, and many other components. "Economizing" on health has always turned out to be very expensive.

### 1990 White Sea Pollution Investigation Continues To Produce Theories

9/11/90/041 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 8 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondents K. Belvaninov, O. Volkov, A. Kosulnikov, V. Nedogonov, and V. Umnov, Arkhangelsk Oblast: "A Chasm Full of Stars Opened Up. An Expedition by the Inquisitives' Club Has Returned From the Shore of the White Sea, Where a Year Ago a Disaster That No One Can Explain Occurred"]

#### [Text] Maritime Disease

At that time 6,000,000 starfish were cast onto the shore of Dvinskaya Guba.

"They themselves were to blame," Vasily Atanasievich Sysoyev, chairman of the emergency commission and the oblast environment-protection committee, who is

unaccustomed to getting overly excited, said in a soothing tone of voice. And he cited the findings of the Zoological Institute of the Academy of Sciences:

The starfish had rushed to a dying settlement of mussels on which they feed, but the weather was also unseasonable: the ice had left two weeks early, and there was a strong wind in the direction of the shore. So the gale had cast up onto the shore the starfish that did not manage to get to the bottom.

As the expression goes, if they died, then they died.

One and a half months later USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member A. Yablokov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Committee for Ecology, analyzed the medical statistics in Primorsky Rayon in recent time (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 25 April 1991) and came to the conclusion: NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY had occurred there. No one has been able yet to say with any certainty precisely what had occurred.

So, if, on a beautiful day, millions of animals die under unknown circumstances, who can guarantee that, the next day, people won't die (or become ill) from the same cause?

That is why we are here.

### On the Shore

Our helicopter was flying over the very edge of the water. Vasily Afanasyevich's associates were looking honestly and intently out the windows—this is called an examination of the shore line.

They were already beginning to nod off when suddenly they saw buildings of a strange design, painted green with camouflage nets. "Nenoksa, Missile test range," Sysoyev said with a slight tone of pride, and in such a firm way that it immediately became obvious that any further questions would be improper. "This is where we are needed," we thought to ourselves, but we did not give any sign of what we were thinking.

The helicopter landed in order to take a breather on a hillock overlooking the sea. It began to drizzle. The large northern-type homes on the shore seemed to become gloomier before our very eyes, and the people who rushed out of the village toward the helicopter were pulling on their sweaters and tying kerchiefs on their heads as they came running. The people know that the people flying on helicopters are usually the leadership—it was not important what caliber they are. You can always ask the leadership a vitally important question: is it possible to eat the fish?

It turned out that at that time, a year ago, a telephone message had been sent to all the coastal settlements: just in case, do not eat the fish. But the second one, which soon canceled the first one, had not arrived at Svuzma. Which, incidentally, is not surprising—there isn't any

telephone in Svuzma, just as there isn't any communication at all. There is absolutely nothing here—no electricity, for example. Flour is dropped to them once every half-year. In order to get kerosene, they have to go to the closest populated point, which is 12 kilometers away. However, they do have a television receiver, which the entire village looks at from time to time, by hooking up a low-power portable generator. They also have a tiny little wooden church without crosses, but with a persistent smell of urine, that does not yield to the sea breezes. And the appropriate inscriptions.

The people do not grumble—they're used to this life. Only the oldtimers recall that, immediately after the war, they had electrical light and communication, but then everything had disappeared somewhere.

As for the starfish, the residents of Svuzma took a rather calm attitude to their appearance a year ago, although this was the first time they had seen anything like this. Perhaps they had other things to worry about. They really needed to have at least one telephone. It would be nice to get newspapers a bit more frequently than once a month ("A war could come, and we wouldn't even know it"). But, most importantly, it would be nice to be able to eat the fish. Since, generally speaking, there isn't anything else to eat.

It turns out that it is indeed possible to eat the fish. Except that people are not allowed to catch them—the fish protection service has not yet given its authorization.

We managed to find out a few other things at another settlement—Pertominsk. The chairman of the settlement soviet told us that last year seven men had died of cancer before they had reached retirement age, that submarines frequently appear on the horizon, and that a year ago a whale had been tossed up onto the shore. They had attempted to tow the whale back into the sea, but when they had been unable to do so, they had eaten it, despite all the bans issued by the oblast. At the Pertominsk sel'po [general store] you can buy real American Marlboro cigarettes. The narrow sidewalks here are made of pine. If you see someone coming toward you, you stop and let him pass, or you greet one another and then walk around one another courteously. Our traveling companions really bought a lot of bread, explaining that the bread here is the tastiest on the shore.

### Hysterics

We are looking in the wrong place and for the wrong thing! Why, then, does the most unnatural version look out to be natural? Because so many "ifs" would have had to combine during an infinitesimal unit of time. But the reasons that would seem to be obvious (those that are behind the fences of closed projects) are easily swept away.

It was not until a month after the beginning of the disaster that the emergency commission began operating, and much of the physical evidence had proven to



be lost forever. The piles and piles of dead starfish—the largest one as big as the palm of your hand—had been burned and buried long ago, (along with the mussels and the crabs). And the sea water had already been renewed many times, so that even an electron microscope itself would not notice in it what have been visible to the naked eye a year previously.

For official ecologists who have been given even the slightest amount of power, of course, it is more advantageous to prove that the mussels were to blame for all of this. Mussels are fools—you can't get anything out of them. So we have to search for real ecologists—even if they might be a little "nutty"—because they are the only ones who have grabbers.

### Grabber

It turned out that in a supersecret military unit in Nenoksa there is a piece of equipment for pumping military fuel. The only one in the entire district. So now we proceed along the chain that was constructed by Severodvinsk deputy Oleg Khimanych.

On 7 December 1989 in the White Sea, 105 kilometers to the northwest of Severodvinsk, a submarine has an accident. According to the rumors, one missile failed to fire. It was necessary to jettison one of the fuel components—15.8 tons of nitric acid—into the sea.

But other components remained in the missiles! And they also had to be dumped somewhere. Where else if not at coastal Nenoksa? The military themselves admit that in January the piece of equipment was operating.

Everything would seem to match up perfectly: the submarine moors at the shore, the highly toxic fuel is urgently pumped out of it, and it is dumped directly onto the ice. In the spring the ice floe floats away entirely into the sea and melts somewhere nearby.

"You will still see things that are not right in the Arctic," Khimanych said. "Along the shore—and I have walked as far as Tiksi—entire army complexes that have served their time are rusting on their foundations—with antennas, radar stations, structures for official purposes and for everyday purposes, pools of motor vehicles and tractors... Don't dig there, guys."

### Facts That Do Not Prove Anything

On 24 October 1990, when petroleum products were being washed away from the edge of the land that had been occupied by a fuel and lubricants depot at a certain military unit, 19.8 kilograms of petroleum products got into the water.

On 13 December, when engine fuel was being pumped into the Kineshma tanker, 650 kilograms spilled into the sea.

On 19 December, 912 kilograms of petroleum products were dumped from a VMF [navy] vessel.

In February 1990 the locomotive roundhouse at Kuloy station dumped runoff water containing petroleum into the Nenyushka River (750 cubic meters a day).

In order to supply the population of Severodvinsk with water, the Sevmashpredpriyatiye PO [Production Association] built a dam at the source of the Solza River. An area of 240 hectares of forest was flooded, and the forest died.

### At the Test Range

"Keep in mind the fact that you are being given a pass only as an exception," a person wearing civilian clothing, who proved to be the senior person, told us at the station. "And remember, incidentally, that you have the right to spend only one day in Nenoksa."

All the buildings of Nenoksa ran slowly down to the lake, leaving on the hill a place for two wooden churches with a bell tower. Nenoksa gleamed with the fresh boards of the recently built homes. And Nenoksa, finally, was surprisingly calm. Except that we saw rising over our heads nearby searchlight towers of unknown purpose, which subsequently proved to be the invariable attribute of a missile test range.

"My name is Fomenko. I'm the unit commander," a captain first rank said, introducing himself, and then he suddenly added: "Do you know that there used to be very big salt mines in this settlement. The ladies would order stylish hats directly from Paris. At one time Vera Figner was exiled here, and the local supervisor of gendarmerie made her move to another village?"

The commander proved to be a good local historian. Although his circle of interests is not limited to that.

"Our unit was created for the purpose of testing new types of equipment," he said, sweeping aside all questions at once. "We get an experimental 'article' from the plant. We equip it here with the necessary apparatus and launch it. We cannot discuss the charges or warheads."

The fact that missiles from Nenoksa have been flying out into the Pacific Ocean for about 30 years is something that can be told to you by practically any local lad. And the locals used to take a calm attitude toward the explosions which at one time used to occur at the hill close to the settlement practically twice a month.

"We have a special instructional guide," Vladimir Nikolayevich explained, "according to which, when we conduct especially dangerous tests, we are obliged to take all the settlement residents out of town. So we do that: we put them on trains going to Severodvinsk. Then they come back."

"Wouldn't it be easier just to move the test range somewhere else?"

"We recommended to the command element that a special bomb shelter be built in Nenoksa, but for the time being there has not been any decision. In addition,



the last test that represented any potential danger to the inhabitants occurred in 1984. Currently this pertains only to the village of Syuzma: it is located directly on the missile flight path. As you can realize, the articles are experimental, and absolutely anything could happen."

In Syuzma we did not hear any claims expressed against the military.

If one speaks of starfish, then Captain 1st Rank Fomenko proposes a natural version.

"Nothing from our side could have got there! Missile fuel is basically ordinary kerosene. Leakage is completely precluded, and we even use fuel that is packaged at the plant."

"But wasn't there an instance when, a half-year ago, there arose an emergency situation on a submarine, and, according to the instructional guide, it had to jettison all the fuel, and, incidentally, according to completely unofficial data, the fuel from that submarine was pumped at your base?"

"I report that that incident actually did occur. It was an extremely critical situation, when absolutely anything could have happened. And we were actually forced to pump the fuel out of the submarine's tanks into our own storage tanks, using the equipment assigned to us. Not a single enterprise—neither in Arkhangelsk or in Severodvinsk—wanted to accept it. So we had to convey it ourselves to special plants. But that was the only incident in the past 20 years."

"And you completely preclude the possibility that your own missile could have fallen into the water of the bay?"

"There have been accidents, but practically all of them have been over the Arctic coast. We launch missiles to tremendous distances..."

"But why are you constantly talking about starfish?" Vasily Afanasyevich Sysoyev asked, clasping his hands. "In the Kara Sea, in Amderma, the military dumped onto the ice covering Toin-To—the only fresh-water lake in the district—some kind of trash. Soon the ice will begin to melt, and the settlement will be left without water."

#### In Polar Amderma

People have been forbidden to drink here. Not in the sense of a dry law—in that respect you can drink everything that you can get. It's just the water you're forbidden to drink.

Instead of the customary display with photographs of advanced production workers, there is an iconostasis with skillfully drawn portraits of the regiment's advanced officers and warrant officers.

Last winter, fuel (according to various estimates, from 20 to 120 tons) quietly poured out of a boiler room on the

shore of beautiful Toin-To. And it found its way onto the ice covering the lake just 70 meters away from the water intake.

Petroleum products are special. In the North, to prevent the fuel from crystallizing in the freezing temperatures, so-called "I [letter] fluid" is added to it. It is ethyl cellosol, with a large number of poisonous and toxic additives.

The spot was discovered accidentally. But it was not until a month later, when the fuel had already had time to be absorbed into the ice for a depth of approximately 40 centimeters, that rumors began to fly through the settlement about the dirty water, the increase in the illness rate among children, and about infections that no one could explain. Quiet panic arose in the kitchens. In the middle of the school year, the children were suddenly taken out and sent to "the Big Country." With airplane tickets at the very peak of the winter, just like during the vacation season...

In a big city you can "sit down at the telephone" and call the ZhEK [housing-operation office], SES [sanitation and epidemiology station], or the rayon ispolkom. In Amderma almost everything is departmental, is under the jurisdiction of various ministries, and you have a tough time figuring out who is responsible for what! In "the Big Country," at the Arkhangelsk Oblast Ispolkom, people say that even the toilets here are subordinate to different ministries. A neighbor who wants to make a trip there, even an urgent one, finds the road closed to him...

The water-supply line belongs to the army. For a month the leadership remained silent. They simply began to set fire to the spot, right on the ice. Nothing happened.

By then the rumors had reached the okrug and oblast centers. Commissions made loud noises. They conducted a search for a long time by their joint efforts, but they could not find the culprit (as a result, everyone was satisfied to accept an abstract figure of a handless private who had not completely tightened a certain nut).

In the final analysis, after computing the almost 2 million rubles worth of damages and having expressed a large amount of abusive language, people remembered about the approaching spring and the thawing of the snow. The military were required to remove the dirty ice immediately.

Currently the operations have been practically completed. For the time being, the analyses conducted by specialists from Arkhangelsk indicate that the fuel did not get into the water. Although the concentration of "I" fluid in the ice exceeds the PDK [maximum permissible concentration] by a factor of 1000.

"Why get needlessly indignant?" Yevgeniy Obertenyuk, state inspector for environmental protection, explained. "I spent probably half a year of my life to impose a fine of 350 rubles on the regiment for maintaining a dump in

the middle of the military housing area. It is impossible to reason with them. In addition, we are all tied together with the same rope. The chief of our SMU [construction-installation administration], at a rally, shouts that he is in favor of a nuclear-free North, and someone from the crowd asks, "Well, buddy, wasn't it you how built that test range for them?" We get indignant, but good-naturedly. We joke that, after the next explosion on Novaya Zemlya, the acid rain will wash off all the starfish on the aircraft wings... But if we can talk seriously, we are living together, and we are also dirtying up the environment together..."

### Visiting the Rear Admiral

Rear Admiral Nikolay Pakhomov, chief of staff of the White Sea Naval Base, was practically the only military man in that emergency commission "to deal with the starfish." He unrolled for us a top secret map of the White Sea, in the middle of which were two small squares: "submerged explosives."

"They're not dangerous. Most probably. But we really don't know what's lying on the bottom there, or what it has to do with the starfish," Nikolay Pavlovich explained. "It's just too expensive to find out... Of course, they might explode," he said, anticipating our question. Then he said that the life of a general in the North is no bed of roses. You yourself have to dig out the stumps and plant the potatoes—and in confirmation of that he stretched out his scratch-covered hands.

Obviously we had poked our way into the wrong office.

### At the KGB

The official oak doors slammed behind us.

"Yes, our associate went there. At first we thought it was a provocation. But when we were convinced that there was no deliberate intention there and that everything was natural, we closed the case."

### Alongside the Submarines

For the most part, the city of Severodvinsk, which until recently had been absolutely closed, is not a city at all, but something like a "make-weight" to the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise. If the country had not suddenly felt a critical need for submarines, this city would probably not have arisen at all.

We did not know anything about the SMP [Northern Machine-Building Enterprise]. It was known, of course, that the enterprise has been producing submarines since the late 1930's, that new models are tested here in the White Sea, and that, in the final analysis, old nuclear reactors that have exhausted their service life are also replaced at this machine-building enterprise.

The submarines actually go out to their tests directly from the plant's slips and carry out test firings not too far away from the shore. And, yes, the reactors are replaced,

but deputy director Viktor Petrushin does not know how that is done or what happens to the fuel and the housings.

"We have a special shop where the military work, and not even I am allowed to enter it. The used reactors are removed from our territory, but no one knows where they go. I have been living here for 30 years and and so far I haven't heard anything about any special burying ground in the North. True, there have been rumors to the effect that they have been dumped into the Barents Sea, but those are only rumors."

Although, Viktor Antonovich assures us, that is just a minor point. And even if the reactors are dumped into the northern seas, they will not make their presence known for at least 300 years or so. But the White Sea has a chance of dying much earlier than that.

"You figure it out yourself: in the course of one year our enterprise alone carried out to the ordinary city dump 200,000 tons of trash. The city has two such enterprises, plus a large number of small plants. The share of highly toxic waste is no less than 10 percent. And the level of the ground water in the oblast is only half a meter deep..."

"Incidentally, the killing of our starfish," Viktor Antonovich reminded us, "could well be linked with the leakage of highly toxic waste. And if that is confirmed, you can be assured that the starfish are only the first signal."

### People and Starfish

It would seem that the sea that has fallen into the area of our strategic interests is doomed. It will simply be painted white on the maps, and be provided with observation towers. Go to the right and there will be KPP [regimental command posts]. Go to the left and there will be a barbed-wire fence. If you want to live long enough to retire, don't let your eyes stray to the left or right.

And that is how people have lived until now. So far, because of someone's obvious oversight, information about the unfortunate starfish did not leak out into the world. At first that information caused a ruckus only in certain free-thinking capitals.

But when people begin to be afraid, the serried ranks break down and the order that the army heart holds so dear collapses in an instant. Slightly at first, a few people are beginning to guess that here, in the White Sea, people would look much more sympathetically not at missile-tracking stations, but at multicolored beach umbrellas and cabanas.

And so, from completely banal fear, there is born a large freedom-loving idea, and people appear who are impatient and who up until now were unknown in these parts of the country.

We, of course, found a person like this. And, of course, the only one in all of Severodvinsk. That person proved to be Emiliya Ivanovna Galibina, a teacher at the local polytechnicum.

It was she, together with her students, who organized the mass burials of Arkhangelsk flora and fauna (they walked through the housing area with a child's coffin), carried out at the secret project a defiant ecological volunteer clean-up day, and, finally, as something absolutely unheard of, invited Swedish schoolchildren to the closed city.

So the starfish had not died in vain. Things had started working: a flame leaped up from them. And fire in the cold North is a big force. Even in the hands of just one person.

Somewhere in Volgograd or Ufa, Emiliya Ivanovna would be lost in a crowd of people at a rally. What has already become a tradition throughout the country still has to be drummed into people's heads here.

Emiliya Ivanovna had learned from the newspapers about the death of the starfish. It was precisely at that time that she got a new ecological idea—the idea of writing a letter to USSR People's Deputy A. Yablokov. The letter proved to be successful. It was prepared in accordance with all the democratic rules: with appreciation "for activities in the fight for a clean environment." And the guys really made a bit effort—they got 15,000 signatures on the letter.

There is a fear that the story of Severodvinsk democracy that was engendered by the tragedy will remain incompletely written. Neither Emiliya Ivanovna nor any other bold individual, even if such a person could be found, is capable of fighting all alone. And our democracy does not yet know any other form of freedom-loving other than the struggle.

Will Emiliya's enthusiastic zeal last for long? Who else, then, will have to be thrown up onto that shore in order to pull the unhurried inhabitants of the Arctic from the places they have occupied for so long, and to excite them with the intoxicant of real freedom?

People say that it has already been about five years since the cod left this sea. But the people are calm. There are no cod, and there is nothing you can do about it. The next species to go will be the "khek."

#### On the Bottom of the Sea

When KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reported its intention to begin its own investigation, the editorial office received a large number of telephone calls. One of them was a special one. Pavel Pavlovich Sapozhnikov, a retired colonel from Arkhangelsk, said that, a couple of times, he had heard a story to the effect that, in the mid-1950's, a tremendous quantity of chemical ammunition had been buried in the White Sea.

It was no easy matter to find two participants in those ancient events. Two retirees—Aleksandr Stepanovich Kozlov, who had served at that time as a warrant officer, and Ivan Vasilyevich Gilushkov, who at that time had been a company commander.

The incident had apparently occurred in the summer of 1954. For three or four months in a row, day and night—true, the nights here are as bright as the day-time—military trains containing shells had arrived at the port of Severodvinsk. No one knows what kind of shells they were: there were no distinctive markings on the boxes, although there had been rumors to the effect that they were chemical weapons. Especially since it was precisely at that time that army was frontally armed.

Soldiers—it is difficult to state definitely whether they were from the battalion or the regiment—took the boxes directly off the train and loaded them into large-capacity barges. The barges were taken out to sea and then returned empty 10-12 hours later.

"At that time we did not think about what we were sending out to sea," Ivan Vasilyevich admitted. "It is only now that the idea has popped into my head: what if this is what killed the starfish? Because it could have taken this amount of time for the sea water to erode the shell casings..."

That might be so. A positive reaction to mustard gas was produced by analyses of samples of starfish (as well as fish that live at the sea bottom) that were conducted at the Arkhangelsk Fish Combine. Incidentally, the results were refuted by the commission on the grounds that there had been only qualitative, rather than quantitative, research.

Repeated analysis (there has been no success in establishing when it was carried out) did not confirm the presence of mustard gas. Let us consider, nevertheless, that that substance decomposes quickly in sea water.

As we have learned from a reply from the Ministry of Defense to a question raised by RSFSR People's Deputy A. Butorin, prior to 1989, on the basis of official documents, it was authorized to dump ammunition into the sea. Because until the present time the enterprises do not have any recycling need for them...

Therefore it would appear to us to be an extremely important task to establish this burial site. We ask for a response from everyone who took part in 1954 in the loading, transporting, and burial of those mysterious boxes. Our telephone number is 257-27-65.

Perhaps this is only a made-up story. Perhaps it does not even have anything to do with the killing of the starfish. When we set out for Arkhangelsk, we wanted to investigate what had killed the starfish in the White Sea. But apparently we realized what can kill people.

And it can "explode" absolutely anywhere.

Finally, we managed to find out the main point: the White Sea is practically the cleanest one in the Soviet Union.

### **Zalygin Sees Shortcomings in National Environmental Policies, Institutions**

91BN05054 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by Sergey Zalygin, chairman of the Ekologiya i Mir [Ecology and Peace] Association, under rubric: "An Ecologist's Notes: Nature Day—Eternity Day"]

[Text] Nature Day... World Environmental Protection Day...

Doesn't the word "day" sound strange in this context? Doesn't it reflect a certain waning of an awareness that reduces a global problem of our existence to a one-day propaganda measure? Let's just talk about this topic for a day, but when what? Will everything continue in the way that it has been going up until now?

Why not—by analogy, of course—institute a "life day"? Or an "eternity day"? Because nature is the cause of life. It is only through nature that life exists, life which, even though it is not itself eternal, it is nevertheless part of eternity, isn't it?

But still we understand absolutely all the world surrounding us only as the environment for our own habitation, and it is well known how we deal with property, especially if it is not personally owned, but belongs to the state and the nation. Nature was created only once, and it can also be enjoyed only once, without any hopes of renewing it or rejuvenating it. So it is already becoming clear to us that the time period during which nature and man can coexist is expiring and that it is still possible to do something to postpone the fatal date and the next "Nature Day"—alas!—the only one in the yearly cycle.

Properly speaking, nowadays there is no longer an area of human activity that does not have a direct relationship to the ecology.

The reader certainly knows already that for me ecology is primarily the problem of water resources, or, to put it more precisely, the problem of water reclamation, the so-called improvement of the land for purposes of increasing fertility by changing the water balance on that land.

Once again that word "improvement"! But how frequently do our noble impulses end up as inconceivable worsenings? Once again there is an analogy between social phenomena and the use of the environment: at one time we thought of changing the nature of man. We did not succeed, but we caused incredible damage on nature as such.

The initiator, and also to a certain degree the direct originator, of our gigantic construction projects was no one else but Stalin.

The first experiment conducted by Stalin in the mid-1930's was the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

As a result of the repressions, and primarily the liquidation of the "kulak class," the state had at its disposal at that time millions of unskilled and unpaid working hands, and it was necessary to find some application for them.

It was precisely earth-moving operations, which were almost unmechanized (and partially also the concrete-pouring operations), that required neither skill nor quality, and from that point of view the White Sea-Baltic Canal justified itself not only technically, but also ideologically, inasmuch as it became a "higher" educational institution in the area of "re-forging" and socialist competition.

The press at that time was replete with rapturous articles. Authors (including Gorkiy himself) "responded" with fighting essays. Performing artists performed at construction sites. And the "Belomorstroy" [White Sea-Baltic Construction Project] trade mark was assigned to tobacco and other articles (and is preserved to this day).

The indoctrinated participants in the construction—the laborers and the highly skilled specialists who were awarded state decorations—were proud of it. A rather large number of those people also possessed the title of professor, and their work at Belomorstroy and on the Canal imeni Moscow was something that added to their fame.

But no one at such time considered or even recalled (or recalls now) the human sacrifices that resulted from the "nationwide" construction projects.

The experiment was conducted and it became even more widespread during the postwar years when carrying out the "Great Stalinist Plan for the Transformation of Nature" at such construction sites as the Kuybyshev, Volgograd, Tsimlyansk, Bratsk, Krasnyarsk, and Novosibirsk GES, the Karakumy and Volga-Don canals, and many other projects.

And that is precisely the "methodology" that has existed in the USSR to this day. To a certain extent it has indeed changed (for example, the people working at the construction sites are no longer prisoners, but are hired ones). And also to a certain extent there has been an improvement in the visibility of a project's having passed through all the levels of technical evaluation, as well as a more "intelligent" appearance as a whole. But the factor that continues to be the main one is not technical evaluation, but coordination, that is, the opinion of variously highly placed individuals.

The misfortunes have been aggravated by the fact that the USSR does not have any environmental-protection legislation. Nor does it exist, and one could scarcely expect it to exist, in the currently existing state system (or, rather, lack of system).

A totalitarian state cannot be legal if only because, even if it does create a law, it does so for itself alone, and that state itself must be brought to responsibility for having violated the legality. The law has in mind the existence of a minimum of two completely equal juridical entities, the relationships between which are regulated by that law, but if there is only one entity (the state), the law becomes a fiction. In essence, that law is not needed: instructions would suffice.

In their turn, the answerable entities must possess the right of ownership and must possess property, and it is that property that they legally protect and multiply. If there is nothing to protect, then what purposes does the law serve?

And if the state has not been prepared for privatization, if it still cannot define the reciprocal obligations between itself and the newly fledged property owner, won't we be putting our head in our hands a few years from now as a result of this "measure," and won't we begin a perestroika of the current perestroika? Apparently the need for privatization has been proven. But any proof requires practical execution—how? when? in what volume? with the participation of what individuals? under what conditions, including ecological? Are we really supposed to believe that this is normal, that the word "privatization" in our country does not live side by side with the word "ecology," or that this neighborliness does not exist?

Well, for the time being, this question is not resolved, and the activity of all our state environmental-protection organizations—committees, commissions, and ministries—cannot be effective. And might be a complete farce.

Under these conditions not even the court can rise to the defense of the environment. In the USSR not a single major project involving the use of the environment has ever been opposed in the court. There has never been any court proceeding of any significance involving an environmental-protection case.

Individual poachers have been brought to court.

The fines imposed on enterprises that pollute the water, the air, and the land are insignificant and are paid for at the expense of the very same state funds.

In the United States as many as 85 percent of all projects involving the use of the environment pass through the court system, and that is natural: no use of a natural resource has even been, or ever could be, unconditionally beneficial for everyone, and only the court is capable of weighing all the pros and cons. In the United States also, before beginning to design a particular project involving the use of the environment, one must report that fact in the press.

Perestroika is frequently explained by only political motivations, and then by economic ones, but no one ever brings either type of motivations to their end. However, in the final analysis, the most essential thing is the

ecological condition of the country and the state, and its prospects. In the process of perestroika, ecological disasters are becoming, essentially speaking, everyday phenomena. According to the most modest computations, 16 percent of the entire territory in the USSR is already disaster territory which, according to the standards that are generally accepted in the civilized world, is unsuitable for the normal existence of man.

We combat ecological disasters in a procedure of applying emergency measures, not eliminating, but smoothing over the consequences and in no way exerting an effect upon the causes of those disasters. But ecological well-being cannot be achieved either first of all, or simultaneously with political and economic well-being. It can become only a remote result of the stabilization of both of them. Ecological well-being is possible only if there is intelligent production activity by the state and society.

Adam Smith defined production in three components: labor, capital, and nature. But we work half-heartedly, we do not have any correctly organized labor, and we do not have capital. Essentially speaking, we have reduced all of production to nature, to the use of its resources. You have to admit that socialism posed a threat to Adam Smith!

The question arises: if that is so, then don't we have any hopes for a stable ecology?

Alas, that might be so. But there is something else that is clear: under these conditions, ecological crimes must be stopped by the state with special rigidity. The public must be especially vigilant, and must not allow anyone to twist it around his little finger. Because the pernicious projects—all those changes of runoff, dikes like the Leningrad and Karagobaz dikes, water reservoirs like the Kakhovskoye Reservoir, water dividers like the Astrakhan water divider, and others—all these backslidings to the Stalinist mania for gigantic projects continue to be presented as achievements of our recent past, and it is recommended to us that we continue to proceed along the path of these "achievements."

State criminals in the field of the use of the environment currently feel that they are the heroes of the day, since they do not encounter any resistance on the part of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Ecology or the Ministry (State Committee) for Environmental Protection.

All of this is occurring before our very eyes, frankly because the public is not organized, and the departments, which had started to lose control of themselves at the beginning of perestroika, are beginning once again to organize into powerful offices and firms, and one can observe the creation of a neobureaucracy that is a bit stronger than the "stagnant" one. That one was afraid of the leadership, but this one is afraid of no one.

The ecology must self-determine itself more precisely in the modern world—no one can do that for the ecology.



The farther that science goes, the more it subdivides into specialties (and there has already arisen the science that deals with the names and specializations of individual sciences). At the same time it also, as it were, subdivides nature into small and then even smaller pieces, swiftly crowding out our ideas concerning nature as being an integrated phenomenon and organism. Ecology, for the first time since the ancient Greeks, perceives nature as something whole, and in that sense it is close to philosophy and religions (or they are close to it).

All the sciences prior to ecology developed and satisfied at the expense of nature man's newer and newer needs. Ecology is the first science to pose the question of limiting those needs. It is a new dietology of human existence.

Thus, ecology is just as much scientific as it is suprascientific. Ecology is just as much a science as it is a social movement. In and of itself, as the sum of various deductions, it does not cost anything and will not achieve anything, will not achieve any real results.

Unlike classic science, and even more so modern science, it must be not only comprehensible to people, but must also become part of their everyday life, part of their psychology.

Thus, it defines the forward movement of the new "ecological civilization," in which there is a change in the role and status of science, and, I repeat, changes from a means of developing human needs into both a means and a method of limiting them. The transition from one civilization to another has always been difficult and dangerous.

Nor do we have ecological education. Where are we to get it? How can we get it if there is no law governing the citizen?

Under these conditions education becomes propaganda, and nothing more.

But here is something interesting: all that has to happen is for a system of individually owned farms to arise, and the farmers develop an interest in acquiring ecological education. Why is that so? Well, because ecologically pure agricultural produce costs much more. And the psychological factor, of course, plays a role: people want to begin a new job cleanly, and to oppose it to the unclean practice that prevails all around.

So we must definitely not postpone ecological education until the time when environmental-protection legislation has been created and goes into effect.

Moreover, ecological education must ennoble our education in general—secondary and higher, technical education and education in the humanities.

The fact of the matter also is that, whereas in foreign countries "personnel factories" at all levels are producing enrichment specialists and every kind of enrichment is, of course, selfish, we are training specialists in

destroying society and the state, and that altruism actually proves to be a type of irresponsibility that is worse than any other kind of selfishness.

Ecology as a science, as a way of life, as a standard of behavior, is that ideal that has remained for us unspotted and irreproachable.

And what is true continues to be true: education without an ideal is no more than technology, technology that is not far-reaching, and that often is also blind. It is another matter that the ideal may prove to be a false one. We have gone through that. We know that, but, for the ecological ideal this is precluded. In that ideal there not only is no falsehood, but also, in principle, there cannot be any falsehood, to the same degree in which it does not exist in any activity that is aimed directly at the salvation of man. Activity of this kind can be successful or unsuccessful. That is already another matter, but the principle always remains high and noble. Having said that, I would like to end my notes, but first I would like to formulate my proposals:

—we need an international ecology school.

—we need an international ecology inspectorate.

—we need an international ecology court.

#### **Rector on New International Ecological Academy in Alma-Ata**

9/14/90/5034 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with Professor Marat Makhmedovich Teletmayev, rector of the Ecology Academy, by L. Vaydman: "The Phenomenon of Large Systems: in Alma-Ata the World's First International Ecological Academy, InterEkola, Has Been Established"]

[Text] This institution of higher learning is confronted with the task of training highly skilled specialists to protect the environment and for rational use of nature; for conducting fundamental and applied research as well as for organizing its own intellectual base.

In other words, from now on the broad public can rely on not only the directives of street demonstrations and the conclusions of the "fronts." Ecological problems are being put on a very serious scientific base.

Today KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA is publishing an interview by its correspondent with the first rector of the first academy, Prof Marat Teletmayev.

[Vaydman] There is the old truth that the times dictate style. In this context, Marat Makhmedovich [Teletmayev], how much will the establishing of yet another institution of higher learning in Kazakhstan cost the taxpayers? There certainly are problems of ecology and our ecological situation is most tense. But all the same from whose pocket will come the clearly numerous millions?

[Edmontayev] You can calm the taxpayer down as we do not intend to invade his pocket. Nor will the academy make any claim against the state budget. We must learn to fend for ourselves. And we must earn as much as is needed to put things on a modern technical and economic base.

The issue is that our institution of learning will have a commercial character. That is, it will introduce the principle of paid instruction adopted throughout the entire civilized world. I do not see in this any retreats from our social victories.

But at the same time, since I am pragmatic about this, I see a different problem. Over the decades our institutions of learning have not worked for a specific client, rather creating a "general" educational system. They turned out specialists. They were merely certain abstract specialists. On the one hand, these were very essential and, on the other, they were not essential to anyone. Certainly, no one ordered them and did not assume any responsibility for them. And the student, if a very good student, satisfied his curiosity at state expense.

Such an organization of education at present is simply purposeless. Under the conditions of a total deficit of specialists, when we needed simply literate workers who had been trained at least a bit in one or another area, such an approach was completely justified. But now there is a completely different situation. We don't need people "in general," but rather persons who possess profound knowledge in a very specific sphere. Of course, possessing a high level of culture and profoundly erudite.

We intend to train ecologists for the very specific interests of the client. If he needs a highly qualified specialist in the ecology of water resources, then the specialist will be completely, I would say exhaustively, trained for this specialty, even if he was the only one.

Can you feel the difference in comparison with an ordinary VUZ [higher educational institution]? The training of a single specialist would cost 30,000-60,000 rubles. No budget could tolerate such a load. For this reason, we will organize our entire economy on a commercial basis. The state actually has no money. But there is money among the enterprises which more and more need ecological specialists of a world class. And of course these cost a lot.

Incidentally, all of this is in no way an innovation. Paid instruction has been introduced at the Dzhambul Hydromeliorative Institute, the Pavlodar Industrial Institute and at the Kazan University as well as certain other VUZes in the nation. In no instance can we go beyond reasonable limits or all the more make a certain "business" out of education. But the training of ecological specialists should be on the highest level. We have set this task for ourselves without any concessions for the traditional "difficulties" or other circumstances. If, for example, it turns out that somewhere there is an expert who has investigated a specific aspect of the problem to the very bottom and has mastered this as no one else, we

will find an opportunity to invite him to us. And this can be done in different ways, for a certain permanent post or for giving a special lecture series. And it should make no difference from where the person comes, from Novocheerkassk, Japan, Kazan or Paris. In this regard in economic terms we are dependent solely on ourselves. But, you will agree, there is a paradox here as with the enormous intellectual potential which has accumulated in our nation and which is largely concentrated in the VUZes, we have our hand out as, having learned a great deal and being capable of much, we have not learned to earn enough to maintain our institution of learning.

All of this is elementary as if there is demand there should also be supply. A completely healthy exchange. But this for us initially was greatly distorted and at a certain stage we did not immediately realize that the stage of a total deficit was over and it was time to move on to a qualitatively different level in the organization of education. For this reason, in the conventional view we are seen more as parasites on state support than the merchants of material goods. In actuality, that is not the case at all. It is merely a question of being able to materialize an idea. You will agree that all the same this is nonsense when science is incapable of supporting itself. We must not take millions from the lean state budget but rather create an intellectual product worth billions for it.

[Vaydman] I would like to know how this can be done. The economy of InterEkolA is based upon commercial principles and there are no particular problems here for if a metallurgical or a chemical production combine wants to have a world-class ecologist, then let it pay for his training, otherwise it will lose more in penalties. That is, something is taken from one pocket and put in another. But does this mean "materialize"? In nature nothing is added from such manipulations.

[Telemtayev] You are not completely right. If up to a certain moment one person has known something, after an exchange of the information many know it. Sometimes very many. In nature, as you say, the most different things appear from such "manipulations." What we are engaged in is another opportunity for turning over financial resources. What are assets per se? By themselves they do not mean anything. I mean the mere fact of their being there or not.... The assets must be put into circulation and forced to interact in order that as a result something material arises.

If by turning over the obtained money we provide for the interaction of the instructor with the student, then a completely new product, an information product, arises. In other words, a specialist is born who has perfectly mastered the entire essential "set" of knowledge. And this is a powerful tool in modern production.

What I mean is, his. In a desire to make as many turnovers of financial assets as possible, what we are doing is one of these but repeating in a multiplicity. Involving major scientists in the undertaking, we will

instruct people, creating new directions in production activity. The specialists trained by us will use the obtained knowledge in carrying out ecological programs in contributing to ever-new opportunities for turning over the financial resources. Here lies the root of many problems. In any economy, everything should circulate and in the process of such "whirling" new commodities are created. Hence it is not a matter of the amount of funds; it is not one of moving them from pocket to pocket.

Let me point out, incidentally, that if it were a question of earning money generally, we could do this differently. For example, we would establish a cooperative of programmers operating in the area of information sciences. We would have a certain classroom and the product would sell like hotcakes. Without any problem we would have enough for living and a little more. But we are setting to work on a matter the results of which will determine the future and the fate of generations. I am saying this to you without any hidden motives. Because I left a completely comfortable university chair, I moved here to the Academy where all of us can scarcely expect a calm life.

[Vaydman] Are you an idealist?

[Telemtayev] I have already pointed out that I am a strict pragmatist. At one time I completed the Novosibirsk Electrical Engineering Institute, I worked at a plant and then in a polytechnical institute. I defended both dissertations in Leningrad. In the area of cybernetics and information theory. This is a concrete science far removed from "idealism," but very close to the ideal by which I understand our universe, the very act of the creation of nature.

The subject of my scientific interests is control of so-called Large Systems in which one could put, for an example, water, air, the biosphere, neosphere, social and so forth.

This requires profound analysis from the standpoint of systems analysis. I have made such an attempt, to create a model which would make it possible to describe Large Systems with the aid of several languages, in other words, from several viewpoints at once.

There is no need for us to go back to very distant times as history is so subjective that at present there is scarcely any researcher who cannot propose his own variation for reading it. Let us take the quite recent years. Why have things not gone well with perestroika? One thing goes wrong and then another, and a society there is a growing nervousness and disappointment in the proclaimed ideals. Why? Because the solving of the problems of the Large System—in the given instance the social system—cannot be done partially. A part cannot be greater than the whole and the solution to the problem must be approached comprehensively and consistently. But how is it possible, please tell me, to view the social life of man in isolation from the water resource situations, the soil and atmosphere?

Most importantly, let us try to understand once and for all that Large Systems have their own patterns of existence and they include a definite and unconditional passage of time. We would be very pleased if the most urgent task for society—as the situation demands—could be solved in two years. But decades will be needed to find the interaction within and outside the Systems. In encountering the growing contradictions, we cannot understand that we simply are unable to resolve them more rapidly than is dictated by objective circumstances.

An elementary example in illustration.

A motor vehicle which weighs five tons and travels at a speed of 90 km an hour cannot be turned instantly to the right or left, let alone thrown into reverse. Definite inertia operates in any motion. But the motor vehicle—road system consists of just two elements. But Large Systems, including economic ones, are made up of tens of thousands. And with their own time, with their own internal patterns of existence.

Can all of this be turned all at once?

It cannot.

We are dominated by a revolutionary consciousness which has been established over more than one generation. The aim is more than noble, that is for the first time to create for living man an existence worthy of him. Hence the motto of perestroika, a revolution in the revolution. We are endeavoring more quickly, in a single leap, to emerge from the socioeconomic crisis which we ourselves have organized. But we in no way can realize that the Large Systems—due to their very nature and inner logic—do not respond to our controlling efforts immediately. We can fuss as much as we like over the problem, as we are doing at present, and fall into a depression after our expected disappointments, but real changes will come about only after the accumulation of an entire total of qualities and which are adequate to our efforts.

Here certainly we must seek out an understanding of the very nexus of things. Certainly our nation has enormous natural resources and its intellectual base is strong. We live a life which is not worthy of ourselves. Albert late, we must set out to assimilate the laws of evolution and slowly make headway rather than remaining in place jumping up and down. Remember that just six or seven years ago it was said on the state level that in 1989 computer production would fully satisfy all the needs of the USSR national economy. Or we must stop talking about a rise in labor productivity by so many percent and rather set the task of increasing it by a number of fold. And even before on a broader scale it was said that the current generation of Soviet people would live under communism.

We must not as fiercely as we do now subject ourselves to social masochism which has long since gone beyond the acceptable level of constructive self-criticism and has evolved into an ordinary, senseless mocking of ourselves.

We must understand the logic of Large Systems and correlate our desires with our possibilities.

[Vaidman] Research in the phenomenon of the Systems has brought us to ecology. But why precisely there? Your analysis of the social System should be of particular interest to the sociologists, where at present philosophers are dominant and not the systems engineers—involved with precise sciences or pragmatists who are involved in (all) many more than with.

[Telyman] It would give any importance to the logic of my argument—I can't help but understand that any move in the period for a practical action of a person is motivated not by any one fact but rather by a total of the most diverse factors. Precisely this, I'd like to please note—to professionals—differs in contrast to the amateur movement. Both are extremely close, however in different qualitative ways like an amateur circle and an ordinary normal theater.

Ecology at present is of the same loose structure as another sector of the national economy at its onset—and develops energetically—to develop an industry and establish a system of ecological education and an ecological science.

At present almost there is more enthusiasm, it does not exist at all. It is scattered over the various sectors and exists under the umbrella of something else.

For example, we must take up the treating of waste water as we cannot go on like this any longer. But there are no enterprises to do it even there are actually more which in the necessary work but not capable because crowded in producing the other equipment. Why? There is not the corresponding industrial infrastructure and ecological industry. Let us take some abstractly formal example. Surely, from immediate it is really not recommended treating the wastes. But not so professionally, perhaps, production. Because this is the responsibility of ecologists, more or professionals. This simply, as yet, does not exist. Here is one other among the problems ecology is disasters which we must pay directly in connection their consequences.

Education and science have a subordinate character and thus are, as it were, incorporations in the sectors of the national economy, complex. But also more often means because it is a marginal, independent, or a new ecology.

That is, in this regard no foundation. And where is this? In the gigantic Large System about Nature. Here we must put things on a professional basis if we wish to survive.

It is a predominant one and not an intermediate.

How is it? Let me make myself hear immediately.

From my viewpoint, we will have a strong specifically although there is, of course, nothing wrong in demonstrations or in movements such as the Green Fronts. This is also a new undertaking if it is correctly organized. Let us

put it this way: the people who are seriously concerned by the deteriorating ecological situation in a future accessible to them explain their attitude to the local authorities and economic leaders. This is also a matter of expressing public opinion.

That is, the strict demonstration, parades, assemblies and meetings—all of this certainly can be and even should be. Regardless of the fact that here there is much that is superficial and improves in the sense of posing the problems but we are taking the direction in this direction and it is no wonder that we talk about failures.

All the same, professionalism should stand in the front from always in any undertaking. No parade, no demonstration is capable of resolving a specific scientific problem. Particularly in ecology where, for me, repeat, we have not even established a foundation. Someone must make a start.

[Vaidman] Is this an idea of yours?

[Telyman] You mean from where—more difficult to find order and fragments of space fall that the ideas as these are forced into the life by the demands of human life.

The idea of laying a foundation from ecological education exists about after Afanador, Mikheevich Demosov, a USSR people's deputy and well-known specialist in the area of Large Systems and Environmental Ecology. How this question could be raised at all?

And we arrived at completely different conclusions.

The state is now not very fond of spending very large amounts on ecological education. This was very similar to how these problems were resolved for example in information sector when the paid universal total computerization.

With all the meagerness of our budget I turn out that a great deal of money is provided to be distributed between the V.I. Zes. But this money is distributed in an unique manner. Of course, the drafts are formed and some equipment is acquired. But the basic portion is spent at the disposition of the native, the protection and the most influential head of a plant is a dean. As a result, the money dribbles through the entire body of the educational system without solving the general question. Somewhere a root is leaking, somewhere a leak is repaired but there is nothing to support it with.

A typical picture: Ecology is being studied on two score V.I. Zes in the nation founding universities, polytechnical construction, hydrometeorological, agricultural and pedagogical institutes.

But there the roots are also leaking.

And these are fixed using funds provided for ecology.

For this reason Prof Demosov and I made the following decision:



It is essential to create a firm which is self-managed and covers its costs and which is specifically concerned with precisely an ecological education.

Our International Ecological Academy has become such a firm.

I have already mentioned that in almost two-score of our VUZes this discipline is being studied in one way or another. And it is a very good thing that this is the case. But practice has shown that we will do little in following such a path. In the future, ecology cannot remain under the technological specialties. This should be a separate block of disciplines for training professionals capable of working in all spheres of the national economic complex. Such a task has been drawn up by the Subcommittee for Ecological Education under the USSR Supreme Soviet and it is the assignment of this subcommittee which we are now carrying out, that is, to train the highest class engineers for the entire block of nature conservation specialties. For example, for geology, for agricultural production, metallurgical or chemical industries. We will teach the students to model ecological systems and the ability to resolve arising situations in each concrete production area. If we do not do this, ecology as before will remain on the sidelines and the problems related to it in the same manner. The way out, in my view, is one: to develop the intellectual base and train broad specialists while maintaining their high class.

[Vaydman] However, there is such a question, professor. Today's industrialists have absolutely subordinated ecology to themselves and wherever you look in nature there is complete discord. We have come to our senses just in time. But are we not now "designing" the directly opposite situation, when ecology subordinates production to itself? This is happening more and more frequently. Precisely here lies the essence of the contradictions between local economic power and the Green Movement and this has led to very acute clashes.

[Telemtayev] In such antagonisms there is rather a large amount of the speculative and distorted views in carrying out ecological policy. Very many people understand the Green Movement as a mere tribute to fashion. This is how we have been taught, to attack full force either one thing or the other, and for us it is not so easy to get rid of such an ideology. Paradoxically, we do not treat the organism but rather are fighting against diseases, and individual ones, and each time we find justification for such a policy in that there are not enough resources. We have one-sixth of the world's land mass and still not enough.

However, about fashion.

When it becomes "prevailing," when some political dividends can be earned from it, then a noisy but completely ineffectual act. What is the issue here? According to the logic of Large Systems, the ecological problem is the ability to live correctly in interacting with nature. Then everything is in its place. A movement

politicized in the extreme ceases to be the fashion and becomes a normal component of human activity.

If only this is done according to a strict science, without any speculation.

Man has always plundered nature. In all times. Because man is capable of living off of nature. No matter how we presently idealize our ancient predecessor or extol his harmonious relations with the "environment," he has left us a heritage of both the Gobi and the Sahara, as well as much else just as we have left our heirs Chernobyl, the Aral area and Balkhash.

The difficulty of our relations with the environment in which we live is not a matter of not touching it.

Everything is much more desperate.

The time has arrived when the System created by man in terms of its power has become commensurable with Nature. He is already capable of "reworking" it. If he does not change his mind and find an approach for the interaction between the two Large Systems. Here it would be a profound confusion to feel that man could invent something in order "not to touch" nature, something like a waste-free production method.

The most harmful thing is to foster illusions in oneself.

We will not be able to maintain the nature which we found in coming into this world. Nature also is alive and evolves according to its own laws, according to the inner logic of Large Systems. Man must understand all of this and prepare himself gradually to create a new environment. A widely organized ecological education can mark the beginning to such thinking. Including our InterEkoA.

[Vaydman] Undoubtedly, in our times true professionalism should stand in the forefront. However, I have a concern here. A self-respecting nomadic Kazakh who has the run of enormous territories would never allow himself to deal barbarously with that land on which he has lived for the millennia and which he has been able to protect. Alas, at present, only the memory remains of this former husbandry. The Kazakh would not establish his cattle or sheep pen on the bank of a river in order to be "closer to the water," and he would not employ the "progressive method of hydraulic monitors...."

[Telemtayev] It has turned out that for us true professionalism has not become the synonym of true morality. This still must be instilled for a long time to come, it must be turned into a permanent stereotype in our conscience, even into a faith, if you wish, which one cannot reckon by reason. Ecology, as a discipline, must be taught in the VUZes and schools and we must establish ecological high schools. Morality cannot be replaced by a sum of knowledge. This is how I perceive the task of our Academy. Ecological ethics, in my view, should become one of the leading disciplines in it, like social ecology.



At the same time, I would put forward the following seditious notion. There is a more delicate, a more complicated mechanism for obtaining knowledge than the purely scientific methods of forming this. The peoples have collected information on the world about them piecemeal in order to hand this on to the coming generation and this has actually been turned into an unique religion, when one must not spit in a well and an oath over bread was one of the most emotional.

Such ideas reached mankind not out of science. The experience of generations, the enormous social experience of the peoples is just as valuable as scientific knowledge.

[Vaydman] A question which cannot be left unexplained: Why the InterEkola, that is, why the International Ecological Academy? Why not, for example, one of Kazakhstan? Or even simpler, an ecological academy? Forgive me, professor, was it...ambition?

[Telemtayev] Don't worry, I have already heard this. As we stated at the outset, it is actually a question of establishing the world's first academy of global ecological problems. The Chernobyl or Aral disaster has struck not only the Ukraine, Russia, Belorussia or Kazakhstan, Turkmenia or Uzbekistan. Saddam Hussein set the oil fields afire and all mankind will suffer for this. The state frontier is a political category but not an ecological one. The problem is the same for all and we will not be able to sit out the approaching disaster isolated in our national quarters. There are different cabins but the ship is the same.

The status of an international organization will provide us with an opportunity to collaborate actively with all ecologists of the world. An extensive exchange of students, teachers, researchers and scientific information is simply essential. An agreement has already been reached that in Prague, on the basis of the training center at the so-called Ecological Division (that is, Movement as this has no bearing on the army) an affiliate of our InterEkola will be established. Upon the initiative of the same association, analogous institutions will arise in other European countries. The idea has also evoked interest in the United States.

Moreover, our international status will make it possible to send talented researchers for foreign graduate students and doctoral studies, we must be concerned for the coming generation and work for the integration of the intellectual base.

As you can see, all of this is rather far from ambition.

The forms should correspond to the content or vice versa.

In the highly developed countries of Europe and America, in recent decades it has been possible to resolve numerous ecological problems, having anticipated the approaching crisis. We are at present approximately in the same situation which they found themselves at one time. It is merely being stupid to only learn from our own mistakes.

[Vaydman] Would you like your children to be educated at InterEkola?

[Telemtayev] They are already adults. But my grandchildren, yes I would like that a lot. And I am ready to pay for this.

### USSR People's Deputy Appeal for Aid to USSR's Starving Children

91US05291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 May 91  
Second Edition p 3

[Article by Albert Likhanov, writer, chairman of the board of the Soviet Children's Fund and USSR People's Deputy: "The Cries of Hungry Infants: a Response to PRAVDA's Initiative"]

[Text] The cries of hungry infants are resounding above the nation, but they are not being heard by the hard-of-hearing planners and some politicians who are like grouches calling to their mates—thank goodness, PRAVDA heard them. One wit noted that it is now more interesting to read than it is to live, but the thought never leaves us that, if each powerful publication had directed the liberated power of the word not at confusing their own readers, who have grown stupid, but rather, into a persistent leaning toward at least a single matter, but a really vital one—how many desired goals could have been achieved already over 6 years? Alas, the force of the steam is spent in the whistle and not in movement.

Many people associate their own hopes with the recently established Safety Council, raising the perhaps fair question: whose safety and from what? For example, can a pain with unpredictable consequences, such as the hunger of infants, be the object of its concern and custody? What about anxiety over the fact that a nation with a steep increase in prices for children's goods by a factor of five or even ten has a good chance of becoming extinct, while the birth of a child becomes an expensive and burdensome matter for a young couple? And, finally, where is the line which separates the concern of the Cabinet of Ministers, with its significantly reduced obligations, and that of the Safety Council which does not have the right to sidestep internal knots of such complexity?

According to the repeated assertions of the classics and contemporary writings, the main issue of politics is the issue of power. But, perhaps, a most profound historical delusion is also hidden in this? Indeed, it has long been evident to everyone that the main issue of politics is man. No one needs an old man abandoned by his relatives or a sickly child crying from hunger. The strength of politics is in the capacity, first of all, to respond to their troubles and pains not merely with words, but with actual deeds.

The contemporary lexicon contains the frequently used but ill-defined expression "the nation's gene pool." But here are the uneducated Russian peasants who knew, even without beautiful expressions: the longer a child is breastfed, the healthier it will grow up. There was even a special profession—wet nurse. Since then, a lot has changed. Unfortunately, a truly popular opinion, raised to the status of a rule, loses more and more its meaningfulness and profound wisdom, especially in the cities. Children who are not breastfed by their mothers are

called "bottle babies," predestined thereby to the notorious complications of developing smallness of stature, susceptibility to illnesses and slowness in gaining weight which very often generally affects the survival rate. The medical opinion regarding this has also become complaisant, not that anyone pays attention to the doctor—after all, it is not as if we were talking about health, but only about nourishment.

This is on the one hand. On the other, we are talking here about regions with an increased birthrate—first and foremost, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, where, because of frequent childbirth, the mothers are so drained and their own nourishment is of such poor quality—the female body can hardly produce a lot of milk from just green tea and a biscuit—so that a newborn child is deprived of wholesome food right from its very first days.

And so it turns out that, in order to help the infants, special plants are needed, which will produce substitutes for breast milk—this is as the minimum. And this goal is by no means an exceptional one, but rather, one which has been extremely neglected due to our planning practices. Of all the complications of a child's existence, this is perhaps the most distressing and most shameful with regard to the responsibility—or more accurately, irresponsibility—of the adult world to its own "future," so often mentioned in vain. It needs to be said bluntly, the state has done everything it could so that the "future" would grow up puny, physically feeble and sick. Thus it is necessary that both the Safety Council and the Cabinet of Ministers no longer "study" or "listen to reports," but rather, on their own, undertake the immediate construction—over the course of the next few months!—of 10 such enterprises. Only, for goodness' sake, let us do it without the notorious "assignments." Over the few short years of its existence, the Children's Fund has seen too many examples of children's ills being shifted from one department to another, of papers being sent from some executors to others and even of the most extreme and urgent concerns being reduced to the paranoia of red tape.

Thus, the hottest issue of all is feeding the children. No policy or social system is worth the cost if children howl from hunger. The problem, naturally, is broader than this response, if only because, even today, in school, some children can not concentrate on their studies—they are hungry and first year students' heads are nodding because a meal in the school cafeteria costs 2-3 rubles [R] each time and not every mommy has this much money for a child's breakfast.

We therefore propose that:

1. Prices in school cafeterias be reduced without delay by a directive (although this is the tenth time this statement has been made, it seems to be taking forever to get it implemented).
2. Financial standards for nourishment in all boarding school-type children's institutions (children's homes

boarding schools, auxiliary schools and institutions of this type for mentally and physically handicapped children) and in children's sanatoria, regardless of their subordination, be increased

3. The construction or conversion of 10 enterprises for the production of children's food be undertaken under presidential patronage over the course of 12 months with hard currency investments.

This last proposal is a key, basic one. In actual fact, we are talking about the most important problem of our human safety. Securing the health of the people and preserving this very "gene pool"—not only merely by using disposable syringes and scarce medicines, which is infinitely important in and of itself, but there are already consequences of the bad base and weak foundation—is a matter of practical policy, away from which, unfortunately, we are moving farther and farther, more and more, into an unending struggle

We have all grown tired of the struggle, really. We want to live! And we want the children to be satisfied and healthy at the least!

So here we have it—the construction of plants. After having pounded in vain on various doors, the Children's Fund attempted to do something on its own. Ultimately, a public association [obyedinenie] has the right to have its own property, including industrial property, and the fund decided to build a plant for producing a unique sov-based substitute for mother's milk

To be frank, the idea was borrowed from the Seventh-Day Adventist [SDA] Church, from enthusiasts from the church's Worldwide Center. The fact is that this religious confession established its own international association [assotsiatsiya] for wholesome nutrition, considering one of the main goals to be the maintaining of a healthy way of life, including, naturally, wholesome nutrition for infants. Throughout the entire world, this church is building plants for children's food—as a charitable activity. The fund has also planned such a plant for the production of new types of nourishment for infants, Soyalak [Soylac] and I-Soyalak. The president of the ASD [SDA] General Conference at first supported a joint project, memoranda were signed, the product underwent testing in the Nutrition Institute and received the approval of the Ministry of Health. A building had even been constructed already at a Leningrad fat combine—specially for a small but very productive little plant

The project was set up like this: it would become a joint enterprise of the fat combine and the Children's Fund with raw materials provided under a guarantee by Agroprom Rossi [Russian Agricultural Industry]. An equipment supply firm was selected—the Dutch firm Alpha-Laval and the process and drawings were received. But the matter, while not exactly coming to a standstill, was slowed down with a gnashing of teeth. The fact is that 1.5 million dollars were required for the equipment and the Adventists promised to give that amount just for this

purpose. At the last moment, they could not come up with the funds. And the Children's Fund did not have that kind of money

And so, since then, the fund has been going from door to door—a rejection at one, a polite smile at another: as if to say, we really do not have time for infants now. With the help of the USSR Embassy in Finland, talks were held with the Soviet-Finnish joint-stock company TEBOYL, which supplies Finnish lubricants and fuel. Could a sort of semi-state, not-quite-dependent company, but still a joint one, which earns "a pile" of money from our underground wealth, specifically benefit the children's world and "pour out" \$1.5 million for a visible and cultivated project?

Of course, the ill-fated \$1.5 million could be given—or even sold to the fund—by the state, but let us be more specific—only at the official exchange rate! Indeed, it is immoral to take from a charitable organization R45 million (at the rate of 1:30), even if they are nearly worthless, but still donated by people, after buying this money at brutal auction, in order to patch the state hole! Nowhere is charity treated like this! This is a purely Soviet paradox: charity, which has been revived by perestroika, is also being rejected by it. How else can one describe the parade of closed doors, the system of restrictions of all sorts and the reluctance to respond to proposals for the benefit of the common cause? Why, finally, is the fund supposed to beg on the sidelines, going from one person to another with appeals, while the budget spends tens of millions of rubles in hard currency to purchase the very same children's food from abroad?

In the early days of perestroika, it was possible to use the expression "public-state"—a program, a project, a policy. It seems this is no longer fashionable. With respect to both the expression and its essence, according to which the state, jointly with public movements and associations [obyedineniye], does something for the benefit of a person

For example, no matter how much money our Children's Fund collected, it would be impossible to use it for large-scale projects without the state's help. The public-state program Childhood, on behalf of which so many well-turned expressions have been uttered, will remain nothing more than a beautiful phrase if the state does not takes steps to meet the public halfway or, in our regulated circumstances, the charitable structures do not receive privileges and actual opportunities for implementing similar projects independently

And so, we have a new course. At least, an attempt. PRAVDA started an alarming conversation about children's nutrition. PRAVDA, together with the Children's Fund—and we are expressing here not just solidarity, but also material willingness—would like to carry out the realization of a program for the urgent production of children's food. This needs to be combined with the purchase of samples, including for the Leningrad version. With respect to the rubles—here the fund is ready

to participate but, naturally, in each individually protected project and, of course, with state investments. In other words, it is time for the treasury, the budget, the state, the Safety Council and the Cabinet of Ministers to implement the term "public-state" in practice and in a matter of the utmost urgency.

Indeed, the infants are crying and crying. It is shameful to say that they are crying from hunger. Let us at least do something quickly, in a paternal manner, in our vainly garrulous time.

Let us take note of our errors in the end!

### Roundtable on Childhood Malnutrition Held in Moscow

91US05494 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jun 91  
Second Edition p 3

[Article by V. Lyubitskiy, L. Pyatiletova: "PRAVDA Roundtable: Let's Feed Our Children!"]

[Text] As already reported, a roundtable meeting was held in PRAVDA's editorial offices to discuss the problems of child nutrition and ways and practical measures to solve them.

The following persons took part in the discussion: A. Baranov, USSR Deputy Minister of Health; A.M. Belichenko, USSR deputy minister of agriculture and food; T.I. Kolokolov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food's main child nutrition industry directorate; K.S. Ladodo, doctor of medical sciences and supervisor of the child nutrition department of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences' Nutrition Institute; D.A. Likhanov, chairman of the V.I. Lenin Soviet Children's Foundation; P.I. Mayeva, head of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers' department for women and the protection of families, mothers and children; A.N. Nikonov, chief engineer at the Lianozovskiy Child Dairy Products Experimental Plant, Moscow; E.Ye. Novikova, senior secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Women and Families; V.I. Pivovarov, director of the USSR Ministry of Trade Public Nutrition Institute; M.N. Rakhmanova, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Women, Family, and Demographic Policy Committee; N.F. Reymers, doctor of biological sciences and president of the USSR Ecological Union; I.A. Rogov, rector of the Moscow Applied Biotechnology Institute and member of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences; Yu.M. Sinitsyn, USSR deputy minister of the defense industry; and I.S. Sviridov, general director of the Krasnaya Poyma Production Association, Moscow Oblast.

The meeting was opened by academician I.T. Frolov, the newspaper's chief editor.

"PRAVDA's very first articles on this subject prompted a great many responses from readers, especially the article by Albert Anatolyevich Likhanov, who is present. The situation is indeed very grave. Of the 5.5 million children born each year, half are deprived of the most vital thing—

good-quality nutrition—from their first weeks of life. In other words, we are essentially talking about the fate of a generation. This is why PRAVDA intends to explore this problem seriously and at length. At least until the concrete outlines of a solution to it emerge. And I would like to invite you to hold a matter-of-fact discussion whose results can be channeled from the journalistic sphere into practical steps as quickly as possible."

### On Problems, Programs and 'Manna From Heaven.'

[Rogov] I would like to call attention first of all to our science. What kind of institute doesn't our country have! We have everything. But there's no child nutrition research center. This is shameful! I understand of course, that establishing one isn't going to solve all the problems overnight. But it will be able to bring together scientists who are currently working under a variety of special programs. It's time to finally take practical steps on the part of the party and on the part, perhaps, of other forces that have consolidated around the party. For example, to find and make available a building for such a center. I think such a step would not only attract the attention of the public, but also demonstrate the full seriousness of our intentions.

[Kolokolova] But such a center was recently created. It is the All-Union Child Nutrition Research Institute in Istra, Moscow Oblast. True, it occupies only one floor. And even that floor had to be won in the face of such opposition that it's hard to imagine. And it took a whole year to open a bank account for the institute. The Istra Rayon leadership said: Give us 500,000 rubles to make improvements in the rayon, and we'll open an account for you! Isn't it barbaric—to put the rayon's finances in order at the expense of children? At the Moscow Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, chairman comrade Tyzhlov put the question in even sharper terms: "Why are you so intent on being close to Moscow? Why don't you go to Perm or Siberia?" I told him: "We have few specialists on this problem, and we have somehow managed to bring them together under one roof. Can we really afford to scatter these researchers?"

[Baranov] No question about it, science is extremely important. But I have in mind hands a list of baby foods developed over the past five years. There are several dozen of them, and almost all of them meet world standards. But virtually none of them has been put into production by our industry. The reason? The lack of quality raw materials, components, production capacity, and so on. As a result, every third child is deprived of the most vital things. We simply have no child nutrition industry!

[Mayeva] And why not? It seems to me that the time has come to demand a serious accounting from our industrial magnates and the defense complex, which were instructed several years ago to produce complete sets of equipment to make dairy, meat, fruit, and vegetable products for children. Today, of 90 models of equipment for producing child nutrition products, only eight have

been manufactured. Judging from newly adjusted schedules, we will get the things we need in late 1993 or early 1994 at the earliest. Does this mean that the current five-year plan will also be lost to the branch's development? Can we really allow this to happen?

[Ladodo] Babies are not getting enough essential nutrients from their mothers' bodies. Many children require medically supervised nutrition all but from birth. We have good research for both sugar diabetes patients and children with food allergies. But these new products, which we ourselves developed, are being put into production not by our own industry, but by foreign firms. They're producing, while we're still talking.

[Rejoinder] It's as if we're waiting for manna to start falling from heaven.

[Ladodo] What is the main complication where this problem is concerned? The fact that so many different departments are involved. We'll never be successfully unless we coordinate all efforts.

[Rakhmanova] The factors impeding the developing of the child nutrition industry are clear. The first is the lack of specialized zones that would provide ecologically pure raw materials. The second is the lack of Soviet-made equipment. We can't go on endlessly using foreign currency to buy imported production lines. We have a lot of plants that were built with foreign currency, but they are virtually idle today because we don't have any spare parts for them. A third cause is absolutely prosaic. There are no packaging materials—foil, wax paper, cardboard. If we solve the packaging problem, we could increase the production of canned fruit and vegetable baby foods by one-third overnight. A fourth issue is that there is no economic incentive to produce baby foods. This is the result of an irrational state pricing and tax policy. And a fifth cause—one that I would perhaps rank even first—is that child nutrition haven't become a priority at all levels of state administration.

We're constantly addressing various particular matters. We buy a production line there, we try to build a few plants here. But only a comprehensive approach can solve the problem. It's good that we have finally gotten a main administration for the child nutrition industry. It has helped formulate a state program to meet the nutritional needs of children of all ages. This program, in my opinion, is the key to a comprehensive solution to the problem.

[Mayeva] Let me elaborate. The program to which Marina Nikolayevna is referring is a section of the state program for improving the lot of women and families and for protecting mothers and children. But its fate is still unclear, it has been approved by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, but not yet adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Belichenko] I want to point out that this is the third program in recent years. The two previous ones were successfully killed. What does the program consist of? It

involves 214 plants that will have to be modernized or rebuilt. The total cost is 12 billion rubles. The program is detailed and was drawn up by all departments and republics. And the cost of carrying it out should be assumed first of all by the state, as the chief guarantor of its implementation.

[Rakhmanova] Nor can we overlook just how much our old problems are being compounded with new ones. Look. For the most part, four of our republics produce fruit and vegetable foods, just three produce dairy products, and two produce meat. These republics have monopolies. And despite the fact that the plants located on their territories are under union jurisdiction and were built with the whole country's money, there are already instances in which, citing sovereignty, republic leaderships are trying to lay claim to their entire output, refusing to meet deliveries. And so now, as the Union Treaty is being discussed and this is being accompanied by the drafting of a very large package of documents, it is simply vital to have an agreement on cooperation among the republics in the sphere of social policy. Such an agreement should also deal directly with child nutrition, which presents a mirror reflection of our political confusion.

[Likhonov] Children are a universal human concern. We're not worth a thing if we fail to declare, a priori and from the outset, that in our society—which may not be the best, unfortunately—children and the elderly are more important than all sovereign entities. Let's try to mold public opinion precisely along these lines.

Unfortunately, "pure politics" is sometimes more important than people in our country. The two most vulnerable segments of the population are being subjected to ever greater hardship. It used to be that even the poorest family would have two children and raise them. But today a child is becoming too expensive a pleasure for some families. And it seems to me that a major bank of the future—the labor resource bank—is failing right before our eyes.

There is a document—the state program for the development of infant formula—that has been validated, substantiated, and agreed upon with the republics, ministries, and departments. And we need to give impetus to it. I think that we should ask our country's President to confirm that program. But for heaven's sake, don't "entrust" it to various agencies or order "studies." Simply put it into effect.

Yes, it talks about 214 enterprises. But I think that of that number, we should single out some limited, most essential number of enterprises to be given top priority (at least 20 to 25), make sure they get allocations of everything they need, and put them into production—not sometime in the future, but within the next few months.



### Money, Money, Money Everywhere.

[Sinityn] The defense branches are everywhere depicted as monsters. We've heard it said even here. But everyone forgets that more than 60 percent of our ministry's output is "civilian"—consumer goods and equipment for their production. True, only since 1988.

Needless to say, child nutrition is a tremendously urgent problem. We have assigned an institute that used to do military research to the problem. They looked into the problem, without any pressure, and said: We'll take on the job, it's a noble cause. We have the personnel, resources, and capacity. But I have to report to you what I reported to the commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The work hasn't been financed.

The country continues to buy food abroad. So let's create our own industry—from research and technology to the production of equipment and products. Our minister, B. Belousov, in a letter published in PRAVDA, said that we are prepared play a most active role in this. I reaffirm that today, but I repeat. The work has been halted, the promised financing was suspended.

[Nikonov] In a discussion of the development of the child nutrition industry, the problems of our plant might seem local. But how many similar enterprises are there throughout the country, and they all have the same difficulties! I have with me a list of materials in short supply, unless that plant is supplied with them, it could grind to a halt at any moment. We have funds, but it's impossible to convert them into goods! We should have some kind of priority!

And another question—that of material incentives. We supply dairy products for young Muscovites by operating the enterprises (capacity at 115 percent). We have competent specialists, they aren't leaving yet, but an alarming trend is already starting to emerge. Why? In the Moloko [Milk] Association, to which we belong, other enterprises are operating at just 70 percent of capacity, and yet we, at the times with the lowest pay, not them!

And the quality of the raw materials! I recently visited some farms, and now I understand. How could the raw materials (quality) be any different when milk is still filtered through cheesecloth and refrigerators don't work? Now we plan to assign yet another quality-control commission to the plant to monitor output quality. We might be better to set up quality control of the raw materials.

[Kolekoloza] I'm afraid that an incorrect perception could emerge of child nutrition enterprises as being utterly dependent on the state. This is not the case. We could earn money ourselves. Baby foods are not unprofitable, they are profitable. The problem is that the money we make goes into the budget. Suffice it to say that under the President's latest decree, we have to pay an income tax on profits of 35 percent! We've spent the past nine months going to the USSR government, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Planning Committee and begging

them: "Exempt baby foods from the taxes." But officials of these agencies are deaf to our requests, it's impossible to get through to them.

I share the alarm of officials of the Lianozovskiy plant with regard to keeping their staff. Working at baby food enterprises is no longer prestigious because their profitability, like that of ordinary dairy enterprises, is 8 percent. We propose that it be increased to 20 percent; in the process, we could also increase our capacity! But no one pays any attention. We ask: Don't limit the wage fund for the enterprise's employees! And again, not the slightest effort to meet us halfway. And yet economic issues are the most important, especially today, when we have virtually entered the market, when everything is out of balance and it's simply useless to ask anyone for anything.

[Sviridov] Generally speaking, where does any food come from? From the people working directly in the fields and livestock farms. Until recently, everyone demanded just one thing of them: Increase production! Hence the methods that have put our common cause in such a difficult position.

Our sovkhoz rejected these methods. Specifically, we rolled up our sleeves and built a shop that has allowed us to shift to applying fertilizer in liquid form. Exactly where we need it and in an amount no greater—but no less—than is needed. Last year, we treated 4,000 hectares this way, and this year we intend to treat all our farmland in this way. What am I driving at? Without changing the methods that are used in agriculture in our fatherland, we are not in a position to provide you with quality foods for children.

The same is true of animal husbandry. On the large farms that we have virtually everywhere, the orientation has been one of getting the most output from the people and animals. But given that kind of workload, the milkmaid—that poor soul—has been forced, willy-nilly, to look for a solution in production methods. And hence the incidence of disease among the cows. And it's not hard to imagine what kind of milk you get from sick cows. We've gotten away from this. We went all out and didn't scrimp on money, and now the milkmaid has 33 cows instead of 50. But other farms, the majority of them, don't want to do this. Because it's unprofitable! And nevertheless, we're forced to pour our excellent-quality milk into the common vat! Isn't this madness? We put things in order, expended an enormous amount of effort, and won people over and got them fired up—and what was the result? Nothing. The better and the more people work, the more they bang their heads against the wall. That's all.

I am convinced that it is possible to obtain pure output in both crop cultivation and animal husbandry. But it has to be profitable to the farmers!

And another thing. Take a look at our rayon, with its river land and meadows. It's no accident that in olden times, food was taken to the czars from this area. For

example, right now I have 10,000 tons of milk, carrots, and other vegetables. Why should I have to wait until the state comes up with the millions or the billion rubles to build those gigantic processing plants? It doesn't make any sense. All over the world—take the English or the Swedes, for example—everything required for processing can be found within a radius of 10 or 20 kilometers. We don't have to wait for those giant plants in Moscow, we can scrape up the money and built right here, where the output is produced, small enterprises of original design that can process the output and get the food to the children.

Needless to say, I'm talking about good but also inexpensive products. But here again, there's a problem. I am not in favor of making money at the expense of children; but nor am I in favor producing milk for three kopeks. Even a bottle of lemonade costs a ruble and half today!

We've heard it all here: imports, imports! We're investing in the wrong things! When we do that, we're only hurting ourselves and devaluing the people who feed us. On behalf of the sovkhoz's collective, I want to say that we are ready to accept any proposals regarding child nutrition, and we'll find a way to put them into effect.

[Rogov] I agree with Ivan Sergeyevich. I was in the United States once, and the only line I saw was at a health-food store, where the foods are three to four times more expensive. In our country, of course, baby foods should not be that expensive. But as an incentive for the producer farms, special funds could be set up to pay them more, and tax benefits could be used.

[Kolokolova] We still don't even have standards to tell us what an ecologically pure product is! There are none, and we can in no way succeed in getting them calculated. In the baby food production program, of 12.5 billion rubles, two-thirds are earmarked for ecology. But it is very difficult to convince people that the money for these purposes should come from the state. At all levels, we're told: That's the job of the farm itself! As if it weren't clear that such large expenditures are beyond its means.

[Mayeva] Every kopek invested should produce the greatest possible return. It seems to me that PRAVDA should pay special attention to changing the prevailing mentality in foreign economic activities. We spend an average of 100 million foreign-currency rubles a year to import baby foods. We could have used that money to buy and build entire factories long ago and set up our own real industry. But it's still very hard to convince the foreign-economic services and State Planning Committee of this, something I know from my own experience.

[Likhanov] It would be best of all to enlist foreign firms in setting up enterprises in our country. Needless to say, they will not go into the baby food industry on their own—we have to provide them with foreign currency benefits and give them tax breaks, at least for a few years. Perhaps we shouldn't even tax the import of equipment,

packaging materials, spare parts, raw materials, and components for these enterprises at all. In addition, we should give them the opportunity to take back in foreign currency or raw materials the percentage of the profits that they will make by producing products for our children.

[Baranov] The outlook is good and the programs are good. But what are we going to feed 8 million children in their first two years of life tomorrow? We're not going to have anything until we pay foreign firms what we owe them for the products we've already received. I know that in the United States, one firm has been sitting on loaded containers of Similac for three months now—waiting for us to pay it more than \$10 million. Other partners are turning away from us as well. Basically, we are now living off humanitarian aid. As a member of the government commission charged with distributing it, I know that we have already received thousands of tons of baby food products and sent them to ecological disaster areas, to Chernobyl, and to areas of high infant mortality. But it is naive to expect humanitarian aid to continue indefinitely.

#### Parents Across the Country, Shall We Unite?!

[Likhanov] I don't know about you, but as a reader I've have grown weary of the phrase-mongering that has afflicted almost all our publications. And so now, when, thanks to PRAVDA, the very old idea of trying to achieve some concrete results and to help solve the country's social problems is being revived, I see this as extremely important. We want action, we want changes for the better in our lives.

As concerns money. We can't do without it. But where do we get it? Let's recall an old story. Back when Soviet government was being established, a certain percentage of the price of every bottle of vodka sold was earmarked for children's problems. Back then we had a very acute problem with homeless children, and money was needed to deal with it. What if we were to say frankly to the people: Since, when we drink, we are doing harm to our children, let us all ask the government to set aside one ruble from every bottle of vodka, which costs 11 rubles—not to go to the budget, but to be used for baby food. We would get all the ruble resources we need within six months!

And now as regards foreign currency. Do you remember when we had "fish day" in our country? I would propose to the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity that it hold a "children's day" three times a month, say on the first, the 10th, and the 20th. And on these days it would make payments on the loans we have used to purchase equipment, spare parts, and technology for baby food, and so on. When you consider that the bank pays out \$15 million a day, it seems to me that the problem would be solved.

In letters published in PRAVDA, readers have suggested the idea of opening a charity account. I think that the problem cannot be solved by charity alone, of course, but

that it would nonetheless be worthwhile to open an account. And a council should be set up that would have sole power to decide how the money will be used. There's no sense in relieving the state of its responsibility to look out for our future, but helping it in this is a matter of conscience.

I would like to call attention to one idea that has almost been realized. In Leningrad, a building has been constructed for a butter and fats production combine where the Children's Foundation wants to set up the production of baby foods made out of soybean—a food rich in protein that does not sour or go bad. It can be accumulated and shipped to various regions of the country. The shop could be placed in production within a couple of months, but we don't have the \$1.5 million to buy the equipment. I have no doubt that we need this kind of small enterprises. They will be an alternative to state industry.

[Novikova] We have to turn our attention to people, and the most direct and living example of such a turn is the matter that you and I are discussing. While in the past we expressed solidarity with children in the colonial and developing countries and made beautiful gestures and gifts, let us now simply put the emphasis on the word "protection"—including the protection of our own children.

As for a central charity account, I think that such funds could best be collected in each individual republic, each individual city. A person could contribute some amount and then be able to see a food facility for children opened up in his own neighborhood. It is important that he see the result.

[Rejoinder from the hall] People will see the result—there will be new factories and baby foods on the store shelves. These are the things that we need to bring closer to people. But if the money is scattered all around, we won't achieve anything. Of course, a charity account won't solve the whole problem, but there are 73 million families in this country. And if each one were to donate one, three, or five rubles for baby food, this would bring us all together, regardless of nations, parties, or religions.

[Rogov] That's right! Ask the primary party organizations, which now have their own funds—not one of them will decline to make a donation.

[Mayeva] I agree with that viewpoint too. It seems to me that the idea of setting up an account under PRAVDA is invaluable. Why? Because neither the main directorate for child nutrition nor the Ministry of Agriculture and Food has an independent account to amass voluntary contributions. We know that the country is bankrupt and that we can't rely on the state alone, we have to look the truth in the eye. The fund could also accept benefactor contributions in foreign currency from organizations that export goods and from cooperatives and joint enterprises. For example, our department recently made such a request of A. Tizyakov, chairman of the board of the

Association of Industrial Enterprise Directors. We're counting on mutual understanding.

[Reymers] If so entrusted, the Ecological Union could take on the job of providing expert consultation to farms, determining raw materials zones, and serving as their sponsor. Needless to say, we're not rolling in money, but we have to find it. It will be easier to get rubles, a bit harder to get foreign currency. But there is a solution. Ecological organizations currently pay 35 percent to the budget. But if there were a reduction, they would gladly make the difference available for child nutrition needs.

[Belichenko] Another specific proposal. Not very long ago, I visited a plant that makes food for cosmonauts. What marvellous equipment it had! Why not have that plant set up a shop to make at least medicinal nutrition products for children? And I think the Main Space Directorate has foreign currency—it could share some of that money with kids under the Space For Children program. After all, cosmonauts are parents too! And yet we are selling products to the USSR Main Space Administration at the same prices as before! Despite the fact that our wholesale costs are much higher.

[Baranov] We already talked here about how all the previous programs have failed. But there is one republic that fulfilled them—Kyrgyzstan. In three years' time, it built three plants and dozens of dairy facilities. There is excellent cooperation with research, and local raw materials are used to produce original food products that are accessible to all children. I think the press should take note of such rare oases in our difficult work.

[Ladodo] I think there is one other source of foreign currency. When preparations are made to buy any imported food product, it is first approved by our Nutrition Institute. We provide a recommendation on whether to register it or not. This analysis is paid for in foreign currency, and a considerable sum is amassed in the course of a year. But the institute doesn't get a cent. Who disposes of that money? No matter how hard I tried, I couldn't find out. At least give the money we earn with our own hands to the children!

Almost all the comments we have heard here today have been critical, and the picture that emerges is a bleak one. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a change for the better is already under way. I think that if we join forces with all parents and all grandmothers and grandfathers, the problem can be solved.

### Legislation on Protecting Women, Families Outlined

91US05551 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
4 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by M. Salutskaya under the rubric: "From Competent Sources: Benefits for Women"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet has officially acknowledged. The attitude toward women in our country is

rather blase. And stated: Not enough attention is being paid to their problems; there is not enough concern about them; not enough is being said about them; and, in general, too little is being done for them.

Naturally, this observation—pronounced at the off-site session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Women, Family, and Demographic Policy, which took place a few days ago at the Reutovo settlement near Moscow—was not a revelation. The Soviet woman, whether she is a peasant woman, a worker, an officer worker, or a homemaker, truly is a universal being. At the workplace and at home she works on an equal footing with men, and then goes on a mind-boggling search for food and clothing. Through all of this she remains a woman. At least, she bears children.

How much is being said lately about benefits solely for women! Benefits for mothers, single mothers, milkmaids, tractor drivers, chemists... But this was mostly just men talking from high podiums. However, when this committee got down to business, things started shaping up.

It is now being planned to spend about 3.2 billion rubles [R] annually on implementation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: "On Urgent Measures To Improve the Situation of Women, Protect Motherhood and Childhood, and Strengthen the Family." This figure is a subject of pride for the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Women, Family, and Demographic Policy. It is this committee that introduced for consideration by the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by order of implementation of the legislative initiative, two draft laws directly affecting women. The committee also introduced proposals that were taken into account in other government documents. Our gratitude goes to this committee. Without it we would never have gained benefits for women. Now, however, they stand as follows:

**1. Once only childbirth benefit:** In the case of two or more children being born the benefit is paid for each child. Regional coefficients to salaries are applied to this benefit. Old benefit—R210. New benefit—R250 (compensation—R40).

**1. Monthly benefit to care for children under the age of 18 months;** when more than one child is born, paid for each child:

a) to working women with one year length of service or women under 18 (regardless of length of service), and full-time students.

Old benefit—R70.

New benefit—R110 (compensation—R40).

Paid with regional coefficients applied:

b) to working women over 18 without one year length of service and nonworking women and women who are not students.

Old benefit—R35.

New benefit—R80 (compensation—R40).

**3. Monthly benefits to single mothers** for children under 16 (students not receiving stipend—under 18).

Paid with regional coefficients applied:

a) to single mothers with children under six.

Old benefit—R35.

New benefit—R80 (compensation—R45).

b) to working mothers with children aged six to 16 (18).

Old benefit—R35.

New benefit—R90 (compensation—R55).

c) single mothers (widows, widowers), wards of orphanages and boarding schools [as published]

Old benefit—R70.

New benefit—R110 (compensation—R40).

**4. Temporary benefit for children whose parents are delinquent on child support payments or in any other circumstances that make child support payments impossible.**

Paid with regional coefficients applied

a) for each child under six.

Old benefit—R35.

New benefit—R80 (compensation—R45).

b) for each child aged six to 16 (18).

Old benefit—R35.

New benefit—R90 (compensation—R55).

**5. Child-care benefit for wives of military in fixed-period service:**

Old benefit—R70.

New benefit—R110 (compensation—R40).

**Child-care benefit for guardians:**

Old benefit—R70.

New benefit—R110 (compensation—R40).

**7. Child-care benefit for children under 16 infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus or ill with AIDS:**

Old benefit—R70.

New benefit—R110 (compensation—R40).

**8. Monthly benefit for children aged 18 months to six years:** paid for each child if the total per capita family income does not exceed R280 a month.

Old benefit—R35

New benefit—R80 (compensation—R45)

**9. Monthly benefits for children who do not receive pensions and benefits under current legislation, in the amount of R40 a month,** provided that total per capita family income does not exceed R280 a month

**10. Compensatory payments to families with children in connection with a substantial increase in the cost of children's goods,** provided that total per capita family income does not exceed R280 a month

a) for children under six—R200 a year (R16.67 a month)

b) for children six to 13—R240 a year (R20 a month)

c) for children 13 to 18—R280 a year (R23.33 a month)

Pensions paid for children are increased by R65 a month to compensate for the retail price reform. The minimal loss-of-provider pension for children is R100; social pension for children—R100; and pension for a disabled child—R135

Lastly, Members of the "women's" committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet receive visitors by appointment every first Thursday of the month in the reception room of the USSR Supreme Soviet. If you, dear readers, encounter problems in getting so-called benefits, as well as if you have suggestions on how to lighten the women's load, please come to Moscow. We have to defend our rights!

### Legislation Urged To Deal With Destitutes

91US05724 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 23, 12 Jun 91 p 7

[Interviews with Moscow Deputy Mayor Sergey Stankevich, RSFSR Central Committee Secretary Gennadiy Zyuganov, Charity Foundation Chairman Vadim Menshikov, USSR Labor Minister Valeriy Paulman, Russian Social Democratic Party official Oleg Rumiantssev, and destitute Vladimir Sivakovskiy, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondents N. Asadulloyev, A. Gasparyan, N. Zenova, and A. Kozlovich: "What Should Be Done?"]

[Text] Sergey Stankevich, USSR People's Deputy and First Deputy Chairman of the Moscow City Soviet:

Why are there so many destitute people on the streets of our cities?

Our society is changing. Our half-poor equality, which made it possible to maintain a meager-to-tolerable standard of living through the feverish, suicidal sale abroad of the country's natural resources, chiefly the resources of Russia, is receding into the past. The illusory inexpensiveness of so-called "consumer goods" was ensured by tons of oil, timber, gold fed to the insatiable Moloch of the "economical" Brezhnev economy. It was inevitable

that we would have to pay for this at some point. And that time has come. Now we are obliged to live within our means, and at the same time to pay for all the past mistakes. But how hard it is to live within our means! Especially if there are none. How hard it is for society and people corrupted by a mentality of prolonged social dependence and years of propaganda to become accustomed to the notion of their own impoverishment.

Can the city help its poor? It must help them, and it is. It is expanding the network of cafeterias that offer meals for free or at reduced prices. It is preparing to open several shelters where a person can find a place to sleep at night, especially in winter. But this will not change the overall picture. Poverty will long be a part of everyday life, a sad sign of our misfortune.

But God help us, as we encounter the many forms of poverty, from again being tempted by the voices of the political sirens who tell us we can easily attain universal prosperity through total level distribution.

We have paid a high price for a truth that must not be lost. On the path to prosperity, many of us will have to endure the hardships of poverty and inequality, and later tears. And this path lies through a common-sense economy freed of ossified idiocy.

**Gennadiy Zyuganov, Secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee:**

Our government had every opportunity to ensure that a state that once proclaimed the principle of charity, the principle of a humane society, on its banners would never find itself in a situation in which poor people would start appearing everywhere, including in the capital. I think that a society can be called democratic and humane when it goes about change in such a way that these people, who have sacrificed a great deal on the altar of their fatherland, who have fought, suffered, and been persecuted and repressed do not find themselves abandoned to the whims of fate in their later years.

**Vadim Menshikov, Chairman of the Board of the Soviet Charity Foundation:**

We have on several occasions tried to establish direct contact with these people, to invite them to our foundation, to try to give them material assistance. In most cases, their reaction was not a positive one—they didn't come to us. For our part, we help everyone who comes to our foundation or to its local chapters. We assist them with money, goods, and various medical services. We help them solve the problems that brought them to Moscow (for in most cases many are not Muscovites)—such as legal, employment, and other kinds of problems.

**Valeriy Paulman, USSR Minister of Labor and Social Problems:**

I think that this is first of all a task of local government bodies—they should show concern for these people. Then, apparently, we need to divide them into several groups, which is to say to identify the factors that forced



these people into the streets. If they are able-bodied people who are full of energy and the ability to work, we need to find jobs for them, to help them acquire skills. We need to help handicapped and disabled people who can't work, to find out (if we are dealing with elderly people) through the Ministry of Social Security if they get benefits, and to provide them with the social benefits they are supposed to have, in order to give them a means of normal existence.

**Oleg Rumyantsev, member of the Presidium of the Russian Social Democratic Party:**

We cannot combat poverty by means of a special policy for the poor—such a policy would not lead to the disappearance of poverty, but strengthen it in people's minds (because a whole generation of dependent people would arise). Such a policy would have an adverse impact on children's outlook. Obviously, the main way to combat poverty is a comprehensive social policy that is aimed above all at changing productive relations, so that they that would redistribute, through taxation, income from well-to-do segments in favor of those who are moderately well off, the poor, and so on.

**Vladimir Ivanovich Sivakovskiy, 71, who has been destitute for three years, has no permanent residence, and has been living in the underground crossing on Arbat Square in Moscow:**

I think it is necessary:

1. For the USSR Supreme Soviet to rescind all decrees on combating parasitism.

2. For the USSR Ministry of Defense to set up military field kitchens where poor and destitute people could get free meals in all cities, at train stations, and so on.

3. For the USSR Ministry of Labor and Social Problems to create jobs for the poor, so that feeble people could earn a small amount of money in a day or night with which to buy food.

4. For city and rayon Soviets to allocate from their budgets money to set up free overnight shelters for the poor and for people without permanent places of residence.

5. For the country's citizens to realize and get used to the fact that poor people on the streets, whose numbers are going to grow, are a normal feature of life in any society.

6. For poor people to remember that rescuing the poor is the job of the poor themselves, and to rely only on themselves.

#### **'Political Depression' Among Youth Leads to Apathy**

9JUN17491 Moscow *DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No. 9, 24 May 91, p. 4.

[Article by I. Gozman and Ye. Etkindt "Depression"]

[Text] Once again there were hardly any young people at the street demonstration in Moscow. In a country where the intelligentsia is leading a peaceful revolution, where the workers' movement is growing stronger, and a real threat of a peasant uprising has arisen in a number of regions, the passivity of the young people is unexpected and surprising, especially among the student body. Soviet students not only are not building barricades, as their age group did in Paris in 1968—they are not even taking part in the elections. Owing to the removal of information barriers, this generation has for the first time seen the world as it is—alluring, but strange and dangerous. As opposed to the young people of the West, they have been deprived of the lifelong habits they learned from childhood for living in such a world—and their training is reduced to advertising for a narcotic that no longer has any effect.

In a certain psychology laboratory in the USA a rigid experiment was set up: a laboratory rat would receive an electric shock for anything it did, both the "incorrect" and the "correct" actions. Animals subjected to such processes lost their capacity to orient themselves in their environment, fell into torpidity, and when dropped into a tub of water, submissively sank to the bottom without trying to save themselves. A similar, more subtle version of this psychological mechanism sooner or later goes into operation among people under totalitarian rule.

In clinical practice, emotional impoverishment can be overcome by means of contact with another living being capable of arousing human feelings. The well-known psychiatrist V. M. Bekhterev used to put puppies into the wards with persons suffering from catalepsy—and patients who had not communicated with anyone for years would gradually regain feelings of love and responsibility.

One may draw the conclusion that for those suffering from political depression, civic life becomes attractive only by virtue of personal contact with the people who symbolize this life.

Such popular figures in the country as Yeltsin, Popov and Sobchak—skillful politicians and bright, strong personalities—are now gaining the sympathy of those who had been unable to endure their political ideas. The main difference in the image of these leaders from the previous leadership lies in the fact that the people who elected them have begun to sense their own participation in government, and the responsibility of their personal choice.

But what will it be like in 20 years? Who will take part in meetings, in the elections? When the students of 1990 have grown up, will they not hand over their rights and civic duties to new adventurers, to the budding "iron lads" of today? How can one know? One thing is clear: today, the political depression of many young people has gone so far, that direct and emotional involvement in politics at large is impossible for them.

Only when they solve their personal problems—housing, stipends, studies—will they be able to sense their own strength and recover from their apathy. So what if they were to demand the replacement of a stupid instructor—for them that would serve as one of "Bekhterev's puppies." Let the youth associations of today try to solve the problems of "coming down to earth." That would provide hope that the democratic movement, which today rests upon the older and middle generations who were raised on building communism, would not disappear into the sands like a river in the desert.

### Reforms Advocated in Serbskiy Psychiatric Institute

91US05504 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 30 Apr 91 p 6

[Interview with Serbskiy Psychiatric Institute Director Tatyana Dmitriyeva and Honorary Director Georgiy Morozov conducted by by Dmitry Frolov: "This Is Where They 'Treated' the Dissidents"]

[Text] They are calling for changes at the Institute imeni Serbskiy, whose reputation has been seriously marred.

The Institute of General and Court-Appointed Psychiatry imeni Serbskiy is known to specialists not only as a place where prisoners and those under investigation undergo expert evaluation, but also as the largest research center having the most current methodologies and a staff of highly trained associates. Yet public opinion associates it with the system of punitive psychiatry, with the fates of the defenders of rights who have found themselves in closed-type psychiatric hospitals.

It is as if there are two directors at the institute. Doctor of Medical Sciences Tatyana Dmitriyeva has worked here for 15 years. She started out as a junior associate. Dmitriyeva has occupied the director's chair for only eight months, but then they had to find a new chair for her. The former one, along with the office, "Chayka" and the other attributes of the higher administration remained with Academician Georgiy Morozov, who headed up the institute for over 30 years, and who has now become its honorary director. Academic Morozov, whose name often appeared in the press in connection with dissident legal processes, today, in his own words, has left administrative work to engage exclusively in science.

"There were abuses throughout the Soviet Union, but this applies least of all to court-appointed psychiatry. Of that I am sure," stated Georgiy Morozov. "They say that I was directly involved in having Zhores Medvedev placed in a psychiatric hospital. In fact, he was hospitalized by psychiatrist Livshchits. There were complaints to the Ministry of Health, and Boris Vasilievich Petrovsky asked me to go to Kaluga, where Medvedev was being held, and to examine him. As a result, my colleagues and I came to the conclusion that he should be discharged."

[Correspondent] And what about Vladimir Bukovskiy? After all, he was also your patient.

[Morozov] You know, I don't remember exactly now, but I think... no, we did not exactly find him to be irresponsible for his actions.

[Correspondent] Your colleagues who speak of punitive psychiatry.

[Morozov] I am sure that this is caused by political motives. I know for a fact that we have some "independent" psychiatrists who are being financed by the West, so that they would seek out cases of supposed abuse.

[Correspondent] Could you name some names?

[Morozov] For example, Tsaregorodtsev is a doubtful personality. There is another one like him. When I remember his name, I will tell you.

[Correspondent] And have they been engaged in this for long?

[Morozov] Especially in recent years, when everything has been permitted.

We also touched upon the recent past in our conversation with the new director.

[Dmitriyeva] "People must understand the content of the definition of 'abuse of psychiatry.' This was a system engendered by the system. It was in all the republics. Society pushed us toward this," says Tatyana Dmitriyeva. Those who worked with persons who were being investigated under political statutes maintain that they experienced no pressure and made independent decisions. I know that it was often stated in the press that Professor Lunts, who was in charge of the fourth section where persons under investigation by the KGB were housed, was also either a KGB general or a colonel. For his associates this is not as obvious as for those who talk about it. Therefore, we may only ask: Has our psychology really changed that much? About five years ago we evaluated many things differently, and after all, a psychiatrist shares the psychology of society. You may recall how at one time society quite calmly perceived the search for enemies of the people, and how many people voluntarily and sincerely participated in this effort.

I have understood much after reading the book by Vladimir Bukovskiy, "And the Wind Returns," continues T. Dmitriyeva. Nothing is distorted here. Everything he says about our institute and about the special hospital is very harsh, but objective. I think that if psychiatrists were to read this book it would be of benefit to the psychiatry of the future.

[Correspondent] Has the softening of public morals entailed any changes in your field?

[Dmitriyeva] I recently attended a session of the Supreme Soviet where the draft of the new Principles of Criminal Legislation was being reviewed. There is much

there concerning court-appointed psychiatry, and the legislation is becoming more humane. However, violations of human rights will occur until the new law on psychiatric help goes into effect, the draft of which is currently being completed. Specifically, it provides that a patient may appeal to the court or to the procurator's office, and use the services of an attorney. Only the court will be able to limit the rights of the patient—the court, and not a doctor.

[Correspondent] Perhaps this law is really a necessary condition for changes in psychiatry. But will it be enough?

[Dmitriyeva] We must create a service of social defenders such as the one which is well-developed abroad. A social defender knows the rights of the patient, is capable of settling a conflict with a doctor, and if necessary may turn to a judicial institution. He is independent from the hospital administration, but no hospital has the right to exist without him.

In the words of T. Dmitriyeva, new departments have been created at the institute which should help solve legal and ethical questions and subject many dogmas to analysis and review.

"We are speaking out for the introduction of the concept of limited responsibility, and the most flexible application of out-patient treatment... But do you think everyone supports this?", she says.

[Correspondent] Where do they not support it—inside or outside?

[Dmitriyeva] In both places. I had the following seditious thought: If, as was presumed, the institute will be transferred from the Ministry of Health to the Academy of Medical Sciences, we should present the question of removing it from all departmental subordination altogether. The budget could come either from the Supreme Soviet or from the Cabinet of Ministers. The higher our level of subordination, the less capacity the departments would have to influence us. I believe psychiatry has all the prerequisites to become entirely different. If they do not hinder it too much.

To become entirely different... The first steps toward this have been taken, and they have not remained unnoticed. The World Psychiatric Association has reinstated our membership with the condition that commissions for the control of processes in Soviet psychiatry be sent to the USSR. The first was held in the summer of 1989, and another one was supposed to come in March of this year. According to the official version, this was hindered by the fact that the Ministry of Health was unable to find the currency for putting the commission members up in a hotel. Abroad this was viewed as an excuse. The relations, which have barely begun to be put in order, have become notably more complicated.

### Tomsk Region Shows Economic, Demographic Decline

PA11305080991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
12 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Solovyev report: "Fewer Births, More Deaths"]

[Text] Tomsk—The crisis phenomena in the Tomsk Oblast economy are increasing. This is shown by the results for socioeconomic development in the first quarter.

Total industrial output fell by 7.4 percent compared with last year. Stockraising output fell sharply. State purchases of livestock and poultry fell by 30 percent, with a corresponding decline of 18 percent for milk and 12 percent for eggs.

Things have gotten worse in construction and transportation. Commissioning of housing and fixed capital fell by 30.6 and 42 percent respectively. The indicators for consumer goods production, trade turnover, and services improved, but at the cost of higher prices.

The ailing economy is also affecting the demographic situation. The number of people born in January-March fell by 8.5 percent compared with the same period of 1990, while the number of deaths increased by 0.6 percent. Fewer people are coming into the oblast from other regions, and the problem of labor resources is exacerbating.

### Zaslavskaya on Public View of Soviet Society's Future

91US05674 Moscow POISK in Russian No. 13,  
22-28 Mar 91 pp 4-5

[Article by T. Zaslavskaya: "What Unites Us"]

[Text] POISK has on many occasions told about the seminars held monthly in the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium under the direction of Academician V. Kudryavtsev. The country's leading economists, sociologists, historians, and political scientists take part in the seminary's scientific discussions. The topic of the most recent discussion had to do with how the prospects for the USSR's development are seen through the prism of public opinion. The main report was delivered by Academician T. Zaslavskaya. We publish excerpts from her report below.

One possible way of promoting realization of the democratic variant of perestroika is public opinion work. Based on the research of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, I will try to characterize the public's current views as to the outlook for Soviet society's development...

In the summer of 1990, we asked our respondents: What, in your view, are the chief results of the five-year perestroika of social relations. The largest number of votes went to such answers as "loss of confidence in the

future," 43 percent; "a crisis of national relations," 37 percent; "chaos and confusion in national administration," 29 percent; and "deepening economic crisis," 28 percent. Nineteen percent of the respondents said "normalization of international relations and a peaceful foreign policy." As we see, public opinion is not distinguished by optimism with respect to what perestroika has done for our country. It attests to a collapse of the working people's hopes for an appreciable improvement in their lives, effective economic development, and the resolution of social problems.

In November 1990, people cited as the most acute problems complicating their lives: the shortage and poor quality of food products (70 percent); the poor supply of

manufactured goods (67 percent); and low incomes and high prices (61 percent). Of those surveyed, 87 percent, 80 percent, and 79 percent respectively insisted on the need to solve these problems at once. Thus, assessments of the effectiveness of perestroika at the macro- and micro-social levels are equally pessimistic. They attest to the disappointment of those who had hoped for the country's rapid revival and improvements in their own lives.

One of the causes of that disappointment is the slowing pace of society's democratization. Since January 1990, our center has each month surveyed respondents as to how, in their opinion, this process is proceeding. The dynamics of the distribution of responses is as follows:

Opinion	Months of 1990			
	1	5	8	12
Process Is Developing Successfully	18	22	18	16
Process Has Been Impeded	46	36	37	40
Process Has Waned	17	18	21	24
Can't Say For Sure	19	24	24	20

As these data show, the course of democratization in early 1990 was not viewed in an overly optimistic fashion. Most people thought that this process had been impeded, and the number of optimists and pessimists was roughly equal. Subsequently, the working people's relative optimism declined from month to month, while pessimism grew.

The disappointment with the policy being pursued cannot help but have an impact on attitudes toward those who are formulating and implementing it, which is to say toward the country's leadership. In January 1990, 13 percent of the respondents had complete confidence in the country's leadership; 49 percent basically had confidence; and 25 percent had no confidence. Eleven months later, in December of that same year, only six percent still had complete confidence in the leadership, and 27 percent had partial confidence. The low level and rapid decline in public confidence in the leadership merits attention. Moreover, this tendency is spreading to most institutions of government. For example, in January 1990, 31 percent of all respondents believed that the government merited complete confidence, while 16 percent did not have confidence in it. But by September the picture had become the reverse: 15 percent expressed complete confidence in the government, and 38 percent voiced no confidence. The situation was similar with respect to confidence in the CPSU, the All-Union Communist Youth League, the trade unions, and other political institutions. The sole exception was the republic Supreme Soviets, confidence in which grew from 26 percent in January to 40 percent in September.

People's expectations for the future are no less troubling than their assessments of the present, and their pessimism is growing. In December 1990, only two to three

percent of those surveyed expected a significant improvement in the economic situation, and three percent expected a stabilization of the political situation. A further increase in economic difficulties and political tension was predicted by 63 and 59 percent. Twenty-two percent saw the onset of economic catastrophe as probable, and 20 percent of those surveyed viewed the outbreak of civil war as likely (as against 11 and nine percent respectively in January of that same year). Nor do people entertain any illusions with respect to the likely timetable for society's emergence from the crisis. Only nine percent believe that this could take place in the next two to three years. Fifteen percent think it might occur within the next five to six years; 16 percent by the year 2,000, and 32 percent think it will come significant later. Sixteen percent of the respondents were unable to give a definite answer, and 12 percent answered "never."

Up until now I have analyzed people's attitudes not so much toward the fundamental intent of perestroika as toward the changes actually taking place, which do not always coincide with that intent. Now the time has come to look at public opinion regarding perestroika's relationship to socialism. As is generally known, the country's leadership insists on perestroika's socialist character, while its political opponents assert that it is leading to the restoration of capitalism. But what does the public think about this, which of the aforementioned views does it lean toward? In April 1990, we included the following question in our survey: To what kind of system, in the respondents' opinion, will a market economic lead the country? A sizable part (two-fifths) of those questioned were unable to answer this difficult question, something that is of course easy to explain. The answers of the remaining 60 percent were distributed as

follows. The perestroika of economic relations will lead to renewed socialism, 10 percent; to a society that combines the best features of capitalism and socialism, 24 percent; to a society that combines the worst features of capitalism and socialism, 14 percent; and to capitalism, 12 percent.

These results enable us to draw a number of conclusions. First, in the minds of half of all people, the transition to a market is associated with capitalism to one degree or another. Forty percent of those questioned have no firm opinion as to what kind of system perestroika will lead—capitalist or socialist. At first glance, this is not surprising, since this question is more a scholarly issue than a subject of everyday discussion. But if we consider the persistence of the assurances that are issued daily in the newspapers and on television as to perestroika's socialist character, the percentage of those who refuse to be persuaded and who reserve their own viewpoint appears very high.

Second, 10 percent of the respondents believe that the USSR is moving toward renewed socialism, while 35 to 36 percent would like to see this. Thus, one-fourth of the adult population believes the orientation of perestroika to be incorrect and are not in psychological agreement with its objectives.

Third, people's attitudes to a possible "capitalist future" vary. If we take as 100 the total number of those who consider this prospect to be realistic, it turns out that almost half (48 percent) have in mind the adoption of the capitalism's best features, one-fourth (24 percent) speak of capitalism in neutral terms, simply noting that we are moving closer to it, and only 28 percent experience are disturbed by the possibility of Soviet society's assuming the worst features of capitalism. According to several other surveys conducted by our center, the percentage of people fearing a return to capitalism is higher. For example, the existence of a real threat of "power passing into the hands of swindlers and exploiters" is seen by 44 percent of the population of Russia, and the "sale of our national resources to capitalist countries" by 40 percent. To the question, is society's move away from socialist gains probable in connection with the development of the cooperative movement, 28 percent answered yes, 42 percent were unable to give a definite answer, and only 30 percent answered no. On the whole, public opinion on this fundamental issue does not bear out the expected commitment to a "socialist choice." Despite the efforts of propaganda, people believe in common sense more than anything else. And common sense suggests that socialism's relations with the market are "strained," while capitalism's relations with the market are "warm." And conclusions are drawn from this. For my part, I believe that on the threshold of a market economy, we should refrain from pitting the notions of "capitalism" and "socialism" against each other as mutually exclusive. We must recognize that they have lost the meaning invested in them by the Marxist-Leninist classics, and that they are not needed in practical efforts, in working to accomplish specific tasks. Unsuccessful attempts to

revive these notions and to invest them with content that conflicts with common sense can only lead to the people's final loss of confidence.

Now let us consider how public opinion views changes in the social structure stemming from perestroika, in particular the emergence of a stratum of entrepreneurs, the altered status of the nomenklatura and the "lower" strata, and the deepening social stratification of society. As we know, the first representatives of the new stratum of "business people" were the cooperative operators, lease-holders, and joint enterprise employees. They were later joined by private farmers, as well as owners of small stores, cafes, and service enterprises. But so far, all these categories are small. Surveys show that the emergence of "new people" and their vigorous drive for success have not escaped the attention of at least three-fourths of the population, and the reaction of various groups to the emergence of this stratum is sharply polarized, as is clear from a survey devoted to cooperatives. Most respondents believe that cooperatives pay more fairly than the state sector (52 percent), that people have more opportunity to take initiative and to show what they can do (61 percent), that people make better use of raw and other materials and equipment (66 percent), and that people who work in cooperatives are resourceful and enterprising, know how to work, and want to earn money (45 percent). Consequently, 41 percent of those surveyed believe that cooperatives should undergo development.

On the other hand, a sizable segment of the population believes that the development of cooperatives is worsening the state of the economy (35 percent) and that after the country emerges from crisis, cooperatives won't be needed at all (38 percent). Forty-five percent of those questioned favor limiting the activities of cooperatives. Nine out of 10 people are dissatisfied with their prices, half with the goods they offer, and 44 percent with the quality of those goods. Nearly three-fifths of those questioned feel that cooperative employees are earning undeservedly high incomes, and one-third believe that people working in cooperatives are swindlers, speculators, and people with dark pasts. Hence the opinion of the roughly one-third who believe that cooperatives should be curtailed. The bias of public opinion on this issue significantly complicates the development of new forms of economic activity in the city and countryside.

Let us turn to how most people assess the changes in the nomenklatura, including the scaling down of their privileges. Four-fifths of those questioned know that officials of the party and state apparatus enjoy many privileges. Almost all of them (77 percent) agree that the nomenklatura's privileges are excessive and socially unjust. Two points are cited in support of this view: First, that the population's life is getting worse, while the authorities have isolated themselves from the public by a firm "wall" of privileges, and second, that these privileges are granted to people on the basis of the positions they hold, not on the basis of their concrete services. Eight percent



of those questioned consider the privileges to be completely justified, which nearly coincides with the percentage of those who have personally enjoyed such privileges (seven percent).

To the question of how they view the results of efforts to eliminate unwarranted differences in the standing of various population groups, two-thirds of the respondents answered that "everything is the same as it was," and approximately equal shares (11 percent and 13 percent) responded that "fewer" or "more" people have begun enjoying privileges. Consequently, according to public opinion, social justice has not been restored.

Nor are responses regarding changes in the lot of the poor particularly reassuring. First of all, in the view of two-thirds of the population, there are many poor people in our country, and the standard of living by the year 2000 will at best be like that of the developing countries. More than one-third of those questioned believe that the number of the poor has "significantly increased" over the years of perestroika, and another 22 percent believe that their number has "somewhat increased." Almost 60 percent are certain that differences in the standard of living of the rich and poor will grow in the future. But when we tried to ascertain who has the greatest chance of increasing his income, the most frequent responses were "only those who live by dishonest work will become richer" (46 percent), and "those who manage to land good jobs will earn more" (43 percent). The responses "those who work hard will also earn more" and "wages will increase first of all for those who already work hard" were given by only half that many people—21 and 19 percent. Only two to three percent of those surveyed believe that workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia are benefiting from the changes in the economy. The rest cited officials of the apparatus, trade employees, and small entrepreneurs. Thus, public opinion does not associate "the renewal of socialism" with growing social justice, or perestroika with a "socialist choice."

To summarize, the most important characteristics of current Soviet public opinion are as follows:

- social pessimism: disappointment with the actual results of perestroika, and a loss of confidence in its rapid success;
- frustration as manifested in deep concern over events taking place, alarm, weariness, a lack of confidence in the future, and the expectation of all sorts of disasters (inflation, monetary reform, economic catastrophe, nationwide famine, and civil war);
- suspicion and aggression as the reverse side of that alarm, widespread perceptions of "plots by secret enemies" (of perestroika, democracy, the Russian people, the CPSU, and so on), heightened attention to "who is to blame," and a desire to immediately punish the "culprits";
- a profound value and moral vacuum resulting from the collapse of communist ideology and the destruction of traditional Soviet values, such as the belief in Soviet society's "great historical mission" in building

communism, the grandeur, power, and security of the Soviet "empire," and its economic and military power, heroic labor "for the benefit of the motherland" and "without regard for recompense," a constant readiness to work to accomplish great feats and to stoically endure daily hardship, scorn for material benefits, consumerism, and so forth.

- a return to previously rejected religious and moral values, the growing authority of various religions, the attraction of all manner of mysterious phenomena and mysticism for a sizable number of people;
- paternalism and egalitarianism that date back to our communal mentality, these traits flourished in the nutrient medium of "real socialism" and are nourished today by people's poverty and depressed situation. Outspoken and aggressive envy of the status of any groups that are materially well off, and especially if they enjoy privileges. The view that people's material prosperity is a direct index of their dishonesty, in the form of involvement in the shadow economy, the appropriation of unearned income, and so on.

All these distinctive features of public opinion do not make it any easier to implement perestroika. At the same time, they are by no means accidental, but are rooted in various stages of Soviet history, in particular the protracted period of social stagnation. The hopelessly sick Brezhnev society could not be mentally healthy. Therefore, today we have to simultaneously treat both its "body" and its "mind." To do so, we must first of all minimize the factors that promote the division of social groups in terms of interests, needs, and values. In other words, we must concentrate efforts on the search for public consensus based on the ideas of social-national and cultural-moral revival.

Peoples who have just broken out (or are still striving to break out) of the fetters of the USSR's rigid national state structure espouse the ideas of national revival most readily. These ideas are being "accepted" and gaining momentum in all republics. But unfortunately, they usually serve not to promote consensus but, on the contrary, to demarcate peoples and give rise to interethnic conflicts. Most nations are striving to achieve their own revival at the expense of national minorities, and we are still far away from a civilized resolution of the issues that arise in this regard.

Moral rebirth is vitally needed, since the loss of most moral and spiritual values deprives a society of viability. It could explode at any moment not only at the hands of criminals who act according to the principle "all is permissible," but also through the fault of immoral, irresponsible, and incompetent people who are incapable of interacting with 20th century technology.

The idea of cultural revival seems to me weaker vis-a-vis moral rebirth, since it encompasses fewer people. It is more capable of uniting an intelligentsia as opposed to an entire nation.

As for social revival, it was the essence of perestroika's original intent. The intention was to make a sick, rotting and sharply differentiated society healthy and socially just. But at present most social ideas are sooner dividing rather than consolidating society.

Does this mean that our society has no foundation on which to reach consensus and that its consolidation is impossible today? In my view, it does not. Consolidation can and must be achieved on the basis of society's economic revival, above all the privatization of state property and the development of market relations. At least two circumstances favor such a solution. First, the USSR's national economy has long been a single complex, not one of whose parts can function without the others. Consequently, any attempts by the republics to break free of the complex's "economic embrace" are doomed to fail, and this is being understood more clearly with each passing month. Second, efforts to overcome the economic crisis, to stabilize the ruble, to saturate the goods market, and to ensure a steady economic upturn serve the interests of all national, regional, and demographic groups. This means that this idea can, in principle, consolidate society. But it is difficult to do this in practice, in particular because public opinion is characterized by great inertia and often resists even progressive and highly promising innovations. In this connection, an analysis of public opinion on key issues of economic reform—such as privatization of production, the development of market relations, and so on—are of great interest and importance. But that must be the subject of a special report.

### Greater Women's Representation in Election Process Examined

*RUSSIAN MOSCOW PRUDIA in Russian 8 Jun 91  
First Edition p. 2*

[Article by Professor Galina Sillaste, doctor of philosophy, under the rubric: "Russia on the Eve of a Choice: Equality Men's-Style, or Democracy Without Women: Reflections on the Election Campaign in the RSFSR, Which May Be Considered a Learning Aide to Future Contenders"]

[Text]A turbulent stream of information related to the elections of the first president in Russian history has flowed over our society. Oh, all the things that are being said and written about the "six duets" included in the official ballot. The candidates have different programs, which include directly opposite positions on many issues. However, all members of the magnificent "six" are united in that none of them named a woman as a potential vice president. Not to mention the fact that there are no women among the six.

We have simply forgotten about the real possibility of electing them to such posts. Some contenders even attempted to substantiate their negative attitude toward women's participation in big politics. For instance Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the nearly mythical

for me Liberal Democratic Party, called on women to first and foremost remain themselves and return to the family. I would not want to weaken the position of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. I am mentioning this contender only because his views are shared by many men, including those who run our governmental business today and those who stand ready to take over the baton tomorrow.

It is an amazing situation! Our democrats, reformists, centrists, and liberals literally knock themselves out in their worship of the Western way of life, regarding it as an unsurpassed model for imitation.

In this matter, however, Western civilization is not an example for us to follow. Ours stand practically as one in their traditionally disrespectful attitude toward women's participation in politics.

Is it, perhaps, out of fear of imaginary female aggressiveness that we have now only one woman in each of the "top echelons"—the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Constitutional Oversight Committee, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. The composition of the power organs—from top to bottom—has changed with a minus sign when it comes to women. Women make up less than 19 percent of the USSR Supreme Soviet now (instead of 33 in the pre-perestroika period), less than 10 percent in the Russian Supreme Soviet, five percent in the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics, and less than one percent in the Moscow City Soviet. A paradoxical correlation is beginning to emerge: The more we talk about democracy, the fewer women we have in power positions.

Let us go further. What else, other than centuries-old prejudice and boyar traditions that are rooted in the deep of the Middle Ages, can explain the fact that none of the candidates for the post of the president of Russia pays attention to even such a "trifle" as the need to win the women's vote, although there are 50 million of them in the RSFSR.

One does not have to be a biased person to notice that no one, in any way, singles out female voters. Generally, this is understandable. In the past neither women nor men had any choice, so there was no need to undertake this labor-intensive effort. Today, in the multiparty environment, with competition present, it becomes necessary to identify primary interest groups, and in this sense female voters present wide opportunities toward which efforts may be applied.

An American presidential contender does not shy away from meeting separately with homemakers. A contender in Switzerland feels it makes sense to meet with women students. Ours do not even look "that way." At the same time there are 10 percent more female than male voters in the RSFSR. If they became united, they could elect—without any support from men—those of their choosing to all the highest state positions.

I must confess that my attitude is the same toward all contenders for the post of the head of the Russian state. I have my sympathies and antipathies. I have to admit, however, that each contender possesses political experience, knowledge, and the will, all of which enable them to participate in the election campaign with maximum benefit to themselves. Each, even with cursory contemplation, could have figured out that the women's vote should play a decisive role. Nevertheless, the candidates do not take the "female factor" into account.

They do not take facts into account in general. According to the results of opinion polls conducted by the Academy of Social Sciences Sociological Center, 57 percent of men—but only 38 percent of women—support a transition to a market. (This is natural: The market economy will result in special hardships for women. They are its first and most numerous victims). How to remove this social fear, how to lighten the problem in favor of women? This, and many other things, should be given some thought. Or the fact that the majority of women actively support, for instance, *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*. Not being extremists by nature, they do not support the absorption of one system by another but rather prefer an equal development of all forms of property. And so on...

I am ready to bet that even such a master of political games as B.N. Yeltsin does not have on his team any analysts—economists, psychologists, or trusted representatives—especially geared for work among women.

Meanwhile, there are important specifics when it comes to this group. Men mostly concentrate at large production entities, while women work at smaller ones. Homemakers and other women separated from the collective fall out of the game entirely. Plus the level of emotional impact that is required for such contacts. All of that requires stepping away from the traditional forms of election toil and, of course, is much more difficult to accomplish.

In addition, the specificity of working with women requires, rather than long-term programs and beautiful but far-removed horizons, a precise, defined, step-by-step resolution of small but very concrete tasks within a reasonably definable timeframe.

But even this is not the main point. The principal difficulty lies in the fact that the fight for the female vote requires the contenders to undertake an obligation toward society—to affirm real, not just verbal, equality for women; to actively involve them in political life; to fundamentally improve the situation of families and the conditions surrounding motherhood and childhood. These are extremely difficult tasks. In my opinion neither Yeltsin nor Ryzhkov, Bakatin, Makashov, Zhirinovskiy, or Tuleyev are ready to tackle these tasks.

Women, however, have no place to go: They will have to choose not among those they might have wanted to choose from, but from those who are available. Armed with the results of public opinion polls, one can try to even do some forecasting (although in politics it is an

unreliable and even dangerous business). It seems that, despite an obvious decline in his rating, B.N. Yeltsin is still "surrounded by women" to a greater degree than other contenders. A certain role in this belongs to a meeting (albeit the only one and a long time ago) with the Union of Russian Women, plus the ability to periodically squeeze in—even though parenthetically—a few words on a topic related to women.

N.I. Ryzhkov, however, with his advocacy of "sparing" transition to a market, also has a chance among women. General Makashov also has a chance. Female mentality, which is oriented toward stability, finds it easier to accept an authoritarian leader, a strong man capable of protecting others.

Certain changes in the moods of V.V. Bakatin have not gone unnoticed, either. In a recent interview by a television political commentator, who read out—with a familiar male smirk—the question: "How is the candidate planning to resolve women's problems?" Bakatin said something that will certainly bring him more favor on the part of female television viewers. He said that this should be taken seriously, and that the one-sidedness of the politics without a female component is obvious.

Their role and place depend on themselves, however—he said in conclusion; permit me to disagree with this. If society does not help women, they themselves will not be able to accomplish it.

It should be noted, though, for fairness sake, that the counter movement toward the presidential chair on the part of women has also been clearly insufficient. It is a sad fact—and this is one of the most serious gaps in the women's movement—that they have not produced a deserving figure for the political Olympus. And that is despite the fact that the process of the politization of women, started by *perestroika*, is clearly gathering momentum.

One more serious reason to be perplexed. The country has special female-oriented structures, but at the same time there are no leaders. How can this be? Perhaps the explanation is that the search for such leaders is going on among women attached to these structures. In our country of patriarchal traditions, it is unrealistic to expect "male" organizations to nominate leaders of the opposite gender. The only organization that has an actual obligation to nominate them is the Committee of Soviet Women. It should be its task to search for contenders beyond the framework of its narrow body of activists. It is necessary to painstakingly search for talented women and groom them for political careers.

This is all a dream for tomorrow. Today, let me repeat, there are no deserving female candidates. This means, among other things, that the last name on a rather small list of women who have stood at the helm of the Russian state will still be that of Catherine the Great.

# Population Figures on Language Acquisition

## Primary, Secondary Language Acquisition

91UN1301A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 2,  
Jan 91 p 15

of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language. According to the 1989 Census (Urban Population)"]

[Text] Languages of the Peoples of the USSR

[Statistical summary, based on 1989 Census: "Languages of the Peoples of the USSR: Distribution of the Peoples

## Distribution of the Peoples of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language, According to the 1989 Census (Urban Population)

Peoples	Total	Consider as Their Native Language							
		Language of Their Nationality		Russian Language		Languages of Nationalities, Formations, Union Republics		Other Languages	
		Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent
Abazins	13,805	12,180	88.2	1,330	9.6	29	0.2	266	1.9
Abkhazians	50,609	45,178	89.3	4,401	8.7	828	1.6	202	0.4
Avars	186,134	174,806	93.9	8,799	4.7	586	0.3	1,943	1.0
Austrians	425	129	30.4	247	58.1	20	4.7	29	6.8
Aguls	6,344	5,703	89.9	501	7.9	22	0.3	118	1.9
Adyghe	52,610	47,270	89.8	5,177	9.8	50	0.1	113	0.2
Azerbaijani	3,390,427	3,278,345	96.7	97,812	2.9	5,113	0.2	9,157	0.3
Albanians	1,629	574	35.2	992	60.9	42	2.6	21	1.3
Aleuts	267	92	34.5	163	61.0	3	1.1	9	3.4
Altay	13,630	8,522	62.5	5,038	37	30	0.2	40	0.3
Americans	225	145	64.4	53	23.6	8	3.6	19	8.4
English	301	174	57.8	105	34.9	14	4.7	8	2.7
Arabs	5,445	3,992	73.3	743	13.6	517	9.5	193	3.5
Armenians	3,229,925	2,884,062	89.3	317,508	9.8	25,669	0.8	2,686	0.1
Assyrians	21,600	12,015	55.6	7,945	36.8	1,498	6.9	142	0.7
Afghans	4,124	2,539	61.6	372	9.0	834	20.2	379	9.2
Balkars	49,929	45,818	91.8	3,648	7.3	129	0.3	334	0.7
Bashkirs	741,302	513,188	69.2	136,740	18.4	1,461	0.2	89,913	12.1
Belorussians	6,536,460	3,977,945	60.9	2,528,298	38.7	26,398	0.4	3,819	0.1
Beluchi	2,305	1,848	80.2	264	11.5	150	6.5	43	1.9
Bulgarians	180,471	89,235	49.4	85,153	47.2	5,274	2.9	809	0.4
Burvats	178,337	135,273	75.9	42,761	24.0	75	—	228	0.1
Hungarians	68,831	60,751	88.3	4,391	6.4	3,417	5.0	272	0.4
Veps	6,165	2,065	32.8	4,081	66.2	14	0.2	45	0.7
Vietnamese	3,365	3,247	96.5	106	3.2	4	0.1	8	0.2
Crugauz	80,744	63,048	78.1	15,808	19.6	1,336	1.7	552	0.7
Dutch	622	194	31.2	391	62.9	13	2.1	24	3.9
Greeks	239,291	100,526	42.0	129,263	54.0	6,905	2.9	2,597	1.1
Georgians	2,178,140	2,115,722	97.1	59,346	2.7	1,730	0.1	1,292	0.1
Dargins	111,394	104,949	94.2	5,332	4.8	140	0.1	973	0.9
Dolgan	1,572	834	53.1	606	38.5	95	6.0	37	2.4
Dungans	17,407	15,363	88.3	1,338	7.7	544	3.1	162	0.9
Jews	1,361,721	149,479	11.0	1,182,658	86.9	25,834	1.9	3,750	0.3
Mountain Jews	17,682	13,479	76.2	3,404	19.3	329	1.9	470	2.7
Georgian Jews	15,771	14,370	91.1	1,270	8.1	66	0.4	65	0.4
Central Asian Jews	35,857	23,401	65.3	12,020	33.5	251	0.7	185	0.5
Izhora	517	145	28.0	321	62.1	36	7.0	15	2.9
Ingush	97,617	92,479	94.7	4,763	4.9	81	0.1	294	0.3

**Distribution of the Peoples of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language, According to the 1989 Census (Urban Population) (Continued)**

Peoples	Total	Consider as Their Native Language							
		Language of Their Nationality		Russian Language		Languages of Nationalities, Formations, Union Republics		Other Languages	
		Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent
Spaniards	3,023	1,402	46.4	1,545	51.1	47	1.6	29	1.0
Italians	1,190	477	40.1	646	54.3	48	4.0	19	1.6
Belmen	956	211	22.1	732	76.6	3	0.3	10	1.0
Kabards	174,381	165,702	95.0	8,245	4.7	118	0.1	316	0.2
Kazakhs	3,150,586	3,004,992	95.4	122,063	3.9	9,677	0.3	13,854	0.4
Kalmyks	85,843	76,348	88.9	8,641	10.1	776	0.9	78	0.1
Karaim	2,460	417	17.0	1,913	77.8	88	3.6	42	1.7
Karakalpak	228,297	219,821	96.3	3,452	1.5	4,769	2.1	255	0.1
Karachay	51,254	47,967	93.6	3,068	6.0	87	0.2	132	0.3
Karelians	81,417	31,841	39.1	49,194	60.4	118	0.1	264	0.3
Ket	219	77	35.2	128	58.4	9	4.1	5	2.3
Kirghiz	560,222	543,736	97.1	10,387	1.9	5,258	0.9	841	0.2
Chinese	8,961	2,856	31.9	5,919	66.1	116	1.3	70	0.8
Komi	170,244	94,195	55.3	75,761	44.5	162	0.1		
Komi-Permyaks	61,442	32,591	53.0	28,608	46.6	54	0.1	189	0.3
Koreans	361,346	171,493	47.5	188,642	52.2	660	0.2	551	0.2
Koryak	2,778	1,113	40.1	1,640	59.0	6	0.2	19	0.7
Krymkhaks	1,258	357	28.4	865	68.8	9	0.7	27	2.1
Kubans	2,667	1,934	72.5	403	15.1	18	0.7	312	11.7
Kumyk	129,224	123,792	95.8	4,643	3.6	54	—	735	0.6
Kurds	60,276	46,012	76.3	5,968	9.9	7,821	13.0	475	0.8
Lak	77,884	71,396	91.7	5,460	7.0	247	0.3	781	1.0
Latvians	885,926	825,519	93.2	58,330	6.6	1,535	0.2	542	0.1
Lezgins	223,480	194,115	86.9	19,605	8.8	7,260	3.2	2,500	1.1
Livs	151	67	44.4	27	17.9	50	33.1	7	4.6
Lithuanians	1,997,361	1,946,282	97.4	43,466	2.2	5,667	0.3	1,946	0.1
Mansi	3,934	1,029	26.2	2,860	72.7	26	0.7	19	0.5
Mari	279,436	191,458	68.5	86,600	31.0	227	0.1	1,151	0.4
Moldavians	1,206,239	995,051	82.5	197,260	16.4	11,189	0.9	2,739	0.2
Mordvians	623,744	337,598	54.1	284,310	45.6	497	0.1	1,339	0.2
Nanay	4,783	1,732	36.2	3,017	63.1	5	0.1	29	0.6
Peoples of India and Pakistan	1,671	1,211	72.5	270	16.2	115	6.9	75	4.5
Nganasan	360	267	74.2	84	23.3	1	0.3	8	2.2
Negidals	250	72	28.8	167	66.8	3	1.2	8	3.2
Germans	1,075,412	439,996	40.9	630,332	58.6	3,956	0.4	1,128	0.1
Nentsy	6,193	3,427	55.3	2,579	41.6	19	0.3	168	2.7
Nivkh	2,383	561	23.5	1,804	75.7	6	0.3	12	0.5
Nogay	14,419	12,168	84.4	1,778	12.3	47	0.3	426	3.0
Oroks	159	77	48.4	80	50.3	—	—	2	1.3
Oroch	444	93	20.9	340	76.6	3	0.7	8	1.8
Ossetians	392,273	330,437	84.2	36,861	9.4	23,662	6.0	1,313	0.3
Iranians (Persians)	25,661	6,327	24.7	3,443	13.4	15,128	59.0	763	3.0
Poles	661,900	186,256	28.1	258,511	39.1	214,943	32.5	2,190	0.3
Romanians	42,149	25,087	59.5	6,280	14.9	10,032	23.8	750	1.8
Russians	113,486,085	113,269,468	99.8	—	—	188,372	0.2	28,245	
Rutuls	6,418	5,738	89.4	494	7.7	39	0.6	147	2.3
Saam (Lapps)	754	248	32.9	499	66.2	1	0.1	6	0.8
Selkup	934	297	31.8	616	66.0	11	1.2	10	1.1



**Distribution of the Peoples of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language, According to the 1989 Census (Urban Population) (Continued)**

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		Language of Their Nationality		Russian Language		Languages of Nationalities, Formations, Union Republics		Other Languages	
		Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent
Serbs	2,048	860	42.1	797	39.0	151	7.4	237	11.6
Slovaks	7,697	2,674	34.7	814	10.6	2,292	29.8	1,917	24.9
Tatars	35,956	33,247	92.5	2,107	5.9	60	0.2	542	1.5
Tajiks	1,193,069	1,140,414	95.6	28,612	2.4	22,544	1.9	1,499	0.1
Tatvsh	2,514	1,566	62.3	71	2.8	828	32.9	49	1.9
Tatars	4,590,528	3,625,362	79.0	939,294	20.5	18,325	0.4	7,547	0.2
Crimian Tatars	187,301	172,222	91.9	11,811	6.3	781	0.4	2,487	1.3
Tats	28,829	21,082	73.1	6,279	21.8	729	2.5	—	—
Totatars	104	39	37.5	53	51.0	5	4.8	7	6.7
Tuvians	65,983	63,519	96.3	2,383	3.6	21	—	60	0.1
Turks	47,505	42,502	89.5	2,515	5.3	1,672	3.5	816	1.7
Turkmen	911,441	882,983	96.9	23,856	2.6	3,883	0.4	719	0.1
Udi	2,844	1,748	61.7	639	25.1	116	4.6	41	1.6
Udmurts	364,437	203,730	55.9	159,613	43.8	268	0.1	826	0.2
Udages	775	276	35.6	367	47.4	48	6.2	84	10.8
Uzbeks	5,169,761	4,997,402	96.7	99,443	1.9	63,081	1.2	9,835	0.2
Uighurs	194,450	88,535	45.6	8,333	4.3	7,193	3.7	389	0.2
Ukrainians	27,690,907	20,464,099	73.9	7,191,878	26.0	23,521	0.1	11,409	—
Uich	923	267	28.9	578	62.6	27	2.9	51	5.5
Finns	47,971	15,223	31.7	28,598	59.6	3,910	8.2	240	0.5
French	651	306	47.0	272	41.8	63	9.7	10	1.5
Khakass	34,736	22,617	65.1	11,957	34.4	69	0.2	93	0.3
Khalkha Mongols	2,814	2,518	89.5	251	8.9	6	0.2	39	1.4
Khants	6,828	2,906	42.6	3,860	56.5	10	0.1	52	0.8
Khorvat	607	296	48.8	277	45.6	23	3.8	11	1.8
Tsakhuars	4,253	3,646	85.7	236	5.5	243	5.7	128	3.0
Gypsies	168,508	130,685	77.6	19,297	11.5	13,087	7.8	5,430	3.2
Cherkess	19,695	16,413	83.3	2,764	14.0	36	0.2	482	2.4
Czechs	10,907	3,138	28.8	5,476	50.2	2,135	19.6	158	1.4
Chechen	267,604	255,841	95.8	11,045	4.1	233	0.1	785	0.3
Chuvans	834	187	22.4	616	73.9	8	0.6	26	3.1
Chuvash	936,547	591,763	63.2	342,449	36.6	573	0.1	1,762	0.2
Chukchi	2,176	1,029	47.3	1,104	50.7	14	0.6	29	1.3
Shors	12,293	6,323	51.4	5,749	46.8	10	0.1	211	1.7
Evenk	6,272	1,838	29.0	2,914	46.5	24	0.4	1,516	24.2
Even	4,369	1,378	31.5	1,987	45.5	11	0.3	993	22.7
Entev	90	36	40.0	47	52.2	—	—	7	7.8
Eskimos	399	139	34.8	250	62.7	1	0.3	9	2.3
Estonians	616,400	579,481	94.0	35,748	5.8	922	0.1	249	—
Yakghir	437	118	27.0	257	58.8	1	0.2	61	14.0
Yakuts	106,727	88,906	83.3	17,726	16.6	36	—	59	0.1
Japanese	530	245	46.2	260	49.1	11	2.1	14	2.6
Other nationalities	9,522	5,489	57.6	1,924	20.2	385	4.0	1,724	18.1
Nationality not indicated	16,346	—	—	—	—	—	—	16,346	100.0
Total	187,745,728	170,885,134	91.0	15,815,191	8.4	789,837	0.4	255,566	0.1

## Languages of the Peoples of the USSR [Continued]

Distribution of the Peoples of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language, According to the 1989 Census  
(Urban Population)

Peoples	Have Fluent Command of a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR									
	Language of Their Nationality		Russian Language		Languages of Nationalities, Formations, Union Republics		Other Languages		Do Not Have Command of a Second Language	
	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent
Abazins	190	1.4	11,183	81.0	45	0.3	387	2.8	2,000	14.5
Abkhazians	676	1.3	41,658	82.3	1,587	3.1	224	0.4	6,464	12.8
Avars	1,053	0.6	150,549	80.9	2,308	1.2	2,201	1.2	30,023	16.1
Austrians	—	—	122	28.7	29	6.8	17	4.0	257	60.5
Aguls	77	1.2	4,727	74.5	48	0.8	174	2.7	1,318	20.8
Adygey	1,241	2.4	43,496	82.7	154	0.3	126	0.2	7,593	14.4
Azerbaijani	26,286	0.8	1,608,540	47.4	31,192	0.9	12,880	0.4	1,711,529	50.5
Albanians	—	—	562	34.5	238	14.6	15	0.9	814	50.0
Aleuts	20	7.5	84	31.5	1	0.4	2	0.7	160	59.9
Altay	645	4.7	7,930	58.2	57	0.4	87	0.6	4,911	36.0
Americans	—	—	106	47.1	15	6.7	6	2.7	98	43.6
English	—	—	141	46.8	16	5.3	6	2.0	138	45.8
Arabs	—	—	3,597	66.1	211	3.9	57	1.0	1,580	29.0
Armenians	69 [?]67 [illegible]	2.1	1,663,557	51.5	119,976	3.7	15,607	0.5	1,361,518	42.2
Assyrians	—	—	8,873	41.1	3,931	18.2	439	2.0	8,357	38.7
Afghans	—	—	1,699	41.2	672	16.3	54	1.3	1,699	41.2
Balkars	378	0.8	40,484	81.1	264	0.5	347	0.7	8,456	16.9
Bashkirs	22,050	3.0	546,307	73.7	5,031	0.7	14,427	1.9	153,487	20.7
Belorussians	938,152	14.4	3,400,586	52.0	105,433	1.6	12,011	0.2	2,080,278	31.8
Beluchi	—	—	487	21.1	679	29.5	24	1.0	1,115	48.4
Bulgarians	—	—	83,484	46.3	20,799	11.5	1,569	0.9	74,619	41.3
Buryats	7,603	4.3	124,791	70.0	273	0.2	374	0.2	45,296	25.4
Hungarians	—	—	36,756	53.4	12,485	18.1	159	0.2	19,431	28.2
Veps	1,046	17.0	1,946	31.6	52	0.8	93	1.5	3,028	49.1
Vietnamese	—	—	1,779	52.9	21	0.6	6	0.2	1,559	46.3
Gagauz	3,402	4.2	56,758	70.3	3,670	4.5	487	0.6	16,427	20.3
Dutch	—	—	179	28.8	31	5.0	11	1.8	401	64.5
Greeks	—	—	88,963	37.2	35,928	15.0	3,933	1.6	110,467	46.2
Georgians	14,164	0.7	897,398	41.2	8,813	0.4	5,730	0.3	1,257,035	57.8
Dargins	614	0.6	92,252	82.8	469	0.4	1,313	1.2	16,746	15.0
Dolgan	63	4.0	718	45.7	20	1.3	10	0.6	761	48.4
Dungans	—	—	12,593	72.3	671	3.9	143	0.8	4,000	23.0
Jews	54,975	4.0	135,803	10.0	331,014	24.3	12,401	0.9	827,578	60.8
Mountain Jews	172	1.0	9,691	54.8	2,606	14.7	238	1.3	4,975	28.1
Georgian Jews	470	3.0	7,376	46.8	179	1.1	62	0.4	7,684	48.7
Central Asian Jews	2,684	7.5	18,203	50.8	3,169	8.8	238	0.7	11,563	32.2
Izhora	56	10.8	146	28.2	62	12.0	13	2.5	240	46.4
Ingush	601	0.6	80,218	82.2	159	0.2	634	0.6	16,005	16.4
Spaniards	—	—	1,291	42.7	207	6.8	37	1.2	1,488	49.2
Italians	—	—	284	23.9	96	8.1	12	1.0	798	67.1
Itelmen	30	3.1	184	19.2	5	0.5	14	1.5	723	75.6
Kabards	1,010	0.6	144,143	82.7	297	0.2	500	0.3	28,431	16.3
Kazakhs	23,531	0.7	2,246,621	71.3	31,401	1.0	29,164	0.9	819,869	26.0
Kalmyks	1,064	1.2	72,584	84.6	258	0.3	171	0.2	11,766	13.7
Karaim	52	2.1	315	12.8	455	18.5	51	2.1	1,587	64.5
Karakalpaks	862	0.4	67,617	29.6	20,804	9.1	276	0.1	138,738	60.8
Karachay	480	0.9	41,270	80.5	217	0.4	185	0.4	9,102	17.8

**Distribution of the Peoples of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language, According to the 1989 Census (Urban Population) (Continued)**

Peoples	Have Fluent Command of a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR									
	Language of Their Nationality		Russian Language		Languages of Nationalities, Formations, Union Republics		Other Languages		Do Not Have Command of a Second Language	
	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent
Karelians	12,236	15.0	30,300	37.2	589	0.7	765	0.9	33,527	46.1
Ket	8	3.7	60	27.4	2	0.9	4	1.8	145	66.2
Kirghiz	2,095	0.4	358,914	64.1	10,316	1.8	1,338	0.2	187,559	33.5
Chinese	—	—	2,628	29.3	301	3.4	133	1.5	5,899	65.8
Komi	14,576	8.6	89,517	52.6	637	0.4	404	0.2	65,110	38.2
Komi-Permyaks	7,144	11.6	30,842	50.2	219	0.4	403	0.7	22,834	37.2
Koreans	—	—	150,569	41.7	8,498	2.4	4,986	1.4	197,293	54.6
Koryak	176	6.3	1,018	36.6	25	0.9	26	0.9	1,533	55.2
Krymchaks	66	5.2	335	26.6	62	4.9	38	3.0	757	60.2
Kubans	—	—	1,984	74.4	33	1.2	19	0.7	631	23.7
Kumyk	564	0.4	109,220	84.5	187	0.1	892	0.7	18,361	14.2
Kurds	—	—	18,926	31.4	24,065	39.9	844	1.4	16,441	27.3
Lak	581	0.7	64,357	82.6	903	1.2	735	0.9	11,308	14.5
Latvians	20,892	2.4	613,507	69.3	5,579	0.6	1,608	0.2	244,340	27.6
Lezgins	2,811	1.3	147,721	66.1	25,829	11.6	2,974	1.3	44,145	19.8
Livs	14	9.3	60	39.7	27	17.9	5	3.3	45	29.8
Lithuanians	13,285	0.7	843,681	42.2	16,715	0.8	1,584	0.1	1,122,096	56.2
Mansi	146	3.7	911	23.2	36	0.9	35	0.9	2,806	71.3
Mari	14,990	5.4	180,694	64.7	896	0.3	3,003	1.1	79,853	28.6
Moldavians	64,604	5.4	810,209	67.2	18,723	1.6	3,470	0.3	309,113	25.6
Mordvians	66,150	10.6	321,190	51.5	3,460	0.6	4,694	0.8	228,250	36.6
Nanay	385	8.0	1,534	32.1	13	0.3	60	1.3	2,791	58.4
Peoples of India and Pakistan	—	—	723	43.3	49	2.9	31	1.9	868	51.9
Nganasan	18	5.0	94	26.1	2	0.6	1	0.3	245	68.1
Negidals	12	4.8	55	22.0	6	2.4	10	4.0	167	66.8
Germans	—	—	410,206	38.1	13,345	1.2	5,847	0.5	646,014	60.1
Nentsy	207	3.3	3,089	49.9	35	0.6	118	1.9	2,744	44.3
Nivkh	58	2.4	471	19.8	2	0.1	37	1.6	1,815	76.2
Nogay	264	1.8	11,291	78.3	85	0.6	191	1.3	2,588	17.9
Oroks	4	2.5	69	43.4	1	0.6	—	—	85	53.5
Oroch	8	1.8	8	1.8	55	12.4	2	0.5	1	0.2
Ossetians	8,586	2.2	282,311	72.0	30,532	7.8	2,461	0.6	68,383	17.4
Iranians	—	—	13,664	53.2	3,043	11.9	325	1.3	8,629	33.6
Poles	—	—	285,605	43.1	132,264	20.0	3,983	0.6	240,048	36.3
Romanians	—	—	23,915	86.7	6,010	14.3	356	0.8	11,868	28.2
Russians	150,153	0.1	—	—	4,605,530	4.1	292,350	0.3	108,438,052	95.6
Rutuls	53	0.8	4,819	75.1	91	1.4	171	2.7	1,284	20.0
Saam (Lapps)	72	9.5	225	29.8	3	0.4	10	1.3	444	58.9
Selkup	35	3.7	281	30.1	4	0.4	11	1.2	603	64.6
Serbs	—	—	974	47.6	159	7.8	31	1.5	881	43.1
Slovaks	—	—	4,182	54.3	1,873	24.3	29	0.4	1,613	21.0
Tabasaran	222	0.6	28,112	78.2	180	0.5	1,243	3.5	6,199	17.2
Tajiks	7,829	0.7	518,857	43.5	150,269	12.6	2,296	0.2	513,818	43.1
Talysh	31	1.2	579	23.0	1,008	40.1	47	1.9	849	33.8
Tatars	215,591	4.7	3,291,356	71.7	66,772	1.5	14,343	0.3	1,002,466	21.8
Crimean Tatars	1,351	0.7	142,666	76.2	11,537	6.2	1,795	1.0	29,952	16.0
Tats	535	1.9	18,899	65.6	2,656	9.2	492	1.7	6,243	21.7
Tofalars	5	4.8	7	6.7	5	4.8	33	31.7	2	1.9

**Distribution of the Peoples of the USSR by Nationality, Native and Second Language, According to the 1989 Census (Urban Population) (Continued)**

Peoples	Have Fluent Command of a Second Language of the Peoples of the USSR									
	Language of Their Nationality		Russian Language		Languages of Nationalities, Formations, Union Republics		Other Languages		Do Not Have Command of a Second Language	
	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent	Absolute	Percent
Tuvians	305	0.5	48,980	74.2	38	0.1	118	0.2	16,541	5.3
Turks	—	—	22,168	46.7	12,503	26.3	486	1.0	1,338	0.3
Turkmen	4,513	0.5	438,126	48.1	10,725	1.2	1,822	0.2	489	0.05
Udi	69	2.7	1,374	54.0	438	17.3	82	3.2	581	22.8
Udmurts	27,590	7.6	192,332	52.8	1,342	0.4	2,460	0.7	14,003	38.7
Udegey	68	8.8	159	20.5	15	1.9	6	0.8	627	68.1
Uzbeks	30,811	0.6	2,256,907	43.7	179,057	3.5	16,191	0.3	3,680,395	8.1
Uighur	—	—	72,448	69.4	8,567	8.2	528	0.5	21,600	20.9
Ukrainians	3,245,011	11.7	16,106,973	58.2	109,407	0.4	26,830	0.1	8,203,680	2.6
Uch	61	6.6	186	20.2	9	1.0	19	2.1	648	7.1
Finn	—	—	15,457	32.2	4,284	8.9	882	1.8	27,348	5.7
French	—	—	293	45.0	83	12.7	10	1.5	265	4.0
Khakass	1,553	4.5	21,131	60.8	158	0.5	197	0.6	11,030	33.0
Khalkha Mongols	—	—	2,143	76.2	8	0.3	12	0.4	81	3.2
Khanty	234	3.4	2,619	38.4	11	0.2	36	0.5	3,978	5.8
Khorvat	—	—	257	42.3	39	6.4	8	1.3	303	49.0
Tsakhurs	70	1.6	1,572	37.0	1,881	44.2	67	1.5	668	15.0
Gypsies	6,420	3.8	106,266	63.1	18,390	10.9	1,117	0.7	30,318	21.6
Cherkess	301	1.5	15,459	78.5	141	0.7	264	1.3	3,831	1.9
Czechs	—	—	4,194	38.5	2,000	18.3	86	0.8	4,627	43.4
Chechen	1,308	0.5	217,031	81.1	854	0.3	1,158	0.4	4,283	1.1
Chuvans	44	5.3	182	21.8	13	1.6	29	3.5	866	20.0
Chuvash	66,705	7.1	559,679	59.8	3,177	0.3	6,966	0.7	1,000,000	1.0
Chukchi	125	5.7	971	44.6	4	0.2	9	0.4	1,067	4.7
Shors	888	7.2	5,997	48.8	42	0.3	88	0.7	5,778	4.7
Evenk	236	3.8	2,985	47.6	18	0.3	258	4.1	2,775	44.7
Even	140	3.2	2,048	46.9	11	0.3	281	6.4	1,889	43.7
Entsy	10	11.1	37	41.1	1	1.1	—	—	42	4.0
Eskimoes	24	6.0	129	32.3	—	—	5	1.3	241	60.4
Estonians	10,764	1.7	246,362	40.0	2,577	0.4	1,013	0.2	355,684	5.7
Yukaghir	30	6.9	149	34.1	—	—	26	5.9	232	53.1
Yakuts	3,739	3.5	77,579	72.7	162	0.2	172	0.2	28,078	24.8
Japanese	—	—	206	38.9	12	2.3	7	1.3	308	57.8
Other nationalities	90	0.9	5,704	59.9	448	4.7	155	1.6	3,125	32.8
Nationality not indicated	—	—	937	5.7	167	1.0	129	0.8	15,113	92.8
Total	5,179,780	2.8	41,007,869	21.8	6,245,255	3.3	532,597	0.3	134,780,227	71.8

Native Languages in Capital Cities

[Text] Such Many-Sided Capitals....

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[Statistical summary of native languages in capital cities,  
based on 1989 Census: "Such Many-Sided Capitals..."]

Inhabitants of the Capitals of the Union Republics Who Named the Language of Their Nationality as Their Native Language. (According to Data of the 1989 Census)

Peoples	Moscow		Kirov		Minsk		Tashkent		Alma-Ata		Tbilisi		Baku	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Abkhazs	100	69.9	2	28.6	1	25.0	8	66.7	—	—	5	83.3	17	85
Abkhaz	844	66.1	47	52.2	25	45.5	24	58.5	14	70.0	288	71.1	26	100.0
Avar	1,282	76.6	119	42.0	19	48.7	150	71.1	171	72.0	93	80.9	366	67.5
Austrians	20	28.6	—	—	—	—	1	11.1	2	80.0	—	—	—	—
Agos	6	66.7	—	—	1	6.7	2	66.7	2	66.7	8	88.9	56	94.8
Adyges	324	66.4	25	58.1	17	48.6	13	50.0	9	42.9	33	62.3	29	64.4
Assyrians	15,021	73.6	1,833	66.8	617	58.0	7,157	74.8	4,125	82.2	15,128	84.2	721,298	98.1
Azerbaijans	18	50.0	8	47.1	—	—	2	33.3	3	23.1	—	—	3	100.0
Azards	108	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Altas	41	48.8	4	30.8	1	20.0	36	46.7	45	44.6	5	62.5	3	42.9
Americians	46	78.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	75.0	—	—
English	68	78.6	8	88.9	—	—	1	28.6	11	80.0	1	33.3	—	—
Arabs	44	82.9	667	88.1	44	59.5	261	85.0	22	95.7	44	81.5	237	96
Armenians	18,584	42.7	1,661	36.8	721	42.4	10,700	52.2	1,458	57.3	110,485	76.9	47,521	66.9
Assyrians	466	46.0	155	36.5	7	41.2	26	33.3	181	67.3	1,283	46.6	36	46.3
Aghans	163	62.0	144	84.7	—	—	225	80.8	—	—	11	57.9	41	100.0
Bashkars	256	64.8	15	53.6	6	85.7	30	56.6	300	75.6	60	69.0	13	100.0
Bashkars	2,706	51.1	144	47.9	96	39.5	4,962	64.0	624	58.9	64	54.7	106	80.2
Ber...	24,225	34.1	7,805	31.0	703,407	61.6	4,372	40.9	2,540	34.1	878	40.4	1,478	52.2
Bulgarians	—	—	1	3.0	—	—	167	8	8	—	25	—	—	—
Bulgarians	1,580	60.5	593	45.7	92	34.6	201	36.3	152	36.5	49	33.8	52	38.5
Bulgars	837	56.6	44	43.1	13	36.1	136	63.1	170	54.0	70	43.5	28	43.8
Hungarians	582	75	289	66.8	26	56.5	37	46.7	8	6	36	32	25	46.3
Upps	6	84.3	—	—	17	50.0	1	100.0	2	100.0	9	75	—	—
Upps...	44	99.2	194	91.5	14	87.4	191	96.5	—	—	8	80.0	106	100.0
Gongauz	204	59.1	94	50.0	16	48.5	23	56.1	18	37.5	9	30.0	34	75.6
Dur...	8	48.4	—	—	—	—	—	6	46.2	1	25.0	—	—	—
Gomiks	875	24.7	126	13.6	40	19.0	2,506	49.2	1,187	46.3	10,280	47.3	76	23.5
Georgians	12,151	62.5	884	45.5	495	55.8	960	56.2	572	66.6	816,718	99.5	1,223	49.7
Dargins	675	76.9	56	63.6	27	64.3	249	78.8	46	69.7	46	69.7	347	81.1
Dargan	2	40.0	15	—	8	—	8	62.5	—	—	—	—	—	—
Dargans	44	66.7	3	60.0	5	71.4	384	77.3	1,856	80.7	4	80.0	1	50.0
Jews	6,525	5.5	4,685	4.7	2,130	5.5	8,625	20.0	1,436	18.9	878	12.9	6,526	32.4
Mountain Jews	628	81.6	3	21.4	1	5.6	41	44.1	28	77.8	13	36	368	57.7
Georgian Jews	61	70.1	—	—	—	—	8	44.4	47	63.5	6,118	92.1	9	50.0
Georgians	29	36.7	3	7.1	—	—	4,805	57.7	26	22.7	3	10.0	17	56.7
Georgians	2	80.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	50.0	—	—	2	100.0
Ingush	534	78.2	16	84.2	16	80.0	88	73.3	2,546	89.5	27	81.8	23	79.3
Spaniards	615	50.6	39	41.5	13	36.1	8	38.1	—	—	26	40.6	20	64.5
Italians	175	73.4	1	7.1	4	44.4	6	27.3	—	—	2	25.0	—	—



**Inhabitants of the Capitals of the Union Republics Who Named the Language of Their Nationality as Their Native Language. (According to Data of the 1989 Census) (Continued)**

Peoples	Moscow		Kiev		Minsk		Tashkent		Alma Ata		Tbilisi		Baku	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Belarusians	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kabards	873	69.2	51	58.6	11	36.7	83	49.1	45	—	—	—	—	—
Kazakhs	6,202	76.2	687	71.0	248	49.0	25,679	85.1	240,185	95.6	714	95.3	47	83.3
Kalmuks	475	64.1	41	73.2	13	61.9	60	55.6	77	52.7	15	44.4	16	8
Karaim	17	6.0	2	3.1	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Karakalpaks	283	70.6	32	78.0	4	33.3	3,186	89.1	115	66.5	9	42.9	4	—
Karachays	483	79.3	20	57.1	4	50.8	88	68.8	—	—	—	—	—	—
Karelians	328	27.2	19	15.4	24	20.2	17	34.7	13	27.1	4	—	—	—
Ket	1	33.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kirghiz	2,655	88.8	133	77.8	128	85.3	2,273	85.4	1,344	89.7	37	67.3	108	85.3
Chinese	157	42.7	13	21.7	1	10.0	84	34.4	165	30.6	16	87.1	8	85.3
Komi	455	40.6	54	29.5	47	32.0	50	42.0	80	65.0	12	54.5	—	—
Komi-Permyaks	117	36.9	—	—	—	—	8	9	—	—	—	—	—	—
Koreans	941	25.8	80	26.1	39	18.4	20,957	47.8	8,246	51.4	18	48.6	25	33.8
Koryaks	2	25.0	4	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Krymchaks	10	22.7	—	—	—	—	3	30.0	6	38.5	—	—	—	—
Cubans	477	79.9	230	80.1	4	14.8	142	86.1	22	84.6	—	—	154	67
Kumys	494	69.1	29	58.0	24	68.6	70	73.7	16	39.0	24	88.9	—	—
Kurds	123	59.1	21	67.7	7	30.4	33	42.9	430	80.4	22	87	16	63.3
Lak	592	65.4	55	37.9	26	66.7	434	85.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Latvians	1,328	34.7	171	29.7	174	36.6	173	39.1	104	30.7	67	31.6	80	44.6
Lezgins	1,638	68.3	131	48.9	64	54.2	280	60.7	130	58.3	77	45.3	19,193	4.6
Liss	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lithuanians	1,919	60.5	353	53.5	418	47.8	283	59.5	238	57.7	244	69.2	19	57.8
Mansi	—	—	3	16.7	1	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Mari	1,394	57.0	69.0	39.7	42	32.1	384	58.4	162	58.5	31	53.4	64	64.6
Moldavians (Moldovans)	4,166	62.2	1,827	57.6	430	53.0	857	59.6	533	55.4	650	72.5	46	63.4
Mordvians	16,598	54.7	119	20.9	100	23.0	1,477	43.1	718	43.7	23	28.8	11	38.8
Nanay	13	52.0	—	—	1	14.3	1	25.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Peoples of India and Pakistan	142	63.7	32	84.2	2	[illegible]	275	97.2	—	—	48	60.8	—	83.3
Nganasans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Negidals	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germanians	1,355	29.5	142	18.0	50	12.4	1,834	30.7	9,375	47.3	127	27.5	134	35.4
Nenets	5	23.8	2	11.8	2	50.0	4	50.0	4	100.0	—	—	—	—
Noxkh	2	66.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nogays	8	72.7	1	[?]	3	37.5	12	52.2	9	47.4	5	41.7	14	46.7
Oroks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oroch	1	100.0	3	42.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	—	—
Ossetians	3,940	54.7	224	44.0	92	40.5	833	59.5	230	52.8	18,860	56.9	469	49.6
Iranians (Persians)	47	37.6	8	23.5	86	80.4	276	39.5	33	52.4	16	38.1	—	—
Poles	1,363	20.0	930	8.9	901	4.9	207	16.1	269	18.0	154	15.1	99	23.0
Romanians	128	48.7	97	40.1	5	18.5	17	38.6	14	58.3	7	38.9	30	88.7
Russians	775,393	100.0	527,879	98.7	311,917	98.6	699,075	100.0	660,203	100.0	122,683	98.3	213,610	99.9
Rutuls	23	79.3	5	41.7	2	100.0	16	100.0	4	100.0	9	64.3	28	68.1
Saam (Lapps)	—	—	1	25.0	—	—	—	—	4	100.0	—	—	—	—
Selkup	1	50.0	—	—	—	—	2	100.0	1	33.3	1	50.0	—	—
Serbs	161	71.6	25	30.9	—	—	5	35.7	12	46.2	4	16.7	1	33.3

**Inhabitants of the Capitals of the Union Republics Who Named the Language of Their Nationality as Their Native Language. (According to Data of the 1989 Census) (Continued)**

Peoples	Moscow		Kiev		Minsk		Tashkent		Alma-Ata		Tbilisi		Baku	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Slovaks	125	78.6	19	37.3	2	20.0	10	83.3	—	—	19	79.2	1	50.0
Tatars	25	75.8	27	79.4	13	61.9	51	73.9	20	62.5	4	57.1	201	69.3
Tajiks	2,057	71.7	344	70.9	135	62.8	11,024	74.6	626	80.5	391	81.5	358	83.1
Talysh	10	58.8	—	—	3	42.9	1	50.0	—	—	1	100.0	135	67.2
Tatars	97,931	63.1	14,777	34.1	656	23.4	96,345	74.8	18,450	67.8	691	52.0	9,217	66.3
Crimmean Tatars	155	64.9	29	34.1	13	43.3	11,615	88.1	373	86.1	16	26.2	148	63.5
Tats	574	44.9	4	21.1	6	40.0	34	40.0	10	90.9	9	60.0	4,090	51.4
Totalians	1	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tuvians	131	67.5	9	40.9	—	—	5	45.5	8	88.9	1	33.3	—	—
Turks	58	43.3	11	35.5	3	21.4	671	70.9	707	82.3	21	67.7	153	57.7
Turkmen	1,315	72.7	281	73.9	236	81.7	2,163	79.3	305	75.9	77	83.7	116	74.4
Uds	16	61.5	4	80.0	—	—	2	50.0	9	100.0	1	50.0	123	56.4
Udmurts	1,096	43.4	70	27.0	47	29.6	245	47.1	189	42.8	6	23.1	16	29.1
Udeges	8	66.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	100.0	—	—	—	—
Uzbeks	6,959	76.4	1,260	73.0	428	67.9	889,930	98.0	3,511	70.3	298	76.8	440	80.1
Uighur	99	62.3	8	47.1	7	50.0	7,972	72.1	37,605	92.0	12	85.7	—	—
Ukrainians	95,764	38.7	457,914	78.7	16,674	32.6	25,804	43.1	17,999	39.6	6,842	42.6	7,735	56.3
Uch	1	10.0	1	11.1	1	100.0	—	—	1	50.0	—	—	—	—
Finns	154	33.3	15	19.2	13	28.3	18	31.0	40	53.3	11	47.8	2	11.8
French	82	70.1	16	72.7	3	50.0	3	42.9	8	80.0	6	27.3	5	62.5
Khakass	88	28.1	2	18.2	6	46.2	83	66.9	74	59.2	—	—	5	29.4
Khalika Mongols	276	92.3	73	92.4	8	100.0	105	94.6	24	70.6	8	100.0	2	100.0
Khants	3	21.4	—	—	—	—	2	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Khorsat	30	55.6	10	76.9	1	20.0	3	60.0	1	25.0	—	—	2	40.0
Isakhurs	36	66.7	8	38.1	—	—	10	100.0	1	100.0	—	—	62	64.6
Gypsies	685	33.8	143	52.2	1,132	82.7	628	81.2	333	87.2	27	54.0	21	56.8
Chekeress	215	58.4	10	35.7	2	22.2	20	48.8	15	44.1	9	28.1	19	51.4
Czechs	401	67.3	132	22.4	7	18.9	11	24.4	9	16.4	4	6.6	4	50.0
Chechen	1,615	77.4	89	56.3	6	19.4	164	64.1	1,770	85.8	111	77.1	115	72.8
Chuvans	—	—	2	66.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Chuvash	10,454	57.9	232	32.9	179	30.7	1,616	52.1	425	45.3	41	43.6	95	51.4
Chukchi	8	66.7	2	13.3	—	—	—	—	2	66.7	—	—	—	—
Shors	5	18.5	—	—	1	100.0	30	52.6	9	37.5	—	—	—	—
Esenk	—	—	4	12.5	—	—	2	66.7	2	40.0	—	—	1	100.0
Esen	1	50.0	—	—	1	33.3	1	33.3	3	75.00	—	—	—	—
Entsy	2	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eskimos	4	80.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Estonians	683	38.5	99	29.2	53	27.0	110	42.3	88	34.6	301	63.5	85	45.7
Yukaghir	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Yakuts	466	61.6	25	33.8	8	40.0	40	67.8	33	53.2	5	71.4	2	50.0
Japanese	35	70.0	2	66.7	—	—	1	50.0	1	100.0	3	33.3	—	—
Other Nationalities	—	—	899	74.9	103	46.6	649	69.9	12	80.0	118	39.9	—	—
Nationality not indicated	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	141,893	93.8	116,003	78.8	104,467	65.9	854,809	90.3	623,205	91.6	134,435	91.3	106,581	91.3

## Such Many-Sided Capitals....[Continued]

Inhabitants of the Capitals of the Union Republics Who Named the Language of Their Nationality as Their Native Language. (According to Data of the 1989 Census)

Peoples	Vladivostok		Kishinev		Riga		Frunze		Dushanbe		Yerevan		Ashkhabad		Tallinn	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Abazins	1	100.0	1	100.0	8	72.7	2	100.0	—	—	2	66.7	2	40.0	1	20.0
Abkhaz	2	20.0	14	58.3	19	46.3	3	50.0	13	50.0	34	97.1	7	46.7	10	76.9
Avar	8	80.0	27	57.4	18	52.9	45	54.9	68	77.3	7	100.0	71	57.3	29	74.4
Austrians	—	—	—	—	1	50.0	2	66.7	—	—	3	100.0	1	100.0	—	—
Agul	—	—	1	33.3	1	100.0	2	66.7	20	100.0	3	100.0	1	100.0	—	—
Adygey	3	100.0	11	57.9	8	50.0	23	74.2	17	89.5	11	57.9	8	72.7	9	90.0
Azerbaijani	292	72.5	529	69.0	1,067	73.4	1,743	80.9	1,202	69.8	797	90.7	6,825	69.0	548	72.3
Albanians	—	—	18	38.3	1	33.3	—	—	7	77.8	2	50.0	—	—	—	—
Aleuts	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Altay	1	100.0	1	8.3	6	75.0	30	71.4	14	45.2	—	—	1	100.0	7	87.5
Americans	—	—	1	25.0	—	—	—	—	1	33.3	—	—	—	—	—	—
English	—	—	1	25.0	1	25.0	—	—	1	100.0	1	100.0	—	—	—	—
Arabs	4	57.1	16	100.0	12	70.6	27	75.0	14	31.1	51	100.0	1	50.0	8	80.0
Armenians	388	55.5	516	44.6	1,077	52.2	679	55.7	2,281	60.01	1,082,153	99.6	11,261	61.8	487	50.1
Assyrians	—	—	1	20.0	2	22.2	9	56.2	7	28.0	262	53.3	2	20.0	—	—
Afghans	12	100.0	4	50.0	6	75.0	200	59.7	7	100.0	15	88.2	—	—	—	—
Balkars	1	100.0	5	62.5	10	71.4	127	59.9	5	55.6	144	100.0	10	66.7	6	100.0
Bashkirs	56	62.9	62	37.3	138	48.4	369	54.3	1,488	62.9	52	89.7	326	57.8	83	46.4
Belorussians	11,295	37.3	2,019	33.0	13,282	30.4	1,352	33.0	1,369	42.5	290	72.0	819	39.3	3,924	31.4
Beluchi	—	—	5	38.5	1	100.0	1	50.0	2	20.0	—	—	28	78.0	—	—
Bulgarians (Bolgari)	39	47.6	4,132	47.1	83	33.5	70	32.7	244	36.6	27	65.9	91	59.1	40	31.5
Buryats	2	33.3	15	55.6	37	55.2	42	48.8	39	65.0	29	82.9	13	65.0	14	51.9
Hungarians	12	46.2	46	53.5	68	55.7	8	34.8	3	27.3	15	65.2	1	50.0	57	57.6
Veps	—	—	6	100.0	3	60.0	—	—	1	50.0	—	—	—	—	1	11.1
Vietnamese	12	75.0	6	100.0	—	—	1	33.3	3	100	—	—	2	100.0	—	—
Gagauz	4	66.7	3,436	59.2	29	48.3	8	53.3	9	50.0	4	50.0	21	75.0	29	52.7
Dutch	—	—	—	—	1	20.0	4	19.0	2	100.0	5	83.3	—	—	2	40.0
Greeks	13	18.1	28	11.8	29	14.4	181	38.3	73	22.2	552	54.9	56	33.9	20	23.0
Georgians	163	62.0	248	51.6	482	56.6	218	60.2	299	48.3	513	76.1	218	48.8	163	53.4
Dargins	9	75.0	9	90.0	17	60.7	604	95.3	164	84.1	177	97.8	344	81.3	24	100.0
Dolgan	—	—	1	100.0	1	100.0	2	50	3	50.0	1	50.0	1	50.0	—	—
Dungans	—	—	—	—	—	—	2,322	89.2	12	80.0	1	100.0	1	33.3	—	—
Jews	3,400	37.3	7,901	22.2	4,261	22.7	764	15.9	1,270	16.1	134	24.4	84	9.8	483	13.3
Mountain Jews	15	46.9	6	15.4	—	—	16	55.2	17	16.0	2	20.0	2	9.1	2	20.0
Georgian Jews	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	25.0	—	—	—	—	1	11.1	1	33.3
Central Asian Jews	8	66.7	—	—	—	—	145	46.8	2,663	63.9	5	38.5	6	37.5	—	—
Izhora	—	—	—	—	1	33.3	—	—	1	16.7	2	100.0	—	—	8	21.1
Ingush	9	64.3	7	46.7	4	36.4	318	83.5	22	68.8	3	100.0	17	81.0	9	81.8
Spaniards	1	14.3	10	58.8	11	32.4	—	—	—	—	10	100.0	1	50.0	2	25.0
Italians	4	50.0	1	14.3	2	25.0	2	40.0	7	46.7	9	52.9	—	—	—	—
Itelmen	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kabards	10	100.0	12	54.5	21	60.0	34	66.7	67	59.3	4	40.0	35	54.7	12	46.2
Kazakhs	268	88.1	201	64.0	302	67.3	7,391	83.1	737	66.8	239	94.5	2,225	85.3	226	86.6
Kalmyks	10	76.9	6	37.5	9	37.5	60	27.5	21	65.6	2	66.7	22	68.8	9	47.4
Karam	119	77.3	2	13.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	100.0	1	100.0	—	—
Karakalpak	33	89.2	19	86.4	1	20.0	31	54.4	15	48.4	31	96.9	25	53.2	—	—
Karachay	4	100.0	13	50.0	8	61.5	208	69.6	5	26.3	4	80.0	4	44.4	7	63.6

**Inhabitants of the Capitals of the Union Republics Who Named the Language of Their Nationality as Their Native Language. (According to Data of the 1989 Census) (Continued)**

Peoples	Vilnius		Kishinev		Riga		Frunze		Dushanbe		Yerevan		Ashkhabad		Tallinn	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Karelians	11	35.5	17	31.5	64	31.4	9	39.1	2	66.7	—	—	2	22.2	95	36.0
Ket	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kirghiz	17	89.5	96	88.9	84	82.4	135,560	97.9	857	87.9	25	78.1	158	90.8	38	73.1
Chinese	2	40.0	3	17.6	1	25.0	85	35.3	9	36.0	4	80.0	2	16.7	—	—
Komi	14	60.9	13	26.0	83	40.7	53	56.4	47	61.0	5	83.3	13	48.1	32	41.0
Komi-Permyaks	—	—	5	23.8	3	25.0	14	45.2	8	44.4	—	—	2	28.6	5	26.3
Koreans	14	38.9	18	17.8	27	19.3	5,299	53.2	3,563	54.0	11	61.1	110	28.4	15	15.6
Koryak	—	—	3	100.0	—	—	1	33.3	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	—	—
Krymchaks	—	—	4	40.0	—	—	1	50.0	10	76.9	6	100.0	—	—	—	—
Cubans	16	88.9	4	44.4	18	69.2	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	1	100.0	—	—
Kumyk	7	70.0	11	57.9	13	56.5	22	66.7	37	68.5	1	100.0	44	86.3	13	72.2
Kurds	1	50.0	2	50.0	1	20.0	40	74.1	17	50.0	4,818	74.2	618	55.2	2	50.0
Lak	7	77.8	6	37.5	12	57.1	129	81.6	643	84.5	4	100.0	738	76.5	26	76.5
Latvians	368	62.9	57	38.3	318,330	95.9	60	34.1	58	45.3	70	82.4	106	58.6	590	57.2
Lezgins	8	47.1	39	54.9	100	62.1	182	70.3	84	61.3	24	82.8	625	74.1	72	71.3
Livs	—	—	—	—	16	51.6	—	—	1	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lithuanians	287,782	98.7	129	59.4	4,320	61.6	116	57.7	106	48.6	109	95.5	40	53.3	673	54.0
Mansi	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	2	33.3	16	100.0	1	100.0	—	—
Mari	27	47.4	56	48.7	105	51.5	75	50.0	114	72.6	14	77.8	26	38.8	67	48.2
Moldavians (Moldoven)	296	75.5	285,886	87.9	752	63.5	293	52.1	342	68.0	122	62.6	241	56.3	372	58.3
Mordvinians	39	35.8	86	31.7	144	34.2	421	37.5	1,352	44.9	269	67.9	329	42.7	142	40.2
Nanay	—	—	2	66.7	1	100.0	1	50.0	—	—	—	—	1	25.0	2	33.3
Peoples of India and Pakistan	—	—	1	12.5	—	—	7	70.0	3	25.0	43	100.0	2	66.7	—	—
Nganasan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100.0
Negidals	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Germans	81	31.2	112	17.3	322	30.6	5,672	43.1	7,048	51.5	60	47.6	189	25.4	145	28.1
Nenets	—	—	—	—	2	33.3	1	100.0	5	45.5	—	—	5	83.3	1	20.0
Nivkh	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nogay	1	33.3	1	50.0	6	66.7	10	66.7	10	83.3	2	100.0	7	31.8	2	66.7
Oroks	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oroch	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ossetians	41	49.4	96	45.1	163	49.1	135	51.9	3,519	74.2	168	87.5	546	67.1	42	40.0
Iranians (Persians)	1	20.0	1	20.0	—	—	19	32.8	102	36.6	4	80.0	246	44.2	—	—
Poles	90,744	83.8	106	10.2	4,432	26.6	51	10.5	52	13.9	57	38.3	42	16.9	271	21.9
Romanians	2	25.0	326	38.0	31	44.3	2	15.4	12	57.1	10	55.6	129,450	100.0	195,874	99.3
Russians	114,681	98.3	173,571	99.4	427,828	99.4	340,624	99.9	194,260	99.9	21,302	97.9	129,450	100.0	195,874	99.3
Rutuls	2	100.0	3	50.0	—	—	1	50.0	2	100.0	7	70.0	1	100.0	—	—
Saam (Lapps)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Selkup	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Serbs	5	45.5	6	25.0	6	35.3	—	—	—	—	4	57.1	—	—	1	10.0
Slovaks	3	60.0	4	50.0	5	41.7	29	60.4	—	—	—	—	1	50.0	—	—
Tahasaran	3	100.0	5	100.0	1	33.3	6	100.0	10	100.0	3	75.0	39	73.6	5	71.4
Tajiks	273	94.1	135	76.7	162	77.1	572	80.8	219,413	96.8	75	96.2	277	77.2	36	66.7
Talysh	—	—	—	—	2	66.7	—	—	1	33.3	9	100.0	1	50.0	—	—
Tatars	430	32.8	450	40.4	1,194	46.7	11,785	70.1	17,736	72.3	113	54.3	4,359	60.8	1,124	56.9
Crimean Tatars	4	57.1	11	47.8	17	85.0	134	78.8	527	87.0	6	66.7	4	80.0	1	20.0

**Inhabitants of the Capitals of the Union Republics Who Named the Language of Their Nationality as Their Native Language. (According to Data of the 1989 Census) (Continued)**

	Vilnius		Kishinev		Riga		Frunze		Dushanbe		Yerevan		Ashkhabad		Tallinn		
Peoples	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	
Tats	—	—	11	34.4	8	44.4	1	100.0	30	71.4	3	33.3	2	40.0	11	61.1	
Totalars	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Tuvimians	—	—	2	40.0	9	90.0	15	78.9	4	50.0	3	100.0	1	100.0	1	50.0	
Turks	2	40.0	1	12.5	826	91.2	17	51.5	3	50.0	19	35.8	8	50.0	—	—	
Turkmen	83	89.2	79	74.5	128	90.8	311	85.4	557	76.1	32	88.9	195	155	96.2	33	78.6
Udy	—	—	1	100.0	11	73.3	—	—	22	78.6	1	16.7	15	48.4	—	—	
Udmurts	14	48.3	60	40.3	75	37.3	54	33.1	116	49.8	8	50.0	37	46.2	58	45.0	
Udeges	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Uzbeks	828	93.7	377	77.3	283	66.0	8451	82.0	56582	90.3	84	79.2	2606	68.3	221	73.2	
Uighur	5	100.0	5	35.7	5	45.5	9897	91.5	104	37.0	—	—	[?]7	45.8	8	72.7	
Ukrainians	5761	43.3	38426	40.8	19368	44.4	10464	30.9	9584	45.1	2352	62.8	4390	40.1	9587	41.9	
Uch	—	—	1	25.0	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	—	—	
Finns	19	30.6	5	17.9	46	25.3	43	78.2	12	28.6	4	36.4	1	33.3	981	30.0	
French	7	77.8	2	66.7	1	16.7	—	—	—	—	3	75.0	—	—	1	25.0	
Khakass	—	—	4	25.0	6	46.2	104	63.4	33	64.7	3	60.0	9	56.2	5	45.5	
Khalka-Mongols	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	4	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Khants	—	—	2	28.6	2	50.0	1	33.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	100.0	
Khorvat	2	40.0	2	40.0	2	40.0	3	60.0	—	—	1	100.0	2	66.7	—	—	
Tsakhurs	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	100.0	6	100.0	—	—	
Gypsies	481	85.3	250	60.7	879	79.3	164	81.2	215	82.4	16	69.6	13	32.5	47	44.3	
Cherkess	4	57.1	3	33.3	8	42.1	13	38.2	18	72.0	4	80.0	20	60.6	10	71.4	
Czechs	7	28.0	16	19.3	19	35.2	17	25.8	3	15.8	2	15.4	3	20.0	3	17.6	
Chechen	27	90.0	30	46.9	34	61.8	270	74.6	24	58.5	43	86.0	49	57.6	11	68.8	
Chuvans	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	50.0	4	66.7	1	100.0	2	22.2	—	—	
Chuvash	83	49.1	109	30.8	339	47.6	214	39.8	542	53.0	60	85.7	239	49.9	233	50.8	
Chukchi	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	2	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Shors	—	—	—	—	—	9	50.0	14	63.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Evenk	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	66.7	1	100.0	1	100.0	—	—	—	—	
Even	1	100.0	—	—	2	66.7	1	100.0	2	50.0	—	—	2	100.0	—	—	
Entsy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Eskimoes	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	
Estonians	107	53.2	34	35.4	498	41.2	56	38.4	20	27.4	5	20.8	26	72.2	223,074	98.2	
Yukaghir	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	
Yakuts	2	40.0	8	34.8	55	60.4	13	48.1	17	43.6	—	—	5	83.3	12	63.2	
Japanese	—	—	1	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Other Nationalities	3	27.3	131	79.4	2	66.7	17	14.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Nationality not indicated	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Total	518,464	89.9	520,112	78.6	801,055	88.0	549,207	90.0	510,264	89.5	115,776	99.1	363,422	91.0	440,209	91.9	

**USSR Law on Freedom of Conscience, Religious Organizations Amended**

91UN18714 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Jun 91  
Union Edition p 2

[Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "On Changes in, and Additions to, the USSR Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

In Article 14 of the USSR Law of 1 October 1990 "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" (VEDOMOSTY SYEZDA NARODNYKH DEPUTATOV SSSR I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA SSSR, 1990, No. 41, p. 813):

—in part one, to replace the words "to the executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet of people's deputies" and "Executive Committee," respectively, with the words "for registration in the organs of justice of



the executive and administrative organ of the local soviet of people's deputies, or—in republics not divided into oblasts—in the Ministry of Justice" and "Organ of Justice;"

—in part two, replace the words "executive committee of the local soviet of people's deputies" with words "organ of justice;"

—in part three, to replace the words "executive committee of the rayon (city) soviet of people's deputies" and "Executive Committee," respectively, with the words "organ of justice of the executive and administrative organ of the local soviet of people's deputies, or—in republics not divided into oblasts—in the Ministry of Justice" and "Organ of Justice;"

—to add, after part three, a new part with the following content:

"Religious associations that consist of religious organizations operating on the territory of two or more Union republics have a right to present their Rules (charter) for registration in the USSR Ministry of Justice, which in such cases considers it and makes a decision within one month;"

—consider part four of the article as part five, and add the words "operating on their territory" to it.

M. Gorbachev, president,  
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Moscow, the Kremlin, 4 June 1991.

Growth, Listing of Ukrainian Religious Associations

91P50217A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian  
6 Apr 91 p 2

[Text]

Religious Congregations in the Ukrainian SSR	
Name of Group	No. of Registered Religious Organizations as of 1 Jan 91
Ukrainian Orthodox Church	5,301
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church	811
Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church	1,912
Roman Catholic Church	313
Armenian Church	3
Lutheran Church	2
Methodist Church	1
Reform Church	90
Old Believers	57
Muslims	14
Jews	23
Evangelical Christians	1
Evangelical Christians-Baptists	1,059
Pentecostals	453
Seventh Day Adventists	210
Seventh Day Christians	2

Molokans	5
Krishnas	4
Apocalyptic Church	1
Church of the Whole Gospel	1
Charismatic Church	1
Reform Adventists	0
Jehovah's Witnesses	0

Religious Organizations in the Ukrainian SSR by Oblast (Comparative Data) As of 1 Jan 1991

Oblast	1988	1991	Change from 1988 to 1991
Vinnitsa	409	601	+192
Volyn	267	492	+225
Dnipropetrovsk	66	118	+52
Donetsk	171	233	+62
Zhitomir	226	361	+135
Transcarpathian	606	809	+203
Zaporozhe	48	88	+40
Ivano-Frankovsk	347	645	+298
Kiev	193	295	+102
City of Kiev	19	39	+20
Kirovograd	78	114	+36
Crimean	39	86	+47
Lugansk	89	130	+41
Lvov	645	1,833	+1,188
Nikolayev	67	96	+29
Odessa	178	293	+115
Poltava	74	109	+35
Rovno	420	618	+198
Sumy	143	183	+40
Ternopol	543	1,080	+537
Kharkov	112	145	+33
Kherson	58	85	+27
Khmelnitskiy	232	546	+314
Cherkassy	148	239	+91
Chernigov	148	237	+89
Chernovtsy	363	519	+156
Total	5,689	9,994	+4,164
			(42.2 growth)

Cabinet Increases Student Grants

91US0524A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
23 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Unattributed article: "On the Monetary Support of Student Youth"]

[Text] In recent days, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers considered a number of questions on further increase in student youth's social guarantees, and passed the decrees: "On the Stipendiary Support of Certain Categories of Student Youth" and "On Additional Measures for the Monetary Support of Student Youth in Connection With the Reform of Retail Prices."

The USSR State Committee for Public Education's recommendations on increasing the amounts of the stipends in higher educational institutions and their fixing at the rates of 150 rubles [R] per month for satisfactory students, R170 per month for those having only good or only good and excellent grades, and R190 per month for those with only excellent grades are adopted.

The current amounts of the stipends for foreign citizens studying in our country are increased to R40 to R60 per month, depending on the type of educational institution.

The stipend is set at the rate of R210 per month for Hero-of-the-Soviet-Union and Hero-of-Socialist-Labor students of higher or pupils of secondary specialized educational institutions studying with job separation.

The following increased commemorative scholarship rates are established: the imeni [commemorative of] V.I. Lenin and imeni Karl Marx scholarships for undergraduate students of higher educational institutions—R210 per month—and for graduate students of higher educational institutions and scientific research establishments—R260 per month;

the imeni Outstanding Figures of Science, Technology, and Culture scholarship instituted by USSR Government decrees for undergraduate students of higher educational institutions—R200 per month;

the imeni V.I. Lenin scholarship for pupils of secondary specialized educational institutions—R180 per month.

The compensation payments in connection with the increase in retail prices are extended to pupils of general education day schools older than age 18. An allowance in the amount of R50 per month is established, using the educational institution's funds, for the students of higher and pupils of secondary specialized educational institutions who are on academic vacation on the basis of medical certifications.

Provision is made for additional measures to improve student youth's nutritional and monetary support; for example:

a threefold increase in the monetary outlay norms for food in the boarding schools and other educational institutions under Union management;

the allocation of funds to the Union ministries and departments having educational institutions to compensate the rise in the cost of food in 1991, considering it to be R1 per person per day during the academic year;

the retention of the current reduced transit fares for student and pupil youth during 1991. It is recommended that the republic governments and local Soviets of People's Deputies pass coordinated decrees on reducing the cost of transit to the level of the fares in effect before 2 April 1991 with respect to the children's organized departure on vacation.

The rectors of higher and directors of secondary specialized educational institutions are authorized to direct up to 1 percent of the stipendiary fund into providing monetary support to student youth. It is recommended that the republic governments and the ispolkoms [executive committees] of local Soviets of People's Deputies pass similar decrees for the educational institutions financed from republic and local budgets.

Per diems in the amount of R4 for each day are paid to the students of higher and pupils of secondary specialized educational institutions during the period of their undergoing production and training practice.

Certain other measures are outlined in the decree [sic] as well.

### Branch of Maryland University Opens In Irkutsk

91US05644 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by N. Savelyev: "An American Degree for Russian Brains: Maryland University Branch Opens in Irkutsk"]

[Text] Irkutsk—Would that I were 17 again! I would certainly enroll in the Russian-American department of management. For the first time in the Soviets' history, a department for training international-class management specialists is opening. And it is being opened not somewhere across the sea, but a 20-minute walk from the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA bureau. What it took Irkutsk University and the province leadership to do this is something I'll get into a little later. But right now, let me talk about the charms. Fifty lucky people will be enrolled in the first-year class. For the first two years they will study under a Soviet curriculum: English language, information science, sociology, social psychology. In their third and fourth years, American professors will take over those students who speak fluent English. Economic principles, business statistics, business, finance, international marketing—this is an incomplete list of the disciplines on the curriculum. The graduates will receive a bachelor's degree and diploma from Maryland University. In addition, they will also get a Soviet degree in "systems analysis and management."

The university will charge tuition. And on the average, an American degree costs between \$8,000 and \$10,000. And a no less important detail: A negligent student expelled for laziness, cutting classes, and so on will be required to refund the cost of his instruction. So there!

The idea of establishing the joint department was up in the air. As things stand, the forest, furs, and oil of Siberia are being traded for VCRs, Toyotas, and—forgive the naturalism—pants, both overalls and underwear. But all this can't go on indefinitely, for we're already scapping the bottom of the barrel. What comes next, when does it all end? A chance occurrence helped put the idea into effect. Two university administrators, one from the city of Irkutsk and one from the state of Maryland, met

somewhere in Japan. At the time, the American administrator was visiting his university's branch in Japan.

"Why don't you open such a branch in Irkutsk?" the Siberian suggested cautiously.

"No problem," the American answered.

But that "no problem" was there. Here it was a different story. Where would the foreign currency come from? Local enterprises resisted. Not a dollar. Much time was spent in an unsuccessful bid to persuade them. The province leadership got involved, sending out a touching bureaucratic letter and scraping up \$50,000. Nozhikov, chairman of the province Soviet executive committee, finding himself on the same plane as Silayev, and little later in the state of Maryland, pulled the letter from his pocket at just the right time. Silayev dashed off a resolution, and Russia will fork out \$300,000 to Irkutsk University. Take a dare, science! The money will be used to buy latest-generation computers, and invitations will be sent to decent professors with a reputation. Incidentally, the Americans have agreed to work for relatively unattractive rubles.

But nevertheless, nevertheless. Doubts began creeping into my mind—after all, I was born and have lived in the Union for 30 odd years.

"Won't it turn out that university graduates with American degrees will rush to go abroad, and our money will vanish?" I put this question to L.A. Platonov, first deputy chairman of the province Soviet executive committee.

"We're not afraid of that. Most will stay. But understand that we cannot do without our international-class specialists. Having dabblers in charge of things costs us much more. Here's just one example. Japan has a joint enterprise in Irkutsk province. Just who concluded the contract, some plotter or a dabbler, is not understood. But we are giving Japan 150,000 cubic meters of choice timber for a song. This is an example of how naivety is worse than stealing."

"I have other doubt, Lev Anatolyevich. Won't it turn out that the university's graduates will pursue a policy that benefits not Siberia, but the US?"

"We have long been a raw-materials appendage of the West. And we will remain so until we learn how to invest money and foreign currency in education and in education only, and not in nice clothes, VCRs, and trinkets. There is simply no other way.

People in Irkutsk understand this, but what about the rest of the country?

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**DATE FILMED**

19 July 1991